

CATO AND LÆLIUS:

OR,

ESSAYS

ON

OLD-AGE AND FRIENDSHIP:

BY

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO.

WITH

REMARKS,

By WILLIAM MELMOTH, Esq.

PROSIMUS, SI POSSUMUS, OTIOSI. Cic.

A NEW EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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
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L Æ L I U S:
OR, AN
ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP:

BY
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO.

*Sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis,
Nec, male necne, Lepos saltet; sed quod magis ad nos
Pertinet, et nescire malum est, agitamus. —* HOR.



1560/739.

L. E. L. U. I.

ESSAY ON THE HISTORY

MARCO TULLIO CICERO



TO THE
REV. MR. JOHN SKYNNER,
RECTOR OF EASTON,
IN THE COUNTY OF NORTHAMPTON,
THE FOLLOWING PAGES,
AS A SINCERE MEMORIAL,
OF ESTEEM AND FRIENDSHIP,
ARE INSCRIBED,
BY HIS
AFFECTIONATE RELATION,
WILLIAM MELMOTH.

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THE following Conference seems to have been drawn up with a particular view to the state of public affairs at the time it was written, as well as for the more general and extensive purpose of moral instruction; several passages evidently alluding to the very critical circumstances of the commonwealth at that period. It was published immediately after the assassination of JULIUS CÆSAR; when some of the most respectable partizans of that ambitious chief were indirectly endeavouring to turn the popular odium upon the cause and the persons of the conspirators, by the public honours they exhibited to his memory: a conduct which they attempted to justify by the duties of private friendship. At a conjuncture, therefore, when the restoration of the republic in some measure depended upon the notions that were entertained concerning those obligations; to ascertain the true principles of that connection, and mark out the just limits of its claims, was a design worthy of CICERO, no less in his patriotic than his philosophical character. Many of the antients, indeed, maintained very extra-

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vagant opinions upon those points: and for this reason, perhaps, it is, that there is scarcely a single ethic writer of eminence, during the philosophic ages of Greece (of whose works any account has been preserved) who does not appear to have discussed the question, as a necessary and important branch of his moral system. It is probable that the substance of what the most judicious of those philosophers had delivered, in relation to that inquiry, is wrought into the present performance: it is certain, at least, that CICERO has considerably availed himself of ARISTOTLE's dissertation inserted in his ethics; as he may be traced likewise in the few fragments that still remain of a discourse on the same topic, composed by THEOPHRASTUS. In fact, he hath so accurately sketched the principal outlines of his subject, as to have left little more to those, who might resume it after him, than to pursue his principles, extend his reasonings, and apply his maxims. Accordingly, Bishop TAYLOR in our own language, and the very ingenious Mons. SACY in the French (the only modern authors of distinction who have written treatises professedly on friendship) have added nothing essential to the admirable draught he has delineated.

LÆLIUS:

LÆLIUS:
OR, AN
ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP.

TO TITUS POMPONIUS ATTICUS.

QUINTUS MUCIUS, the Augur^a,
used to relate, in a very agreeable
manner, a variety of particulars
which he remembered concerning his
father-in-law, the *sage* Lælius, as he
constantly styled him. My father in-
troduced me to Mucius as soon as I
was invested with the manly robe; and

^a See Rem. on Cato, p. 249. Rem. 66.

he so strongly recommended him to my observance, that I never neglected any opportunity in my power of attending him. In consequence of this privilege, I had the advantage to hear him occasionally discuss several important topics, and throw out many judicious maxims, which I carefully treasured up in my mind; endeavouring to improve myself in wisdom and knowledge by the benefit of his enlightening observations. After his death, I attached myself in the same manner, and with the same views, to his relation Mucius Scævola, the chief pontiff: and I will venture to say, that in regard both to the powers of his mind and the integrity of his heart, Rome never produced a greater nor more respectable character.* But I shall take some other occasion to do justice to the merit of this excellent man: my present business is solely with the Augur.

As

As I was one day sitting with him and two or three of his intimate acquaintance in his semicircular apartment where he usually received company; among several other points, he fell into discourse upon an event which had lately happened, and was, as you well know, the general subject of conversation: for, you cannot but remember, (as you were much connected with one of the parties^b) that when Publius Sulpicius was Tribune and Quintus Pompeius Consul, the implacable animosity that broke out between them, after having lived together in the most affectionate union, was universally mentioned with concern and surprize. Mucius having casually touched upon this unexpected rupture, took occasion to relate to us the substance of a conference which Lælius formerly held with him and his other son-in-law,

^b Publius Sulpicius. See the Remarks, note 3.

Caius Fannius, a few days after the death of Scipio Africanus, upon the subject of friendship. As I perfectly well recollect the general purport of the relation he gave us, I have wrought it up, after my own manner, in the following essay. But that I might not encumber the dialogue with perpetually interposing *said I*, and *said he*, I have introduced the speakers themselves to the reader; by which means he may consider himself as a sort of party in the conference.

It turns on a subject upon which you have frequently pressed me to write my thoughts; and indeed, besides being peculiarly suitable to that intimacy which has so long subsisted between us, it is well worthy of being universally considered and understood. I have the more willingly, therefore, entered into the discussion you recommended, as it affords me an opportunity of rendering a general service, at the same time that

I am

ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP. 5

I am complying with your particular request.

In the treatise I lately inscribed to you on old-age, I represented the elder Cato as the principal speaker; being persuaded that no person could with more weight and propriety be introduced, as delivering his ideas in relation to that advanced state, than one who had so long flourished in it with unequalled spirit and vigour. In pursuance of the same principle; the memorable amity which, we are told, subsisted between Lælius and Scipio, rendered the former, I thought, a very suitable character to support a conversation on the subject of friendship: and the reasoning I have ascribed to him, is agreeable to those sentiments which Mucius informed us he expressed.

This kind of dialogue, where the question is agitated by illustrious personages of former ages, is apt, I know not

how, to make a stronger impression on the mind of the reader, than any other species of composition. This effect, at least, I have experienced in my own writings of that kind; as I have sometimes imagined, when I was revising the essay I lately inscribed to you, that Cato himself, and not your friend in his name, was the real speaker. As in that performance, it was one veteran addressing another on the article of old-age; so in the present, it is a friend explaining to a friend his notions concerning friendship. * In the former conference, Cato, who was distinguished among his contemporaries by his great age and superior wisdom, stands forth as the principal speaker: in this which I now present to you, Lælius, who was no less respected in the times in which he flourished, for his eminent virtues and faithful attachment to his friend, takes the lead in the discourse. I must request you, therefore, to turn your thoughts a while from the writer,

*

and

ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP. 7

and suppose yourself conversing with Lælius.

For this purpose you are to imagine Fannius and Mucius⁵ making a visit to their father-in-law, soon after the death of Scipio Africanus; and from that circumstance, giving occasion to Lælius⁶ to enter upon the subject in question. I will only add, that in contemplating the portrait of a true friend, as delineated in the following pages, you cannot be at a loss to discover your own.

ESSAY ON FRIDAY

and suppose yourself conversing with
Laelius, and

For this purpose you are to imagine
Fannius and Marcus, making a visit
to their father-in-law, soon after the
death of Cato the Africanus; and from
that circumstance, giving occasion to
Laelius to enter upon the subject in
question. I will only add, that in con-
templating the portrait of a true friend,
as delineated in the following pages,
you cannot but be led to discover your
own

and to reflect upon the
conduct of your own life, and to
consider the manner in which you
have spent your time, and to
be sensible of the value of time, and
of the necessity of improving it.

And as a friend, he has sustained
the great loss he has sustained.
When I say "by a very singular dis-
position," I am not ignorant that the
late Marcus Cato, in our own times, and
about Athens in the days of our

for
I am

F A N N I U S.

I AGREE with you entirely, Lælius; no man ever possessed more amiable or more illustrious virtues than Scipio Africanus.⁷ Nevertheless, let me intreat you to remember, that the public eye is particularly turned towards you upon the present occasion, and extremely attentive to observe how Lælius, the *sage* Lælius, (as, by a very singular distinction you are universally both called and acknowledged) behaves under the great loss he has sustained. When I say “by a very singular distinction,” I am not ignorant that the late Marcus Cato, in our own times, and Lucius Attilius, in the days of our
fore-

fore-fathers, were generally mentioned with the same honourable addition; but I know, too, that it was for attainments somewhat different from those which have so justly occasioned it to be conferred on you. To the latter it was given, in allusion to his eminent skill in the laws of his country; as it was to the former, on account of the wonderful compass and variety of his knowledge, together with his great experience in the affairs of the world. Indeed, the many signal proofs that Cato gave, both in the forum and the senate, of his judgment, his spirit, and his penetration, produced such frequent occasions to speak of his wisdom with admiration, that the epithet seems, by continually recurring, to have been considered in his latter days as his original and proper name^c. But the same appellation (and I cannot forbear repeating it again) has been conferred on you, for qualifications not altogether of the same nature; not merely in re-

^c See Essay on Old-Age, p. 9. n. b.

spect

spect to the superior excellency of your political accomplishments, and those intellectual endowments which adorn your mind, but principally in consequence of the singular advancement you have made in the study and practice of *moral* wisdom. In short, if Lælius is never named without the designation I am speaking of; it is not so much in the popular, as in the philosophical sense of the term, that this characteristic is applied to him: and in that sense, I will venture to say there is not a single instance throughout all the states of Greece, of its ever having been thus attributed to any man by the unanimous consent of a whole people. For as to those famous sages who are commonly known by the general denomination of “the seven wise men of Greece;” it is asserted by the most accurate inquirers into their history, that they cannot properly be ranked in the class of *moral* philosophers. One celebrated Grecian, however, there was, a native of Athens,

Athens, whom the Oracle of Apollo declared to be the wisest of the sons of men^d: and believe me, Lælius, it is the same species of wisdom which this excellent moralist displayed, that all the world is agreed in ascribing to you: that wisdom, I mean, by which you hold virtue to be capable of fortifying the soul against all the various assaults of human calamities, and are taught to consider happiness as depending upon yourself alone.

In consequence of this general opinion I have been frequently asked, (and the same question, I believe, has no less often, Scævola, been proposed to you) in what manner Lælius supports the loss he has lately sustained? And this inquiry was the rather made, as it was remarked that you absented yourself from our last monthly meeting in the Gardens of Brutus the Augur,

^d See Rem. on Cato, p. 231. Rem. 79.

where you had always before very regularly assisted,

S C Æ V O L A.

I acknowledge, Lælius, that the question which Fannius mentions, has repeatedly been put to me by many of my acquaintance: and I have always assured them that, as far as I could observe, you received the wound that has been inflicted upon you by the death of your affectionate and illustrious friend, with great composure and equanimity; nevertheless, that it was not possible, nor indeed consistent with the general humane disposition of your nature, not to be affected by it in a very sensible manner; however, that it was by no means grief, but merely indisposition, which prevented you from being present at the last meeting of our assembly.

LÆLIUS.

LÆLIUS.

Your answer, Scævola, was perfectly agreeable to the fact. Ill, certainly, would it become me, on account of any private affliction, to decline a conference which I have never failed to attend when my health permitted: and indeed I am persuaded that no man who possesses a proper firmness of mind, will suffer his misfortunes, how heavily soever they may press upon his heart, to interrupt his duties of any kind. Fortherest; I consider the high opinion, Fannius, which you suppose the world entertains of my character, as an obliging proof of your friendship: but it is an opinion which, as I am not conscious of deserving, I have no disposition to claim. As little am I inclined to subscribe to your judgment concerning Cato: for if consummate wisdom, in the moral and philosophic idea of that expression, was ever to be found in the character

character of any human being, (which, I will confess, however, I very much doubt) it certainly appeared throughout the whole conduct of that excellent person. Not to mention other proofs; with what unexampled fortitude, let me ask, did he support the death of his incomparable son? I was no stranger to the behaviour of Paulus,⁹ and was an eye-witness to that of Gallus¹, labouring under an affliction of the same kind; but the sons whom they were respectively bereaved of, died when they were mere boys: whereas Cato's was snatched from him when he had arrived at the prime of manhood, and was flourishing in the general esteem of his country^f. Let me caution you, then, from suffering any man to rival Cato in your good opinion; not excepting even Him whom the Oracle of Apollo, you say,

⁹ See Rem. on Cato, p. 233. Rem. 56.

^f Ibid. p. 256. Rem. 68.

declared

LÆLIUS.

Your answer, Scævola, was perfectly agreeable to the fact. Ill, certainly, would it become me, on account of any private affliction, to decline a conference which I have never failed to attend when my health permitted: and indeed I am persuaded that no man who possesses a proper firmness of mind, will suffer his misfortunes, how heavily soever they may press upon his heart, to interrupt his duties of any kind. For the rest; I consider the high opinion, Fannius, which you suppose the world entertains of my character, as an obliging proof of your friendship: but it is an opinion which, as I am not conscious of deserving, I have no disposition to claim. As little am I inclined to subscribe to your judgment concerning Cato: for if consummate wisdom, in the moral and philosophic idea of that expression, was ever to be found in the character

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^g See Rem. on Cato, p. 233. Rem. 56.

^h Ibid. p. 256. Rem. 68.

declared

declared to be the wisest of the human race. The truth is, the memory of Socrates is held in honour for the admirable *doctrine* he delivered, but Cato's for the glorious *deeds* he performed.¹⁰

Thus far in particular reply to Fannius.—I now address myself to both: and if I were to deny that I regret the death of Scipio; how far such a disposition of mind would be right, I leave philosophers to determine; but far, I confess, it is from the sentiments of my heart. I am sensibly, indeed, affected by the loss of a friend, whose equal no man, I will venture to say, ever possessed before; and none, I am persuaded, will ever meet with again. Nevertheless, I stand in want of no external assistance to heal the wound I have received. My own reflections supply me with sufficient consolation: and I find it principally from not having given into that false opinion which adds poignancy to the grief of so many others
under

under a loss of the same kind. For I am convinced there is no circumstance in the death of Scipio that can justly be lamented with respect to *himself*: whatever there is of *private* misfortune in that event, consists intirely in the loss which *I* have sustained. Under the full influence of such a persuasion, to indulge unrestrained sorrow, would be a proof, not of a generous affection to one's friend, but of too interested a concern for one's self. It is evident indeed, that the colour of Scipio's days has, in every view of it, proved truly bright and glorious. For tell me, my friends, is there a felicity, (unless he wished never to die—a wish, I am confident, he was too wise to entertain) is there a single article of human happiness that can reasonably be desired, which he did not live to attain? The high expectations the world had conceived of him in his earliest youth, were more than confirmed in his riper years;" as his virtues shone forth with a

lustre superior even to the most sanguine hopes of his country. He was twice, without the least solicitation on his own part, elected Consul: the first time, before he was legally qualified by his age to be admitted into that office; and the next, although not prematurely with respect to himself, yet it had well-nigh proved too late for his country. In both instances, however, success attended his arms; and having levelled with the ground the capitals of two states the most inveterately hostile to the Roman name, he not only happily terminated the respective wars, but secured us from all apprehension of future danger from the same powers.¹² I forbear to enlarge upon the affability of his manners; the affection he shewed to his mother; the generosity he exercised towards his sisters; the kindness with which he behaved to the rest of his family; and the unblemished integrity that influenced every part of his conduct:¹³ they

were qualities in his exemplary and amiable character, with which you are perfectly well acquainted. It is equally unnecessary to add, how sincerely he was beloved by his country: the general concern that appeared at his funeral, renders it sufficiently evident.¹⁴ What increase then could the addition of a few more years have made to the glory and happiness of his life? For admitting that old-age does not necessarily bring on a state of imbecility, (as Cato, I remember, maintained, in a conversation with Scipio and myself about a year before his death) it certainly impairs, at least, that vigour and vivacity, which Scipio still possessed at the time of his decease.

Such then was the course of his happy and honourable days, that neither his felicity nor his fame could have received any farther increase: and as to his death, it was much too sudden to have been attended with any sensible degree of

pain. By what cause that unexpected event was occasioned, is by no means indeed clear: the general suspicions concerning it, you well know.¹⁵ One circumstance, at least, is unquestionable; that of all the many brilliant days he had enjoyed, the last of his life was the most completely illustrious. For it was on the very evening which preceded his death that he received the singular honour, at the breaking up of the senate, of being conducted to his house by all the members of that august assembly, attended by the several ambassadors both from Latium and the allies of the Roman Commonwealth: so that he cannot, it should seem, so properly be said to have descended into the regions of the infernal deities, as to have passed at once from the supreme height of human glory, to the mansions of the celestial Gods.¹⁶ For I am by no means a convert to the new doctrine which certain philosophers have lately endeavoured to propagate;

propagate; who maintain that death
 extinguishes the whole man, and his
 soul perishes with the dissolution of his
 body." Indeed the practice of our an-
 cestors alone, abstracted from the opi-
 nion of the antient sages, weighs more
 with me than all the arguments of these
 pretended reasoners: for certainly our
 fore-fathers would not so religiously
 have observed those sacred rites which
 have been instituted in honour of the
 dead, if they had supposed that the de-
 ceased were in no respect concerned in
 the performance of them. But the
 conviction arising from this considera-
 tion is much strengthened when I add
 to it the authority of those great masters
 of reason, who enlightened our country
 by the schools they established in great
 Greece, during the flourishing ages of
 that now deserted part of Italy. And
 what has a still farther influence in de-
 termining my persuasion is, the opinion

See Rem. on Cato, p. 274. Rem. 73.

of that respectable moralist, who, in the judgment of Apollo himself, was declared to be the wisest of mankind. This incomparable philosopher, without once varying to the opposite side of the question, (as his custom was upon many other controverted subjects) steadily and firmly asserted, that the human soul is a divine and immortal substance; that death opens a way for its return to the celestial mansions; and that the spirits of those just men who have made the greatest progress in the paths of virtue, find the easiest and most expeditious admittance. This also was the opinion of my departed friend: an opinion which you may remember, Scævola, he particularly enlarged upon in that conversation which, a very short time before his death, he held with you and me in conjunction with Philus, Manilius, and a large company of his other friends, on the subject of government. For in the close of that conference, which continued, you know, during

during three successive days, he related to us (as if he had been led into the topic by a kind of pre-sentiment of his approaching fate) a discourse which Africanus delivered to him in a vision during his sleep, concerning the soul's immortality.¹⁸

If it be true then, that the souls of good men, when enlarged from this corporeal prison, wing their flight into the heavenly mansions with more or less ease, in proportion to their moral attainments; what human spirit can we suppose to have made its immediate way to the Gods with greater facility, than that of Scipio? To bewail therefore an event attended with such advantageous consequences to himself, would, I fear, have more the appearance of envy than of friendship. But should the contrary opinion prove to be the fact; should the soul and body really perish together, and no sense remain after our dissolution: yet death, although it can-

not indeed, upon this supposition, be deemed a happiness to my illustrious friend, can by no means however be considered as an evil. For if all perception be totally extinguished in him; he is, with respect to every thing that concerns himself, in the same state as if he had never been born. I say, "with respect to himself:" for it is far otherwise with regard to his friends and to his country; as both will have reason to rejoice in his having lived, so long as their own existence shall endure.

In every view therefore of this event, considering it merely as it relates to my departed friend, it appears, as I observed before, to be a happy consummation. But it is much otherwise with regard to myself; who, as I entered earlier into the world, ought, according to the common course of nature, to have sooner departed out of it. Nevertheless, I derive so much satisfaction from reflecting on the friendship which subsisted

subsisted between us, that I cannot but think I have reason to congratulate myself on the felicity of my life; since I have had the happiness to pass the greatest part of it in the society of Scipio. We lived under the same roof; passed together thro' the same military employments; and were actuated in all our pursuits, whether of a public or private nature, by the same common principles and views. In short, and to express at once the whole spirit and essence of friendship; our inclinations, our sentiments, and our studies, were in perfect accord. For these reasons, my ambition is less gratified by that high opinion (especially as it is unmerited) which Fannius assures me the world entertains of my wisdom, than by the strong expectations I have conceived that the memory of our friendship will prove immortal. I indulge this hope with the greater confidence, as there do not occur in all the annals

of

of past ages, above three or four instances of a similar amity : and future times, I trust, will add the names of Scipio and Lælius to that select and celebrated number.

FANNIUS.

Your expectations, Lælius, cannot fail of being realized. And now, as you have mentioned friendship, and we are entirely disengaged; it would be extremely acceptable to me, (and I am persuaded it would likewise be so to Scævola) if, agreeably to your usual readiness upon other occasions of just inquiry, you would give us your opinion concerning the true nature of this connection; the extent of its obligations; and the maxims by which it ought to be conducted.

SCÆVOLA.

SCÆVOLA.

Fannius has prevented me in the request I was intending to make: Your compliance therefore, will equally confer an obligation upon both of us.

LÆLIUS.

I should very willingly gratify your desires, if I thought myself equal to the task: for the subject is interesting, and we are at present, as Fannius observed, intirely at leisure. But I am too sensible of my own insufficiency to venture, thus unprepared, upon the disquisition of a topic which requires much consideration to be treated as it deserves. Unpremeditated dissertations of this kind can only be expected from those Grecian geniuses, who are accustomed to speak on the sudden upon any given question:

question^b: and to those learned disputants I must refer you, if you wish to hear the subject properly discussed. As for myself, I can only exhort you to look on friendship as the most valuable of all human possessions; no other being equally suited to the moral nature of man, or so applicable to every state and circumstance, whether of prosperity or adversity, in which he can possibly be placed. But at the same time I lay it down as a fundamental axiom, that “true friendship can only subsist between those who are animated by the strictest principles of honour and

* The ancient Greek sophists, those literary quacks against whose arrogant claims to universal science, Socrates so successfully pointed the force of his irony, were accustomed to call upon their auditors to propose any philosophic difficulty that embarrassed them, which they declared they would instantly discuss and resolve. The manner in which Lælius mentions them in the present passage, seems to imply that he held no unfavourable opinion of their talents: but Cicero, in another part of his writings, speaking in the person of Crassus, treats these vain and ignorant pretenders with the contempt they so justly merited.—See *Cic. de Orat. I.*

“virtue.”

“virtue.” When I say this, I would not be thought to adopt the sentiments of those speculative moralists, who pretend that no man can justly be deemed virtuous who is not arrived at that state of absolute perfection which constitutes, according to their ideas, the character of genuine wisdom. This opinion may appear true, perhaps, in theory, but is altogether inapplicable to any useful purpose of society; as it supposes a degree of virtue to which no mortal was ever capable of rising. It is not therefore that notional species of merit which imagination may possibly conceive, or our wishes perhaps form, that we have reason to expect and require in a friend: it is those moral attainments alone which we see actually realized among mankind. And, indeed, I can never be persuaded to think that either Fabricius, or Coruncanius, or Curius¹, whom our forefathers justly revered for the superior

¹ See Rem. on Cato, p. 172. No. 24.

rectitude of their conduct, were sages according to that sublime criterion which these visionary philosophers have endeavoured to establish. I should be contented, however, to leave them in the undisturbed possession of their arrogant and unintelligible notions of virtue, provided they would allow that the great persons I have named, merited at least the character of *good men*: but even This, it seems, they are not willing to grant; still contending, with their usual obstinacy, that *goodness* is an attribute which can only be ascribed to their perfect sage." I shall venture, nevertheless, to adjust my own measure of that quality by the humbler standard of plain common sense. In my opinion, therefore, whoever, like those distinguished models I just now mentioned, restrains his passions within the bounds of reason, and uniformly acts, in all the various relations of life, upon one steady consistent principle of ap-
proved

proved honour, justice, and beneficence; That man is in reality, as well as in common estimation, strictly and truly *good*: in as much as he regulates his conduct (so far, I mean, as is compatible with human frailty) by a constant obedience to those best and surest guides of moral rectitude, the sacred laws of Nature!

In tracing these laws, it seems evident, I think, That man, by the frame of his moral constitution, is disposed to consider himself as standing in some degree of social relation to the whole species in general; and that this principle acts with more or less vigour, according to the distance at which he is placed with respect to any particular community, or individual, of his kind. Thus it may be observed to operate with greater force between fellow-citizens of the same commonwealth, than in re-

* See Rem. on Cato, p. 157. No. 8.

gard to foreigners; and between the several members of the same family, than towards those among whom there is no common tie of consanguinity. In the case of relations, indeed, this principle somewhat rises in its strength, and produces a sort of instinctive amity; but an amity, however, of no great firmness or solidity. The inferiority of this species of natural connection, when compared with that which is the consequence of voluntary choice, appears from this single consideration; that the former hath not the least dependence upon the sentiments of the heart, but continues the same it was in its origin, notwithstanding every degree of cordiality between the parties should be utterly extinguished:²⁰ whereas the kind affections enter so essentially into the latter, that where love does not exist, friendship can have no being. But what still farther evinces the strength and efficacy of friendship above all the numberless other social tendencies

tendencies of the human heart, is, that instead of wasting its force upon a multiplicity of divided objects, its whole energy is exerted for the benefit of only two or three persons at the utmost.²¹

Friendship may be shortly defined, "a perfect conformity of opinions upon all religious and civil subjects,"²² united with the highest degree of mutual esteem and affection:" and yet from these simple circumstances, results the most desirable blessing (virtue alone excepted) that the Gods have bestowed on mankind. I am sensible that in this opinion I shall not be universally supported: health and riches, honours and power, have each of them their distinct admirers, and are respectively pursued as the supreme felicity of human life; whilst some there are (and the number is by no means inconsiderable) who contend, that it is to

be found only in the sensual gratifications. But the latter place their principal happiness on the same low enjoyments, which constitute the chief good of brutes: and the former, on those very precarious possessions that depend much less on our own merit than on the caprice of fortune. They indeed who maintain, that the ultimate good of man consists in the knowledge and practice of virtue, fix it, undoubtedly, upon its truest and most glorious foundation: but let it be remembered at the same time, that Virtue is at once both the *parent* and the *support* of friendship.

I have already declared, that by *virtue* I do not mean, with the philosophers before alluded to, that ideal strain of perfection which is no where to be found but in the pompous language of enthusiastic declamation; I mean only that attainable degree of
moral

moral merit, which is understood by the term in common discourse, and may be exemplified in actual practice. Without entering therefore into a particular inquiry concerning those imaginary beings, which never have been realized in human nature; I think myself warranted in considering those persons as truly *good* men, who have always been so deemed in the general opinion of mankind; the Pauli, for instance, and the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, and the Philis: for with *such* characters the world has reason to be well contented!

When friendship therefore is contracted between men, who possess a degree of virtue not inferior to that which adorned those approved personages I have just named; it is productive of unspeakable advantages. "Life would be utterly *lifeless*" (as old
D 2 Ennius

// Ennius expresses it) without a friend on whose kindness and fidelity one might confidently repose. Can there be a more real complacency indeed, than to lay open to another the most secret thoughts // of one's heart, with the same confidence and security as if they were still concealed in his own? Would not the fruits of prosperity lose much of // their relish, were there none who equally rejoiced with the possessor in the satisfaction he received from them? and how difficult must it prove to bear up under the pressure of misfortunes, unsupported by a generous associate // who more than equally divides their

/ See Rem. on Cato, p. 148. No. 2. We look up to Ennius, says the Roman critic, with that sort of religious reverence with which we contemplate an antient consecrated grove, where we admire the venerable oaks much less for their beauty than for their antiquity. *Ennium sicut sacros vetustate lucos adoremus, in quibus grandia et antiqua robora jam non tantam habent speciem quam religionem.* Quint. x. c. i.

load?

// load? In short, the several occasions to which friendship extends its kindly offices, are unbounded; while the advantage of every other object of human desires, is confined within certain specific and determinate limits, beyond which it is of no avail. Thus *wealth* is pursued for the particular uses to which it is solely applicable; *power*, in order to receive worship; *honours*, for the sake of fame; *sensual indulgencies*, on account of the gratifications that attend them; and *health*, as the means of living exempt from pain, and possessing the unobstructed exercise of all our corporeal faculties. Whereas *friendship* (I repeat it again) is adapted by its nature to an infinite number of different ends; accommodates itself to all circumstances and situations of human life; and can at no season prove either unsuitable or inconvenient: in a word, not even fire and water (to use a proverbial illustration) are capable of be-

ing converted to a greater variety of beneficial purposes.

I desire it may be understood, however, that I am now speaking, not of that inferior species of amity which occurs in the common intercourse of the world, (although this too is not without its pleasures and advantages) but of that genuine and perfect friendship, examples of which are so extremely rare as to be rendered memorable by their singularity. It is this sort alone, that can truly be said to heighten the joys of prosperity, and mitigate the sorrows of adversity, by a generous participation of both. Indeed, one of the chief, among the many important, offices of this connexion, is exerted in the day of affliction; by dispelling the gloom that over-casts the mind, encouraging the hope of happier times, and preventing the depressed spirits from sinking into a state of weak and unmanly despondence.

Whoever is in possession of a true friend, sees the exact counterpart of his own soul. In consequence of this moral resemblance between them, they are so intimately *one*, that no advantage can attend either, which does not equally communicate itself to both: they are strong in the strength, rich in the opulence, and powerful in the power of each other. They can scarcely indeed be considered, in any respect, as separate individuals; and wherever the one appears, the other is virtually present. I will venture even a bolder assertion, and affirm that in despite of death, they must both continue to exist, so long as either of them shall remain alive. For the deceased may, in a certain sense, be said still to live, whose memory is preserved with the highest veneration and the most tender regret, in the bosom of the survivor: a circumstance which renders the former

D 4

happy

happy in death, and the latter honoured in life. ^m

If that benevolent principle, which thus intimately unites two persons in the bands of amity, were to be struck out of the human heart, it would be impossible that either private families, or public communities, should subsist; even the land itself would lie waste, and desolation overspread the earth. Should this assertion stand in need of a proof; it will appear evident, by considering the ruinous consequences which ensue from discord and dissension. For what family is so

^m “ They who are the same to their friend when
 “ he is in another country, or in another *world*, are
 “ fit to preserve the sacred fire for eternal sacrifices,
 “ and to perpetuate the memory of those exemplary
 “ friendships of the best men, which have filled the
 “ world with history and wonder.—He that is a friend
 “ after death, hopes not for a recompence from his
 “ friend, and makes no bargain either for fame or
 “ love; but is rewarded with the conscience and sa-
 “ tisfaction of doing bravely.” *Bishop Taylor’s Treat.*
of Friend.

securely

ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP. 41

securely established, or what government fixed upon so firm a basis, that it would not be overturned and utterly destroyed, were a general spirit of enmity and malevolence to break forth amongst its members? a sufficient argument surely, of the inestimable benefits which flow from the kind and friendly affections!

I have been informed that a certain learned bard of Agrigentum published a philosophic poem in Greek, in which he asserted that the several bodies which compose the physical system of the universe, preserve the consistence of their respective forms, or are dispersed into their primitive atoms, as a principle of *amity*, or of *discord*, becomes predominant in their composition.²⁴ It is certain at least, that the powerful effects of these opposite agents in the moral world, is universally perceived and acknowledged. Agreeable to this general sentiment, who is there, when

when he beholds a man generously exposing himself to certain danger, for the sake of rescuing his distressed friend, that can forbear expressing the warmest approbation? Accordingly, what repeated acclamations lately echoed through the theatre, at the new play of my host and friend Pacuvius, in that scene where Pylades and Orestes are introduced before the King; who being ignorant which of them was Orestes, whom he had determined to put to death, each insists, in order to save the life of his associate, that he himself is the real person in question.²⁵ If the mere fictitious representation of such a magnanimous and heroic contention, was thus universally applauded by the spectators; what impression must it have made upon their minds, had they seen it actually displayed in real life! The general effect produced upon this occasion, clearly shews how deeply nature hath impressed on the human heart a sense of moral beauty; since

since a whole audience thus unanimously conspired in admiring an instance of sublime generosity in another's conduct, which not one of them, perhaps, was capable of exhibiting in his own.

Thus far I have ventured to lay before you, my general notions concerning friendship. If aught remain to be added on the subject, (and much there certainly does) permit me to refer you to those philosophers who are more capable of giving you satisfaction.

F A N N I U S.

That satisfaction, Lælius, we rather hope to receive from you. For although I have frequently applied to those philosophers to whom you would resign me, and have been no unwilling auditor of their discourses; yet I am persuaded, you will deliver your sentiments

ments upon this subject in a much more elegant and enlightening manner.

S C Æ V O L A.

You would have been still more confirmed in that opinion, Fannius, had you been present with us at the conference which we held not long since in the gardens of Scipio, upon the subject of government; when Lælius proved himself so powerful an advocate in support of natural *justice*, by confuting the subtle arguments of the very acute and distinguishing Philus.²⁶

F A N N I U S.

To triumph in the cause of justice, could be no difficult task, certainly, to Lælius, who is, confessedly, one of the most just and upright of men!

SCÆVOLA.

SCÆVOLA.

And can it be less easy for *Him* who has deservedly acquired the highest honour by his eminent constancy, affection and fidelity to his friend; to explain, with equal success, the principles and duties of friendship?

LÆLIUS.

This is pressing me beyond all power of resistance: and indeed, it would be unreasonable as well as difficult, not to yield to the desires of two such worthy relations, when they request my sentiments upon a point of so interesting and important a nature.

Having frequently, then, turned my thoughts on this subject; the principal question that has always occurred to me, is, whether friendship takes its
§
rise

rise from the wants and weakneses of man, and is cultivated solely in order to obtain, by a mutual exchange of good offices, those advantages which he could not otherwise acquire? Or whether nature, notwithstanding this *beneficial* intercourse is inseparable from the connection, previously disposes the heart to engage in it upon a nobler and more generous inducement? In order to determine this question, it must be observed, that *love* is a leading and essential principle in constituting that particular species of benevolence which is termed amity": and although this sentiment may be feigned, indeed, by the followers of those who are courted merely with a view to interest, yet it cannot possibly be produced by a motive of *interest* alone. There is a truth and simplicity in genuine friendship,

" *C'est une vertu, says an ingenious writer, que la raison ne peut faire, a moins que la passion n'en soit de moitié. Costar ap. Pens. ingen. p. 154.*

an

an unconstrained and spontaneous emotion, altogether incompatible with every kind and degree of artifice and simulation. I am persuaded therefore, that it derives its origin, not from the indigence of human nature, but from a distinct principle implanted in the breast of man: from a certain instinctive tendency, which draws congenial minds into union; and not from a cool calculation of the advantages with which it is pregnant."

// The wonderful force, indeed, of innate propensities of the benevolent kind, is observable even among brutes, in that tender attachment which prevails, during a certain period, between the dam and her young. But their strongest effects are more particularly conspicuous, in the human species; as appears, in the first place, from that powerful endearment which subsists between parents and children, and which cannot be eradicated, or counteracted, without

without the most detestable impiety; and in the next, from those sentiments of secret approbation, which arise on the very first interview with a man whose manners and temper seem to harmonize with our own, and in whom we think we discover symptoms of an honest and virtuous mind. In reality, nothing is so beautiful as virtue; and nothing makes its way more directly to the heart: we feel a certain degree of affection even towards those meritorious persons whom we have never seen, and whose characters are known to us only from history. Where is the man that does not, even at this distance of time, find his heart glow with benevolence towards the memory of Fabricius, or Curius^o, though he certainly never beheld their persons? On the contrary, who is there that feels not emotions

^o Concerning Fabricius and Curius, (as also Mælius mentioned a little lower) see Rem. on Cato, p. 172, 243, 244.

of hatred and detestation when he reflects on the conduct of Tarquin, of Cassius,²³ or of Mælius? Rome has twice contended for empire upon Italian ground, when she sent forth her armies to oppose the respective invasions of Pyrrhus and of Hannibal: and yet, with what different dispositions do we review the campaigns of those hostile chiefs! The generous spirit of the former, very much softens our resentment towards him; while the cruelty of the latter, must render his character the abhorrence of every Roman.²⁴

// If the charms of virtue, then, are so captivating, as to inspire us with some degree of affection towards those approved persons whom we never saw; or, which is still more extraordinary, if they force us to admire them even in an enemy; what wonder is it, that in those with whom we *live* and *converse*, they should affect us in a still

more irresistible manner? It must be acknowledged, however, that this first impression is considerably strengthened and improved, by a nearer intercourse, by subsequent good offices, and by a general indication of zeal for our service: causes, which, when they operate with combined force, kindle in the heart the warmest and most generous amity.) To suppose that all attachments of this sort, spring solely from a sense of human imbecility, and in order to supply that insufficiency we feel in ourselves, by the assistance we hope to receive from others; is to degrade friendship to a most unworthy and ignoble origin. Indeed if this supposition were true, they who find in themselves the greatest defects, would be the most disposed and the best qualified, to engage in this kind of connection: which is contrary to fact. For experience shews, that the more a man looks for his happiness within himself, and the more firmly he stands supported by the consciousness

sciousness of his own intrinsic merit, the more desirous he is to cultivate an intercourse of amity, and the better friend he certainly proves. In what respect, let me ask, had Scipio any occasion for my services? We neither of us, most assuredly, stood in need of the other's aid; but the singular virtues I admired in his character, together with the favourable opinion which in some measure, perhaps, he had conceived of mine, were the primary and prevailing motives of that affectionate attachment, which was afterwards so considerably increased by the habitudes of intimate and unreserved converse. For although many and great advantages accrued to both, from the alliance that was thus formed between us; yet sure I am, that the hope of receiving those reciprocal benefits, by no means entered into the original cause of our union. In fact, as generosity disdains to make a traffic of her favours; and a liberal mind confers obligations, not

from the mean hope of a return, but solely from that satisfaction which nature has annexed to the exertion of benevolent actions; so I think it is evident that we are induced to form friendships, not from a mercenary contemplation of their utility, but from that pure disinterested complacency, which results from the mere exercise of the affection itself.

That sect of philosophers who impute all human actions to the same motive which determines those of brutes, and refer both to one common principle of self-gratification; will be very far, I am sensible, from agreeing with me in the origin I have ascribed to friendship. And no wonder: for nothing great and elevated can win the esteem and approbation of a set of men, whose whole thoughts and pursuits are professedly directed to so base and ignoble an end.

I shall

I shall take no farther notice, therefore, of their unworthy tenets; well-convinced as I am, that there is an implanted sense in man, by which nature allures his heart to the charms of virtue, in whomsoever her lovely form appears. And hence it is, that they who find in themselves a predilection for some particular object of moral approbation, are induced to desire a nearer and more intimate communion with that person, in order to enjoy those pure and mental advantages which flow from an habitual and familiar intercourse with the good: I will add too, in order to feel the refined satisfaction of inspiring equal and reciprocal sentiments of affection, together with the generous pleasure of conferring acts of kindness without the least view of a return. A friendship placed upon this its proper and natural basis, is not only productive of the most solid utility, but stands at the same time upon a firmer and more durable foundation, than if

it were raised upon a sense of human wants and weakness. For if interest were the true and only medium to cement this connection; it could hold no longer than while interest, which is always fluctuating and variable, should continue to be advanced by the same hand; whereas genuine friendship, being produced by the simple efficiency of nature's steady and immutable laws, resembles the source from whence it springs, and is for ever permanent and unchangeable.

This may suffice concerning the rise of friendship; unless you should have any thing to object to the principles I have endeavoured to establish.

FANNIUS.

Much otherwise: I will take the privilege, therefore, of seniority to answer for Scævola as well as for myself, by requesting you in both our names to proceed.

SCÆVOLA.

S C Æ V O L A.

Fannius has very justly expressed my sentiments; and I join with him in wishing to hear what you have farther to observe, on the question we have proposed.

L Æ L I U S.

I will lay before you then, my excellent young men, the result of frequent conversations which Scipio and I have formerly held together upon the subject. He used to say, that nothing is so difficult as to preserve a lasting and unbroken friendship to the end of life. For it may frequently happen, not only that the interest of the parties shall considerably interfere, or their opinions concerning political measures widely differ; but age, infirmities, or misfortunes, are apt to produce very

extraordinary changes in the tempers and dispositions of men. He illustrated this general instability of common friendships, by tracing the revolutions they are liable to undergo, from the earliest period in which this kind of connection can commence. Accordingly he observed, that those strong attachments, which are sometimes formed in childhood, were generally renounced with the puerile robe. But should a particular affection, contracted in this tender age, happen to continue to riper years; it is nothing unusual to see it afterwards interrupted, either by rivalry in a matrimonial pursuit, or some other object of youthful competition, in which *both* cannot possibly succeed. If these common dangers, however, should be happily escaped; yet others no less fatal may hereafter rise up to its ruin; especially if they should become opposite candidates for the same dignities of the state. For as with the generality

generality of mankind, an immoderate desire of wealth, so among those of a more liberal and exalted spirit, an inordinate thirst of glory, is usually the strongest bane of amity; and each of them have proved the occasion of converting the warmest friends into the most implacable enemies.

He added, that great and just dissensions had arisen also in numberless instances, on account of improper requests: where a man has solicited his friend to assist him, for example, in his lawless gallantries, or to support him in some other act of equal dishonour and injustice. A denial upon such occasions, though certainly laudable, is generally deemed by the party refused to be a violation of the rights of amity: and he will, probably, resent it the more, as applications of this nature necessarily imply, that the person who breaks through all restraints in urging them, is equally disposed to make the same
unwar-

unwarrantable concessions on his own part. Disagreements of this kind have not only caused irreparable breaches between the closest connections, but have even kindled unextinguishable animosities. In short, the common friendships of the world are liable to be broken to pieces by such a variety of accidents; that Scipio thought it required a more than common portion, not only of good sense, but of good fortune, to steer intirely clear of those numerous and fatal rocks.³⁹

Our first enquiry therefore, if you please, shall be, “how far the claims of friendship may reasonably extend?” For instance; ought the bosom-friends of Coriolanus, (if any intimacies of that kind he had^p) to have joined him

^p The manner in which Cicero expresses himself in the text, seems to intimate that he did not look upon Coriolanus as a character likely to receive or
to

him in turning his arms against his country;³¹ or those of Viscellinus, or Spurius Mælius, to have assisted them in their designs of usurping the sovereign power?

In those public commotions which were raised by Tiberius Gracchus, it appeared that neither Quintus Tullius, nor any other of those persons

to impress sentiments of a warm amity: and it appears indeed, that his qualities rendered him more the object of admiration than of love. He possessed the heroic and civil virtues in the most eminent degree; but he had an imperiousness in his manners, an obstinacy and implacability in his temper, which repelled from any affectionate attachment to his person, even those who acknowledged and esteemed his military and political merit. *Plut. in vit. CORIOLAN.*

He was a firm and inflexible friend to the constitutional liberties of the republic; but as eloquence was not his talent, he never rose to any honour in the state. He seems chiefly to have been distinguished by his private virtues; for as he was a stoic by principle, his life corresponded with his tenets, and he is said to have exceeded in his moral conduct even the rigid rules of that severe sect. *Cic. in Brut. 30.*

with

with whom he lived upon terms of the greatest intimacy, engaged in his faction;³² one only excepted, who was related to your family, Scævola, by the ties of hospitality: I mean Blofius, of Cumæ. This man, (as I was appointed an assessor with the two consuls Lænas and Rupilius') applied to me to obtain his pardon; alledging in his justification, that he entertained so high an esteem and affection for Gracchus, as to hold himself obliged to concur with him in any measure he might propose. What! if he had even desired you to set fire to the capitol?—"Such a request, I am confident," replied Blofius, "he never would have made." But admitting that he had; how would you have determined? "In that case," returned Blofius, "I should most certainly have complied." Infamous as this confession was, he acted agreeably to it; or rather, indeed,

³² They were consuls in the Y. of R. 621.

his

his conduct exceeded even the impiety of his professions.³³ For, not contented with encouraging the seditious schemes of Tiberius Gracchus, he actually took the lead in them; and was an instigator as well as an associate, in all the madness of his measures. In consequence of these extravagant proceedings, and alarmed to find that extraordinary judges were appointed for his trial³⁴; he made his escape into Asia: where entering into the service of our enemies, he met with the fate he so justly merited, for the injuries he had done to the commonwealth.³⁴

I lay it down then as a rule without exception, “that no degree of friendship can either justify, or excuse, the commission of a criminal action.” For true amity being founded on an opinion

³³ The ordinary judges were the Prætors, but in delinquencies against which no particular law had provided, (as in the present instance) the cognizance of the charge was delegated to special judges.

of virtue in the object of our affection; it is scarcely possible that those sentiments should remain, after an avowed and open violation of the principles which originally produced them.

To maintain that the duties of this relation require a compliance with every request a friend shall offer, and give a right to expect the same unlimited concessions in return; would be a doctrine, I confess, from which no ill consequences could ensue, if the parties concerned were absolutely *perfect*, and incapable of the least deviation from the dictates of virtue and good sense. But in settling the principles by which our conduct in this respect ought to be regulated, we are not to form our estimate by fictitious representations, but to consider what history and experience teaches us that mankind truly are; and to select for our imitation such real characters as seem to have approached the *nearest* to perfection.

Tradition

Tradition informs us, that Papas Æmilius and Caius Luscinus,³ who were twice colleagues in the consular and censorial offices, were united also in the strictest intimacy: and that Manius Curius and Titus Coruncanius lived with *them*, and with each other, upon terms of the strictest and most inviolable friendship. It may well, therefore, be presumed, (since there is not even the slightest reason to suspect the contrary) that none of these illustrious worthies ever made a proposal to his friend inconsistent with the laws of honour, or that fidelity he had pledged to his country. To urge, that “if any overtures of that nature
“had ever been made, they would
“certainly have been rejected, and
“consequently must have been concealed from public notice;” is an objection by no means sufficient to weaken the presumption, when the sanctity of manners which distinguished these venerable persons shall be duly considered:

ed: for to be capable of making such proposals, would be no less a proof of depravity, than actually consenting to them. Accordingly we find that both Carbo and Caius Cato,³⁶ the friends of Tiberius Gracchus, did not refuse to take a part in his turbulent measures; as his brother Caius, although he was not indeed a very considerable actor in the scene at first, is now most zealously engaged in the same unworthy cause.

Let it be established, therefore, as one of the most sacred and indispensable laws of this connection, “ never either
“ to make, or to grant, a request which
“ honour and virtue will not justify.” To alledge in any instance of deviation from moral rectitude, that one was actuated by a warmth of zeal for his friend; is in every species of criminal conduct, a plea altogether scandalous and inadmissible, but particularly in transactions that strike at the peace and
welfare

welfare of the state. I would the more earnestly inculcate this important maxim, as from the present complexion of the times, it seems peculiarly necessary to guard against introducing principles which may hereafter be productive of fatal disturbances in the republic: and, indeed, we have already somewhat deviated from that political line, by which our wiser ancestors were wont to regulate their public conduct.

Thus Tiberius Gracchus, who aimed at sovereign power, or rather indeed who actually possessed it, during the space of a few months;³⁷ opened a scene so totally new to the Roman people, that not even tradition had delivered down to them any circumstance in former times which resembled it. Some of the friends and relations of this man, who had concurred with him in his life time, continued to support the same factious measures after his death: and I cannot reflect on the cruel part they

acted towards Scipio Nasica, without melting into tears.³⁸ I will confess at the same time, that in consideration of the punishment which Tiberius Gracchus has lately suffered, I have protected his friend Carbo as far as it was in my power.³⁹ As to the consequences we have reason to expect from the tribunate of Caius Gracchus;⁴⁰ I am unwilling to indulge conjecture: but this I do not scruple to say, that when once a distemper of this kind has broken out in a commonwealth, the infection is apt to spread; and it generally gathers strength the wider it extends. In conformity to this observation, the change which was made by the Gabinian law in the manner of voting, was two years afterwards, you know, carried still farther by the law which Cassius proposed and obtained. And I cannot but prophesy, that a rupture between the people and the senate, will be the result of both; as the most important affairs of the commonwealth will hereafter be

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conducted

conducted by the caprice of the multitude.⁴¹ It is much easier, indeed, to discover the source from which these disorders will arise, than to point out a remedy for the mischief they will occasion.

I have thrown out these reflections, as well knowing that no public innovations of this pernicious kind are ever attempted, without the assistance of some select and confidential associates. It is necessary therefore to admonish those who mean well to the constitution of their country, that if they should inadvertently have formed an intimacy with men of a contrary principle, they are not to imagine themselves so bound by the laws of amity, as to lie under an indispensable obligation to support them in attempts injurious to the community. Whosoever disturbs the peace of the commonwealth, is a just object of public indignation: nor is that man less deserving

of punishment, who acts as a second in such an impious cause, than the principal. No person ever possessed a greater share of power, or was more eminently distinguished among the Grecian states, than Themistocles. This illustrious general, who was commander in chief of the Grecian forces in the Persian war, and who by his services upon that occasion delivered his country from the tyranny with which it was threatened; having been driven into exile by the jealousy his great talents had raised, did not acquiesce under the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens with the submission he ought: on the contrary, he acted the same traiterous part under this unmerited persecution, as Coriolanus did amongst us about twenty years before. But neither the one nor the other found a coadjutor among their respective friends: in consequence of which just dereliction, they each of them perished by their own desperate hands.⁴²

It

It appears, then, from the principles I have laid down, that these kinds of wicked combinations under the pretended obligations of friendship, are so far from being sanctified by that relation, that on the contrary they ought to be publicly discouraged by the severest punishments; lest it should be thought an allowed maxim, that a friend is to be supported in every outrage he may commit, even though he should take up arms against his country. I am the more earnest to expose the error of this dangerous persuasion, as there are certain symptoms in the present times which give me reason to fear, that at some future period the impious principle I am combating, may actually be extended to the case I last mentioned: and I am no less desirous that the peace of the republic should be preserved after my death, than zealous to maintain it during my life.⁴³

The first and great axiom therefore in the laws of amity, should invariably be; “never to require from a friend
 “what he cannot grant without a breach
 “of his honour; and always to be ready to assist him upon every occasion
 “consistent with that principle.” So long as we shall act under the secure guard of this sacred barrier, it will not be sufficient merely to yield a ready compliance with all his desires; we ought to anticipate and prevent them. Another rule likewise of indispensable obligation, upon all who would approve themselves true friends, is; “to be ever
 “ready to offer their advice, with an
 “unreserved and honest frankness of
 “heart.” The counsels of a faithful and friendly monitor, carry with them an authority which ought to have great influence: and they should be urged not

“There is as much difference,” says Lord Bacon, “between the counsel that a friend giveth, and
 “that a man giveth himself, as there is between the
 “counsel

not only with freedom, but even with severity, if the occasion should appear to require it.

I am informed that certain Greek writers (*philosophers*, it seems, in the opinion of their countrymen) have advanced some very extraordinary positions relating to the subject of our present inquiry; as, indeed, what subject is there, which these subtle geniuses have not tortured with their sophistry? The authors to whom I allude, dissuade their disciples from entering into any strong attachments, as unavoidably creating super-numerary disquietudes to those who engage in them: and as every man has more than sufficient to call forth his solicitude, in the course of his own affairs; it is a weakness, they contend, anxiously

“ counsel of a friend and a *flatterer*: for there is no
 “ such flatterer as a man’s self; and there is no such
 “ remedy against the flattery of a man’s self, as the
 “ liberty of a friend.—The best preservative to keep
 “ the mind in health—the best receipt (best, I say, to
 “ work, and best to take) is the admonition of a
 “ friend.” *Essay on Friendship.*

to involve himself in the concerns of others. They recommend it also in all connections of this kind, to hold the bands of union extremely loose; so as always to have it in one's power to straiten or relax them, as circumstances and situations shall render most expedient. They add, as a capital article of their doctrine, that "to live
" exempt from cares, is an essential ingredient, to constitute human happiness: but an ingredient, however,
" which he who voluntarily distresses himself with cares in which he has no
" necessary and personal interest, must
" never hope to possess."

I have been told likewise, that there is another set of pretended philosophers of the same country, whose tenets concerning this subject, are of a still more illiberal and ungenerous cast: and I have already, in the course of this conversation, slightly animadverted upon their principles. The proposition they attempt to establish, is, that
" friendship

“ friendship is an affair of self-interest
 “ intirely, and that the proper motive
 “ for engaging in it, is, not in order to
 “ gratify the kind and benevolent affec-
 “ tions, but for the benefit of that assist-
 “ ance and support which is to be
 “ derived from the connection.”⁴⁵ Ac-
 cordingly they assert, that those per-
 sons are most disposed to have recourse
 to *auxiliary* alliances of this kind, who
 are least qualified by nature, or fortune,
 to depend upon their own strength and
 powers; the weaker sex, for instance,
 being generally more inclined to engage
 in friendships, than the male part of
 our species”; and those who are deprest
 by indigence, or labouring under mis-
 fortunes,

“ It would be an invidious task, perhaps, to estimate
 the comparative qualities and dispositions of the two
 sexes, with respect to the connection mentioned in the
 text; but let it be remembered, for the honour of the
 fairer part of the creation, that one of the strongest
 and most affecting instances of a faithful attachment
 to be met with in history, occurs in the friendship
 which subsisted between two females. The instance
 alluded to, is recorded in the Jewish annals, and
 most pathetically related by one of the sacred pen-
 men,

fortunes, than the wealthy and the prosperous.

men. The reader need not be told, that Naomi, together with her husband and their two sons, being compelled by a general famine which desolated the land of Judea, to seek for sustenance in a more plentiful country, retired into the kingdom of the Moabites. Naomi had not been there long, before she had the misfortune to bury not only her husband, but her two sons; the latter, however, before their deaths, had taken "*them wives of the daughters of Moab.*" In process of time, being informed that the famine was ceased which had driven her from her native country, she determined to return: and setting out for that purpose, her two daughters-in-law affectionately conducted her part of the way. But when they arrived at the place where it was intended they should take leave of each other, the faithful Ruth could by no persuasions be prevailed upon to undergo the pain of a final separation. Neither difference of religion, nor the powerful ties of country, or family-attachments, were equally strong with those which the most cordial amity had formed in her heart. "Intreat me not," said this amiable woman to her beloved friend and mother-in-law, "intreat me not to leave thee: for whither thou goest, I will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge. Thy people shall be my people; and thy God, my God. Where thou diest, will I die; and there will I be buried: the Lord do so to me, and more also, if aught but death part thee and me."

Excellent

Excellent and obliging fages these, undoubtedly! To strike out the friendly affections from the moral world, would be like extinguishing the sun in the natural; each of them being the source of the best and most grateful satisfactions that the Gods have conferred on the sons of men. But I should be glad to know what the real value of this boasted exemption from care, which they promise their disciples, justly amounts to? an exemption flattering to self-love, I confess; but which, upon many occurrences in human life, should be rejected with the utmost disdain. For nothing, surely, can be more inconsistent with a well-poised and manly spirit, than to decline engaging in any laudable action, or to be discouraged from persevering in it, by an apprehension of the trouble and solicitude with which it may probably be attended. Virtue herself, indeed, ought to be totally renounced, if it be right to avoid every possible means that may be productive

ductive of uneasiness: for who that is actuated by her principles, can observe the conduct of an opposite character, without being affected with some degree of secret dissatisfaction? Are not the just, the brave, and the good, necessarily exposed to the disagreeable emotions of dislike and aversion, when they respectively meet with instances of fraud, of cowardice, or of villainy? It is an essential property of every well-constituted mind, to be affected with pain, or pleasure, according to the nature of those moral appearances that present themselves to observation.

If sensibility, therefore, be not incompatible with true wisdom; (and it surely is not, unless we suppose that philosophy deadens every finer feeling of our nature) what just reason can be assigned, why the sympathetic sufferings which may result from friendship, should be a sufficient inducement for banishing that generous affection from

from the human breast? Extinguish all emotions of the heart, and what difference will remain, I do not say between man and brute, but between man and a mere inanimate clod? Away then with those austere philosophers, who represent virtue as hardening the soul against all the softer impressions of humanity!// The fact, certainly, is much otherwise: a truly good man is upon many occasions extremely susceptible of tender sentiments; and his heart expands with joy, or shrinks with sorrow, as good or ill fortune accompanies his friend. Upon the whole then, it may fairly be concluded, that as in the case of virtue, so in that of friendship, those painful sensations which may sometimes be produced by the one, as well as by the other, are equally insufficient for excluding either of them from taking possession of our bosoms."

There is a charm in virtue, as I have already had occasion to remark, that
by

by a secret and irresistible bias, draws the *general* affection of those persons towards each other, in whom it appears to reside; and this instantaneous good-will is mutually attended with a desire of entering into a nearer and more intimate correspondence: sentiments which, at length, by a natural and necessary consequence, give rise to particular friendships. Strange indeed would it be, that exalted honours, magnificent mansions, or sumptuous apparel, not to mention other splendid objects of general admiration, should have power to captivate the greater part of our species; and that the beauty of a virtuous mind, capable of meeting our affection with an equal return, should not have sufficient allurements to inspire the most ardent passion! I said, “capable of meeting our affection with an equal return:” For nothing, surely, can be more delightful, than to live in a constant interchange and vicissitude of reciprocal good offices. If we add

to

to this, as with truth we may, that a similitude of manners is the most powerful of all attractions; it must be granted, that the virtuous are strongly impelled towards each other, by that moral tendency and natural relationship which subsists between them.

No proposition therefore can be more evident, I think, than that the virtuous must necessarily, and by an implanted sense in the human heart, receive impressions of good-will towards each other; and these are the natural source, from whence genuine friendship can only flow. Not that a good man's benevolence is by any means confined to a single object: he extends it to every individual. For true virtue, incapable of partial and contracted exceptions to the exercise of her benign spirit, enlarges the soul with sentiments of universal philanthropy. How, indeed, could it be consistent with her character, to take whole *nations* under her protection;

tection; if even the lowest ranks of mankind, as well as the highest, were not the proper objects of beneficence?⁶

But to return to the more immediate object of our present consideration.— They who insist that, “utility is the
“first and prevailing motive, which
“induces mankind to enter into particular friendships,” appear to me to divest the association of its most amiable and engaging principle. For to a mind rightly composed, it is not so much the benefits received, as the affectionate zeal from which they flow, that gives them their best and most valuable recommendation. It is so far indeed from being verified by fact, that a sense of our wants is the original cause of forming these amicable alliances; that, on the contrary, it is observable, that none have been more distinguished in their friendships than those whose power and opulence, but above all, whose superior virtue, (a much firmer support)

port) have raised them above every necessity of having recourse to the assistance of others. Perhaps, however, it may admit of a question, whether it were desirable that one's friend should be so absolutely sufficient for himself, as to have no wants of any kind to which his own powers were not abundantly adequate. I am sure, at least, I should have been deprived of a most exquisite satisfaction, if no opportunity had ever offered to approve the affectionate zeal of my heart towards Scipio, and he had never had occasion, either in his civil or military transactions, to make use of my counsel, or my aid.

The true distinction, then, in this question is, that "although friendship
"is certainly productive of utility, yet
"utility is not the primary motive of
"friendship." Those selfish sensualists, therefore, who lulled in the lap of luxury, presume to maintain the reverse, have surely no claim to atten-

tion; as they are neither qualified by *reflection*, nor *experience*, to be competent judges of the subject^w.

Good Gods! is there a man upon the face of the earth, who would deliberately accept of all the wealth and all the affluence this world can bestow, if offered to him upon the severe terms of his being unconnected with a single mortal whom he could love, or by whom he should be beloved? This would be to lead the wretched life of a detested tyrant, who, amidst perpetual suspicions and alarms, passes his miserable days a stranger to every tender sentiment, and utterly precluded from the heart-felt satisfactions of friendship. For who can love the man he fears? or how can affection dwell with a consciousness of being feared?

^w "Luxury," as an ingenious writer well observes, "confining a man's whole views to himself, admits not of friendship, and scarcely of any other social passion."—*Sketches of the History of Man*, I. 271.

He

He may be flattered, indeed, by his followers with the specious semblance of personal attachment: but whenever he falls (and many instances there are of such a reverse of fortune)⁴⁷ it will appear how totally destitute he stood of every genuine friend. Accordingly it is reported, that Tarquin used to say in his exile, that “his misfortunes had taught him to discern his real from his pretended friends, as it was now no longer in his power to make either of them any returns.” I should much wonder, however, if, with a temper so insolent and ferocious, he ever had a sincere friend.

But as the haughtiness of Tarquin’s imperious deportment, rendered it impossible for him to know the satisfaction of enjoying a faithful attachment; so it frequently happens, that the being advanced into exalted stations, equally proves the occasion of excluding the great and the powerful from possessing

that inestimable felicity. Fortune, indeed, is not only blind herself, but is apt to affect her favourites with the same infirmity. Weak minds, elated with being distinguished by her smiles, are generally disposed to assume an arrogant and supercilious demeanour; and there is not in the whole compass of nature a more insufferable creature, than a prosperous fool. Prosperity, in truth, has been observed to produce wonderful transformations even in persons who before had always the good sense to deport themselves in a modest and unassuming manner; and their heads have been so turned by the eminence to which they were raised, as to look down with neglect and contempt on their old friends, while their new connections entirely engaged all their attention and favour. But there cannot, surely, be a more flagrant instance of weakness and folly, than to employ the great advantages of extensive influence and opulent possessions in the purchase
of

of brilliant equipages, gaudy rayment, elegant vases, together with every other fashionable decoration which wealth and power can procure; and yet neglect to use the means they afford of acquiring that noblest and most valuable ornament of human life, a worthy and faithful friend! The absurdity of this conduct is the more amazing, as after all the base sacrifices that may have been made to obtain these vain and ostentatious embellishments, the holding of them must ever be precarious. For whoever shall invade them with a stronger arm, to *him* they will infallibly belong*: whereas a true friend is a treasure which no power, how formidable soever, can be sufficient to wrest from the happy possessor.⁴⁸ But admitting that the favours of fortune were in their nature permanent and irrevocable; yet how joyless and insipid

* When Cræsus shewed Solon his riches, the latter told him, that whoever should come with better *iron* would soon be master of his *gold*.

must they prove, if not heightened and endeared by the society and participation of a bosom friend!

But not to pursue reflections of this sort any farther; let me rather observe, that it is necessary to settle some fixed standard or measure, by which to regulate and adjust the kind affections in the commerce under consideration. To this intent, three different criterions, I find, have been proposed. The first is, "that in all important occurrences, we should act towards our friend precisely in the same manner as if the case were our own:" the second, "that our good offices should be exactly dealt out, both in degree and value, by the measure and merit of those we receive from him:" and the last, "that our conduct in relation to all his concerns, should be governed by the same kind of sentiments with which he appears to be actuated in respect to them himself."

Now

Now there is not one of these several rules, to which I can entirely give my approbation. The first is by no means, I think, just; because there are many things I would undertake on my friend's account, which I should never prevail with myself to act on my own. For instance; I would not scruple on his behalf to solicit, nor even to supplicate, a man of a mean and worthless character; nor to repel, with peculiar acrimony and indignation, any affront or injury that might be offered to him. And this conduct, which I could not hold without blame in matters that merely concerned myself, I very laudably might in those which relate to my friend.

Add

“ The best way to represent to the life the manifold *use* of friendship, is to cast and see how many things there are which a man cannot do himself: and then it will appear that it was a sparing speech of the antients, that *a friend is another himself*; for a friend is far more than *himself*.—How many things are there which a man cannot with any force or comeliness say or do himself! He can scarce alledge

Add to this, that there are many advantages which a generous mind would willingly forego, or suffer himself to be deprived of, that his friend might enjoy the benefit of them.⁴⁹

With regard to the second criterion, which determines the measure of our affection and good offices, by exactly proportioning them to the value and quality we receive of each; it degrades the connection into a mere mercantile account between debtor and creditor. True friendship is animated by much too liberal and enlarged a spirit, to distribute her beneficence with a careful and penurious circumspection, lest she

“ his own merits with modesty, much less extol them;
 “ —cannot sometimes brook to supplicate or beg,
 “ &c. So, again, a man's person hath many proper
 “ relations which he cannot put off. He cannot speak
 “ to his son but as a father; to his wife but as a husband;
 “ to his enemy but upon terms: whereas a
 “ friend may speak as the case requires, and not as it
 “ sorteth with the person.” —*Lord Bacon's Essays.*

should

should bestow more abundantly than she receives: she scorns to poize the balance so exactly equal, that nothing shall be placed in the one scale, without its equivalent in the other^z.

The third maxim is still less admissible than either of the two former. There are some characters who are apt to entertain too low an opinion of their personal merit, and whose spirits are frequently much too languid and depressed, to exert themselves with proper vigour and activity for the promotion of their own interest or honours. Under circumstances of this kind, shall the zeal of a friend rise no higher than one's own, but cautiously be restrained within the same humble level? On the contrary, he ought to endeavour, by every means in his power, to dispel the

^z "Comme il y a des rivières," says the ingenious Balzac, "qui ne font jamais tant de bien que quand elles se débordent; de même, l'amitié n'a rien de meilleur que l'excès."

gloom

gloom that overcasts the mind of his desponding associate, and animate his hopes with livelier and more sanguine expectations.

And now, having pointed out the insufficiency of the several criteria I have mentioned; it is necessary I should produce some other, more adequate and satisfactory. But before I deliver my own opinion in respect to this article, suffer me previously to observe, that Scipio used frequently to say, there never was a caution advanced more injurious to the principles of true amity, than the famous precept which advises, “so to regulate your affection towards
“your friend, as to remember that the
“time may possibly come when you shall
“have reason to hate him.” He could never, he said, be persuaded that Bias, a man so distinguished for wisdom as to be ranked among the seven celebrated sages of Greece, was really the author, as he is generally supposed, of so
§ unworthy

unworthy a precaution.⁴⁹ It was rather the maxim, he imagined, of some fordid wretch, or perhaps of some ambitious statesman, who, a stranger to every nobler sentiment of the human heart, had no other object in forming his connections, but as they might prove conducive to the increase or establishment of his power. It is impossible, certainly, to entertain a friendship for any man of whom you cherish so unfavourable an opinion, as to suppose he may hereafter give you cause to become his enemy. In reality, if this axiom were justly founded, and it be right to sit thus loose in our affections; we ought to wish that our friend might give us frequent occasions to complain of his conduct; to lament whenever he acted in a laudable manner; and to envy every advantage that might attend him; lest unhappily he should lay too strong a hold on our heart. This unworthy rule, therefore, whoever was the author of it, is evidently calculated for
the

the utter extirpation of true amity. The more rational advice would have been, as Scipio remarked, to be always so cautious in forming friendships, as never to place our esteem and affections where there was a probability of their being converted into the opposite sentiments. But at all events, if we should be so unfortunate as to make an improper choice; it were wiser, he thought, not to look forward to *possible* contingencies, than to be always acting upon the defensive, and painfully guarding against future dissensions.

I think, then, the only measures that can be properly recommended respecting our *general* conduct in the article of friendship, is, in the first place, to be careful that we form the connection with men of strict and irreproachable manners; and in the next, frankly to lay open to each other all our thoughts, inclinations, and purposes, without the
least

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least caution, reserve, or disguise. I will venture even to add, that in cases in which the life, or good fame, of a friend is concerned, it may be allowable to deviate a little from the path of strict right, in order to comply with his desires; provided, however, that by this compliance our own character be not materially affected.⁵⁰ And this is the largest concession that should be made to friendship: for the good opinion of the public ought never to be lightly esteemed; nor the general affection of our fellow-citizens considered as a matter of little importance, in carrying on the great affairs of the world. Popularity, indeed, if purchased at the expence of base condescensions to the vices or the follies of the people, is a disgrace to the possessor: but when it is the just and natural result of a laudable and patriotic conduct, it is an acquisition which no wise man will ever contemn.

But

But to return to Scipio. Friendship was his favourite topic ; and I have frequently heard him remark, that there is no article in which mankind usually act with so much negligence, as in what relates to this connection. Every one, he observed, informs himself with great exactness of what numbers his flocks and his herds consist ; but who is it that endeavours to *ascertain* his real friends, with the same requisite precision ! Thus likewise, in choosing the former, much caution is commonly used in order to discover those significant marks which denote their proper qualities ; whereas, in selecting the latter, it is seldom that any great attention is exerted to discern those moral signatures, which indicate the qualifications necessary to constitute a friend.

One of the principal ingredients to form that character, is a “steadiness
“and constancy of temper.” This virtue, it must be confessed, is not very
generally

generally to be found among mankind: nor is there any other mean to discover in whose bosom it resides, than experience. But as this experience cannot fully be acquired, till the connection is already formed; affection is apt to take the lead of judgment, and render a previous trial impossible. It is the part of prudence, therefore, to restrain a predilection from carrying us precipitately into the arms of a new friend, before we have, in some degree at least, put his moral qualifications to the test. A very inconsiderable article of money, may be sufficient to prove the levity of some men's professions of friendship; whilst a much larger sum in contest will be necessary, to shake the constancy of others. But should there be a few, perhaps, who are actuated by too generous a spirit, to suffer any pecuniary interest to stand in competition with the claims of amity; yet where shall we find the man, who will not readily surrender his friendship to his ambition,

when

when they happen to interfere? Human nature is, in general, much too weak to resist the charms which surround these glittering temptations; and men are apt to flatter themselves, that although they should acquire wealth or power by violating the duties of friendship, the world will be too much dazzled by the splendor of the objects, to take notice of the unworthy sacrifice they make to obtain them. And hence it is, that real, unfeigned amity is so seldom to be met with among those who are engaged in the pursuit, or possession, of the honours and the offices of the commonwealth.⁵¹

To mention another species of trial, which few likewise have the firmness to sustain.—How severe is it thought by the generality of mankind, to take a voluntary share in the calamities of others! And yet it is in the hour of adversity, as Ennius well observes, that friendship must principally prove
her

her truth and strength. In short, the deserting of a friend in his distress, and the neglecting of him in one's own prosperity, are the two tests which discover the weakness and instability of most connections of this nature. To preserve, therefore, in those seasons of probation, an immoveable and unshaken fidelity, is a virtue so exceedingly rare, that I had almost called it more than human.⁵²

The great support and security of that invariable constancy and steadiness which I require in a friend, is a strong and delicate sense of honour: for there can be no reliance upon any man, who is totally uninfluenced by that principle, or in whom it operates but faintly. It is essential also, in order to form a permanent connection, that the object of our choice should not only have the same general turn of mind with our own, but possess an open, artless, and ingenuous temper: for where any one

of those qualities are wanting, vain would it be to expect a lasting and faithful attachment. True friendship, indeed, is absolutely inconsistent with every species of artifice and duplicity: and it is equally impossible it should be maintained between persons whose dispositions and general modes of thinking, do not perfectly accord. I must add, as another requisite for that stability I am speaking of, that the party should neither be capable of taking an ill-natured satisfaction in reprehending the frailties of his friend, nor easily induced to credit those imputations, with which the malice of others may asperse him.

These reflections sufficiently confirm that position I set out with in this conversation, when I asserted that "true friendship can only be found among the virtuous." For in the first place, sincerity is so essential a quality in forming a good, or, if you please, a

wife, man, (for they are convertible terms) that a person of that character would deem it more generous to be a declared enemy, than to conceal a rancorous heart under a smooth brow: and in the next, the same generous simplicity of heart would not only induce him to vindicate his friend against the accusation of others, but render him incapable of cherishing in his own breast that little suspicious temper, which is ever apt to take offence, and perpetually discovering some imaginary violation of amity.

Add to this, that his conversation and address ought to be sweetened with a certain ease and politeness of language and manners, that wonderfully contribute to heighten and improve the relish of this intercourse. A solemn, severe demeanour, may be very proper, I confess, in certain characters, to give them their proper impression; but friendship should wear a more pleasing aspect, and

at all times appear with a complacent, affable, and unconstrained countenance.

And here, I cannot forbear taking notice of an extraordinary question, which some, it seems, have considered as not altogether without difficulty. It has been asked, “is the pleasure of acquiring a
“new friend, supposing him endued
“with virtues which render him deserving our choice, preferable to the
“satisfaction of possessing an old one?”
On the same account, I presume, as we prefer a young horse to one that is grown old in our service: for never, surely, was there a doubt proposed, more unworthy of a rational mind! It is not with friendships as with acquisitions of most other kinds, which after frequent enjoyment are generally attended with satiety; on the contrary, the longer we preserve them, like those sorts of wine that will bear age, the more relishing and valuable they become. Accordingly, the proverb justly says, that “one must eat
“many

“ many a peck of salt with a man, before he can have sufficient opportunities to approve himself a thorough friend.” Not that new connections are to be declined, provided appearances indicate that, in due time, they may ripen into the happy fruits of a well-contracted amity. Old friendships, however, certainly have a claim to the superior degree of our esteem, were it for no other reason than from that powerful impression which antient habits of every kind naturally make upon the human heart. To have recourse once more to the ludicrous instance I just now suggested: who is there that would not prefer a horse whose paces he had been long accustomed to, before one that was new and untrained to his hand? Even things inanimate lay a strong hold on the mind, by the mere force of custom; as is observable in that rooted affection we bear towards those places, though never so wild and uncultivated, in which a con-

considerable part of our earlier days have been passed.

It frequently happens that there is a great disparity between intimate friends, both in point of rank and talents. Now under these circumstances, “ he who “ has the advantage, should never appear sensible of his superiority.” Thus Scipio, who stood distinguished in the little group, if I may so call it, of our select associates, never discovered in his behaviour the least consciousness of his pre-eminence over Philus, Rupilius, Memmius, or any other of his particular connections, who were of subordinate abilities or station. And with regard to his brother Q. Maximus, who, although a man of great merit, and his senior, was by no means comparable with Scipio; he always treated him with as much deference and regard, as if he had advanced as far beyond him in every other article as in point

point of years. In short, it was his constant endeavour to raise all his friends into an equal degree of consequence with himself: and his example well deserves to be imitated. Whatever excellencies, therefore, a man may possess, in respect to his virtues, his intellectual endowments, or the accidental favours of fortune; he ought generously to communicate the benefits of them with his friends and family. Agreeably to these principles, should he happen to be descended from an obscure ancestry, and see any of his relations in distressed circumstances, or that require the assistance of his superior power or abilities; it is incumbent upon him to employ his credit, his riches, and his talents, to supply their respective deficiencies, and reflect back upon them every honour and advantage they are capable of receiving. Dramatic writers, when the fabulous hero of their play, after having been educated under some poor shepherd, ignorant of his

true parent, is discovered to be of royal lineage, or the offspring, perhaps, of some celestial divinity; always think it necessary to exhibit the noble youth as still retaining a grateful affection for the honest rustic to whom he had so long supposed himself indebted for his birth: but how much more are these sentiments due to Him, who has a legitimate claim to his filial tenderness and respect! In a word, the most sensible satisfaction that can result from advantageous distinctions of every sort, is in the pleasure a well-constituted mind must feel, by exerting them for the benefit of every individual to whom he stands related, either by the ties of kindred or amity.

But if He, who, on account of any of those superiorities which I have mentioned, appears the most conspicuous figure in the circle of his friends, ought by no means to discover, in his behaviour towards them, the least apparent
sense

sense of the eminence on which he stands : so neither should *they*, on the other hand, betray sentiments of envy or dissatisfaction in seeing him thus exalted above them. It must be acknowledged, however, that in situations of this kind, the latter are too apt to be unreasonable in their expectations; to complain that their friend is not sufficiently attentive to their interest; and sometimes even to break out into open remonstrances; especially if they think they are entitled to plead the merit of any considerable services, to strengthen their respective claims. But to be capable of reproaching a man with the obligations you have conferred upon him, is a disposition exceedingly contemptible and odious: it is *his* part, indeed, not to forget the good offices he has received; but ill, certainly, would it become his friend to be the monitor for that purpose.

It

It is not sufficient, therefore, merely to behave with an easy condescension towards those friends who are of less considerable note than one's self; it is incumbent upon him to bring them forward, and, as much as possible, to raise their consequence. The apprehension of not being treated with sufficient regard, sometimes creates much uneasiness in this connection: and those tempers are most liable to be disquieted by this suspicion, that are inclined to entertain too low an opinion of their own merit. It is the part therefore of a generous and benevolent mind, to endeavour to relieve his friend from the mortification of these humiliating sentiments, not only by professions, but by essential services.

The proper measure by which these services ought to be regulated, must be taken partly from the extent of our own power, and partly from what the person who is the object of our particular

particular affection, has abilities to sustain. For how unlimited soever a man's authority and influence might be, it would be impossible to raise indiscriminately all his friends by turns into the same honourable stations. Thus Scipio, although he had sufficient interest to procure the consular dignity for Publius Rutilius, could not perform the same good office for Lucius, the brother of that consul. But even admitting that you had the arbitrary disposal of every dignity of the state; still it would be necessary well to examine, whether your friend's talents were equal to his ambition, and sufficiently qualified him to discharge the duties of the post in question, with credit to himself and advantage to the public.

It is proper to observe, that in stating the duties and obligations of friendship, those intimacies alone can justly be taken into consideration, which are formed at a time of life when men's characters

characters are decided, and their judgments arrived at maturity. As to the associates of our early years, the companions and partners of our puerile pleasures and amusements; they can by no means, simply on that account, be deemed in the number of friends. Indeed, if the first objects of our affection had the best claim to be received into that rank; our nurses and our pedagogues would, certainly, have a right to the most considerable share of our regard. Some degree of it is unquestionably due to them; but of a kind, however, far different from that which is the subject of our present inquiry. The truth is, were our early attachments the just foundation of amity, it would be impossible that the union should ever be permanent. For our inclinations and pursuits take a different turn, as we advance into riper years: and where these are no longer similar, the true cement of friendship is dissolved. It is the total disparity between

tween the disposition and manners of the virtuous and the vicious, that alone renders their coalition incompatible.

There is a certain intemperate degree of affection towards one's friends, which it is necessary to restrain; as the indulging of it has frequently, and in very important situations, proved extremely prejudicial to their interest. To exemplify my meaning by an instance from antient story: Neoptolemus would never have had the glory of taking Troy, had his friend Lycomedes, in whose court he had been educated, succeeded in his too warm and earnest solicitations not to hazard his person in that famous expedition.⁵⁴ There are numberless occasions, which may render an absence between friends highly expedient: and to endeavour, from an impatience of separation, to prevent it, betrays a degree of weakness inconsistent with that firm and manly spirit, without which it is impossible

fible to act up to the character of a true friend. And this is a farther confirmation of the maxim I before insisted upon, that “in a commerce of friendship, “mutual requests or concessions should “neither be made, nor granted, without “due and mature deliberation.”

But to turn our reflections from those nobler alliances of this kind, which are formed between men of eminent and superior virtue, to that lower species which occurs in the ordinary intercourse of the world.—In connections of this nature, it sometimes unfortunately happens, that circumstances arise which render it expedient for a man of honour to break with his friend. Some latent vice, perhaps, or concealed ill-humour, unexpectedly discovers itself in his behaviour either towards his friends themselves, or towards others, which cannot be overlooked without participating his disgrace. The most adviseable and prudent conduct in

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in situations of this kind, is to suffer the intimacy to wear out by silent and insensible degrees; or, to use a strong expression, which I remember to have fallen from Cato upon a similar occasion, "the bands of friendship should be gradually *untied*, rather than suddenly *cut asunder*!" always supposing, however, that the offence is not of so atrocious a nature, as to render an absolute and immediate alienation indispensably requisite for one's own honour.

As it is not unusual, (for I am still speaking of common friendships) that dissensions arise from some extraordinary change of manners or sentiments, or from some contrariety of opinions with respect to public affairs; the parties at variance should be much upon their guard, lest their behaviour towards each other should give the world occasion to remark, that they have not only ceased to be cordial friends, but are become inveterate enemies: for nothing
is

is more indecent than to appear in open war with a man, with whom one has formerly lived upon terms of familiarity and good fellowship.

Scipio estranged himself from Quintus Pompeius, you well know, solely upon my account; as the dissensions which arose in the republic alienated him also from my colleague Metellus." But in both instances he preserved the dignity of his character, and never suffered himself to be betrayed into the least improper warmth of resentment.

Upon the whole, then, the first great caution in this commerce should be, studiously to avoid all occasions of discord: but if any should necessarily arise; the next is, to manage the quarrel with so much temper and moderation, that the flame of friendship shall appear to have gently subsided, rather than to have been violently extinguished.

ed. But above all, whenever a diffen-
 tion happens between the parties, they
 should be particularly on their guard
 against indulging a virulent animos-
 ity; as a spirit of this exasperated
 kind, when unrestrained, is apt to
 break forth into expressions of the
 most malevolent contumely and re-
 proach. In a case of this nature, if the
 language should not be too insulting to
 be borne, it will be prudent, in confi-
 deration of their former friendship, to
 receive it without a return: for by this
 forbearance the reviler, and not the
 reviled, will appear the person that most
 deserves to be condemned.

The sure, and indeed the *only* sure,
 means to escape the several errors and
 inconveniencies I have pointed out, is,
 in the first place, “ never hastily to en-
 “ gage in friendships;” and in the next,
 “ not to enter into them with those
 “ who are unworthy of the connec-
 “ tion.”³⁶ Now he alone is worthy,

whose personal merit, independent of all other considerations, renders him the just object of affection and esteem. Characters of this sort, it must be confessed, are extremely rare, as indeed every other species of excellence generally is; nothing being more uncommon than to meet with what is perfect in its kind, in any subject whatsoever. But the misfortune is, that the generality of the world have no conception of any other *merit*, than what may be turned to interest: they love their friends upon the same principle, and in the same proportion, as they love their flocks and their herds; giving just so much of their regard to each, as is equal to the *profits* they respectively produce.

Hence it is, they are for ever strangers to the sweet complacencies of that generous amity, which springs from those natural instincts originally impressed upon the human soul; and is simply desirable for its own abstracted and
5 intrinsic

intrinsic value. To convince them, however, of the possible existence at least, and powerful efficacy, of an affection utterly void of all mercenary motives; they need only be referred to what passes in their own bosoms. For the love which every man bears to himself, does not, certainly, flow from any expected recompence or reward, but solely from that pure and innate regard which each individual feels for his own person. Now if the same kind of affection be not transferred into friendship, it will be in vain to hope for a true friend; as a true friend is no other, in effect, than a second *self*."

To these reflections we may add, that if two distinct principles universally prevail throughout the whole animal creation; in the first place, that love of self which is common to every sensitive being; and in the next, a certain degree of social affection, by which every individual of the same species is led to

herd with its kind; how much more strongly has nature infused into the heart of man, together with a principle of self-love, this herding disposition! By the latter he is powerfully impelled, not only to unite with his species in general, but to look out for some particular associate, with whom he may be so intimately blended in sentiments and inclinations, as to form, I had almost said, one soul in two bodies?

The generality of mankind are so unreasonable, not to say arrogant, as to require that their friends should be formed by a more perfect model than themselves are able, or willing, to imitate:^{ss} whereas the first endeavour should be, to acquire yourself those moral excellencies which constitute a virtuous character, and then to find an associate whose good qualities reflect back the true image of your own. Thus would the fair fabric of friendship be erected upon that immoveable basis,
I which

which I have so repeatedly recommended in the course of this inquiry. For what should endanger its stability, when a mutual affection between the parties is blended with principles that raise them above those mean passions, by which the greater part of the world are usually governed? Being equally actuated by a strong sense of justice and equity, they will at all times equally be zealous to exert their utmost powers in the service of each other; well assured that nothing will ever be required, on either side, inconsistent with the dictates of truth and honour. In consequence of these principles, they will not only love, but *revere*, each other. I say *revere*; for where reverence does not dwell with affection, amity is bereaved of her noblest and most graceful ornament.

It is an error, therefore, that leads to the most pernicious consequences, to imagine that the laws of friendship su-

perfece those of moral obligation, and justify a participation with licentiousness and debauchery. Nature has sown the seed of that social affection in the heart of man, for purposes far different; not to produce confederates in vice, but auxiliaries in virtue. Solitary and sequestered virtue is indeed incapable of rising to the same height, as when she acts in conjunction with an affectionate and animating companion of her generous efforts. They who are thus leagued in reciprocal support and encouragement of each other's moral ambition, may be considered as setting out together, in the best company, and surest road, towards those desirable objects in which nature has placed the supreme felicity of man." Yes, my friends, I will repeat it again; an amity ennobled by these exalted principles, and directed to these laudable purposes, leads to honour and to glory; and is productive, at the same time, of that sweet satisfaction and complacency of mind,

mind, which, in conjunction with the two former, essentially constitute real happiness. He, therefore, who means to acquire these great and ultimate beatitudes of human life, must receive them from the hands of virtue; as neither friendship, or aught else deservedly valuable, can possibly be obtained without *her* influence and intervention. For they who persuade themselves that they may possess a true friend, at least, where moral merit has no share in producing the connection, will find themselves miserably deceived, whenever some severe misfortune shall give them occasion to make the decisive experiment.

It is a maxim, then, which cannot too frequently nor too strongly be inculcated, that in forming the attachment we are speaking of, "we should never suffer *affection* to take root in our hearts before *judgment* has time to interpose:" for in no circumstance

of our lives can a hasty and inconsiderate choice be attended with more fatal consequences. But the folly is, that we generally forbear to deliberate till consideration can nothing avail: and hence it is, that after the association has been habitually formed, and many good offices, perhaps, have been mutually interchanged, some latent flaw becomes visible; and the union which was precipitately cemented is no less suddenly dissolved. Now this inattention is the more blame-worthy and astonishing, as friendship is the only article, among the different objects of human pursuits, the value and importance of which is unanimously, and without any exception, acknowledged. I say the *only* article: For even virtue herself is not universally held in esteem; and there are many who represent all her high pretensions as mere affectation and ostentatious parade. There are, too, whose moderate desires are satisfied with humble meals and lowly roofs,
and

and who look upon riches with sovereign contempt. How many are there who think, that those honours which inflame the ambition of others, are of all human vanities the most frivolous! In like manner, throughout all the rest of those several objects which divide the passions of mankind; what some admire, others most heartily despise. Whereas, with respect to friendship, there are not two different opinions: the active and the ambitious, the retired and the contemplative, even the sensualist himself (if he would indulge his appetites with any degree of refinement) unanimously acknowledge that, without friendship, life can have no true enjoyment. She insinuates herself, indeed, by I know not what irresistible charm, into the hearts of every rank and class of men, and mixes in all the various modes and arrangements of human life. Were there a man in the world of so morose and acrimonious a disposition, as to shun (agreeably to what

what we are told of a certain Timon of Athens) all communication with his species; even such an odious misanthropist could not endure to be excluded from one associate, at least, before whom he might discharge the whole rancour and virulence of his heart." The truth is, if we could suppose ourselves transported by some divinity into a solitude, replete with all the delicacies which the heart of man could desire, but secluded at the same time from every possible intercourse with our kind; there is not a person in the world of so unsocial and savage a temper, as to be capable, under these forlorn circumstances, of relishing any enjoyment. Accordingly, nothing is more true than what Archytas of Tarentum^a, if I mistake not, is reported to have said, "That were a man to be carried up into heaven, and the beauties of universal nature dis-

^a See Rem. on Cato, p. 210. No. 46.

" played

“played to his view; he would receive but little pleasure from the wonderful scene, if there were none to whom he might relate the glories he had beheld.” Human nature, indeed, is so constituted as to be incapable of lonely satisfactions: man, like those plants which are formed to embrace others, is led by an instinctive impulse to recline on his species; and he finds his happiest and most secure support in the arms of a faithful friend. But although in this instance, as in every other, nature points out her tendencies by a variety of unambiguous notices, and proclaims her meaning in the most emphatical language; yet, I know not how it is, we seem strangely blind to her clearest signals, and deaf to her loudest voice!

The offices of friendship are so numerous, and of such different kinds, that many little disgusts may arise in the exercise of them, which a man of true good

good sense will either avoid, extenuate, or be contented to bear, as the nature and circumstances of the case may render most expedient. But there is one particular duty which may frequently occur, and which he will at all hazards of offence discharge; as it is never to be superseded consistently with the truth and fidelity he owes to the connection; I mean the duty of admonishing, and even reproving, his friend: an office which, whenever it is affectionately exercised, should be kindly received. It must be confessed, however, that the remark of my dramatic friend is too frequently verified, who observes in his *Andria*, that “obsequiousness conciliates friends, but truth creates enemies.” When truth proves the bane of friendship, we may have reason, indeed, to be sorry for the unnatural consequence; but we should have cause to be more sorry, if we suffered a friend, by a culpable indulgence, to expose his character to just reproach.

proach. Upon these delicate occasions, however, we should be particularly careful to deliver our advice, or reproof, without the least appearance of acrimony or insult. Let our *obsequiousness* (to repeat the significant expression of Terence) extend as far as gentleness of manners, and the rules of good breeding require; but far let it be from seducing us to flatter either vice or misconduct: a meanness unworthy, not only of every man who claims to himself the title of friend, but of every liberal and ingenuous mind. Shall we live with a friend, upon the same cautious terms we must submit to live with a tyrant? Desperate indeed must that man's moral disorders be, who shuts his ears to the voice of truth, when delivered by a sincere and affectionate monitor! It was a saying of Cato (and he had many that well deserve to be remembered) that "some men were more
" obliged to their inveterate enemies,
" than to their complaisant friends;

" as

“as they frequently heard the truth
“from the one, but never from the
“other.” In short, the great absurdity
is, that men are apt, in the instances
under consideration, to direct both
their dislike and their approbation to
the wrong object. They hate the admo-
nition, and love the vice: whereas they
ought, on the contrary, to hate the
vice, and love the admonition.

As nothing therefore is more suitable
to the genius and spirit of true friend-
ship, than to give and receive advice,
to give it, I mean, with freedom, but
without rudeness^b, and to receive it,
not only without reluctance, but with
patience; so nothing is more injurious

^b There are few, says Plutarch, who have the in-
clination or courage to reprove the misconduct of a
friend, and still fewer who know how to exercise that
kindly office at a seasonable time and in a proper man-
ner; the generality of those who have the fidelity to
interpose their advice upon such occasions, being apt
to mistake rude reprehension, and severe invective, for
an honest and laudable freedom.

to

to the connection than flattery, compliment, or adulation. I multiply these equivalent terms, in order to mark with stronger emphasis the detestable and dangerous character of those pretended friends, who, strangers to the dictates of truth, constantly hold the language which they are sure will be most acceptable. But if counterfeit appearances, of every species, are base and dishonest attempts to impose upon the judgment of the unwary; they are more peculiarly so in a commerce of amity, and absolutely repugnant to the vital principle of that sacred relation: for, without sincerity, friendship is a mere name, that has neither meaning or efficacy. It is the essential property of this alliance, to form so intimate a coalition between the parties, that they seem to be actuated, as it were, by one common spirit: but it is impossible that this unity of mind should be produced, when there is one of them in which it does not subsist
even

even in his own person; who, with a duplicity of soul which sets him at perpetual variance from himself, assumes opposite sentiments and opinions, as is most convenient to his present purpose. Nothing in nature, indeed, is so pliant and versatile as the genius of a flatterer; who always acts and pretends to think in conformity, not only to the will and inclination, but even to the looks and countenance, of another. Like Gnatho in the play, he can prevail with himself to say either *yes* or *no*, as best suits the occasion; and he lays it down as his general maxim, never to dissent from the company.⁶²

Terence exposes this baseness of soul, in the person of a contemptible parasite; but how much more contemptible does it appear, when exhibited in the conduct of one who dares usurp the name of friend! The mischief is, that there are many Gnathos, of a much superior rank and consequence,

to

to be met with in the commerce of the world: and it is from this class of flatterers that the greatest danger is to be apprehended; as the poison they administer receives additional strength and efficacy, from the hand that conveys it. Nevertheless, a man of good sense and discernment, if he will exert the requisite attention, will always be able to distinguish the *complaisant* from the *sincere* friend, with the same certainty that he may, in any other subject, perceive the difference between the counterfeit and the genuine. It is observable in the general assemblies of the people, composed as they are of the most ignorant part of the community, that even the populace know how to discriminate the soothing insidious orator, whose only aim is to acquire popularity, from the firm, inflexible, and undesigning patriot. A remarkable instance of this kind lately appeared, when Caius Papirius proposed a law to enable the Tribunes, at the expira-

tion of their office, to be re-elected for the ensuing year: upon which he employed every insinuating art of address, to seduce and captivate the ears of the multitude. Not to mention the part I took myself upon that occasion; it was opposed by Scipio with such a commanding flow of eloquence, and invincible strength of reason, that this popular law was rejected by the very populace themselves.⁶³ But you were present at the debate; and his speech is in every body's hands. I cannot forbear giving you another instance, likewise, although it is one particularly relating to myself. You may remember that in the consulate of Lucius Mancinus, and Quintus Maximus the brother of Scipio, a very popular law was moved by Caius Licinius; who proposed that the privilege of electing to the sacerdotal offices, should be transferred from the respective colleges to the general assemblies of the people: and let me remark by the way, it was upon this occasion

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that

that Licinius, in complaisance to the people, first introduced the practice of addressing them with his back turned upon the senate-house.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the pious reverence which is due to every circumstance that concerns the worship of the immortal Gods, together with the arguments by which I exposed the impropriety of his motion, prevailed over all the specious colourings of his plausible oratory. This affair was agitated during my prætorship; and I was not chosen consul till five years afterwards: so that it is evident I owed my success more to the force of truth, than to the influence of station.

Now if in popular assemblies, a scene, of all others, in which fiction and fallacious representations have the greatest scope, and are usually employed with the most success; Truth, when fairly stated and properly enforced, could thus prevail; with how much more

reason may she expect to be favourably heard in an intercourse of friendship, the very essence whereof depends upon sincerity ! In a commerce of this nature, indeed, if you are not permitted to see into the most hidden recesses of your friend's bosom, and do not with equal unreserve, lay open to him the full exposure of your own ; there can be no just ground for confidence on either side, nor even sufficient evidence that any affection subsists between you.⁶⁵ With respect, however, to that particular deviation from truth, which is the object of our present consideration ; it must be acknowledged, that, noxious as flattery is, no man was ever infected by it, who did not love and encourage the offering. Accordingly, there is no turn of mind so liable to be tainted by this sort of poison, as a disposition to entertain too high conceit of one's own merit. I must confess at the same time, that conscious virtue cannot be void of self-esteem ; as well knowing her own worth,

worth, and how amiable her form appears. But the *pretenders* to virtue are much more numerous than the really virtuous : and it is of the former only that I am now speaking. Men of that character are particularly delighted with adulation, as confirming their title, they imagine, to the merit they so vainly claim.

It
Plutarch has written an ingenious tract concerning the marks by which a flatterer may be distinguished from a friend ; and among many excellent precepts for that purpose, he particularly advises his reader to be upon his guard against the self-delusions of vanity. For there is no turn of mind that lays a man so open and exposed to the insidious practices of those who mean to take advantages of his weakness, as to entertain an over-weening opinion of his own merit. But into snares of this kind, continues the admirable moralist, those men can never fall, who, in obedience to the famous oracle, study “ to know themselves.” They will discover such a mixture of frailties, follies, and vices, blended with their virtues, and will find, upon a review of their conduct, so many humiliating occasions of self-condemnation, as cannot fail of rendering them firm and inaccessible against the dangerous approaches of adulation. It

It appears then, that genuine friendship cannot possibly exist, where one of the parties is unwilling to hear truth, and the other is equally indisposed to speak it. Friends of this kind are by no means uncommon in the world: and indeed, there would be neither propriety nor humour in the character of a parasite as exhibited by our comic writers, were a vain-glorious soldier, for example, never to be met with in real life. When the braggart Captain in the play asks Gnatho, "Did Thais return me many thanks, say you?" An artless man would have thought it sufficient to answer "many;" but the cunning sycophant replies, "*immense, innumerable*:" for a skilful flatterer per-

was from this just sense of human imperfections that Alexander used to say, his animal appetites, together with his constantly standing in need of being repaired by sleep, were two circumstances that sufficiently secured him from the flattery of those base courtiers, who endeavoured to persuade him he was more than

fectly

fectly well knows, that a pleasing circumstance can never be too much exaggerated, in the opinion of the person upon whom he means to practise.

But although flattery chiefly operates on those whose vanity encourages and invites the exercise of it; yet these are not the only sort of men upon whom it may impose. There is a delicate and refined species of adulation, against which even better understandings may not improperly be cautioned. Gross and open *obsequiousness* can deceive none but fools: but there is a latent and more ensnaring manner of insinuation, against which a man of sense ought to be particularly on his guard. A flatterer of this insidious and concealed kind, will frequently gain his point even by opposition: he will affect to maintain opinions which he does not hold, and dispute in order to give you the credit of a victory. But nothing is more humiliating than to be thus egregiously

duped! It is necessary, therefore, to exert the utmost attention against falling into these covert snares, lest we should have reason to say, with one of the characters in the *Heiress*^d, “Never was
 “old dotard on the stage so finely play-
 “ed upon, as I have been by you to-
 “day.” This indeed would be to exhibit the mortifying personage of one of those ridiculous old men in our comedies, who listen with easy faith, to every specious tale contrived to impose on their credulity.—But I have insensibly wandered from the principal object I had in view; and instead of proceeding to consider friendship as it appears in *perfect* characters, (perfect, I mean, as far as is consistent with the frailty of human nature) I am talking of it as it is seen in the vain and frivolous connections of the world. I

^d A Comedy so called, written by Cæcilius. See Cato, p. 37. Note ^d.

^e See Cato, p. 54, Note ^b.

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return therefore to the original subject of our conversation, and which it is now time to draw towards a conclusion.

It is Virtue,—yes, let me repeat it again; it is Virtue alone that can give birth, strength, and permanency to friendship. For Virtue is an uniform and steady principle, ever acting consistently with itself. They whose souls are warmed by its generous flame, not only improve their common ardor by communication, but naturally kindle into that pure affection of the heart towards each other, which is distinguished by the name of amity, and is wholly unmixed with every kind and degree of selfish considerations. But altho' genuine friendship is solely the offspring of pure good-will, and no motive of advantage or utility has the least share in its production; yet many very beneficial consequences result from it, how little soever those consequences
are

are the objects primarily in view. Of this disinterested nature was that affection which, in the earlier season of my life, united me with those venerable old men, Paulus, Cato, and Gallus, as also with Nafica, and Gracchus, the father-in-law of my late honoured and lamented friend. " That the principle I have assigned, is really the leading motive of true friendship, becomes still more evident, when the connection is formed between men of equal years; as in that which subsisted between Scipio, Furius, Rupilius, Mummius, and myself. Not that old men may not also find a generous satisfaction in living upon terms of disinterested intimacy with the young; as I have the happiness to experience in the friendship I enjoy, not only with both of you and Q. Tubero, but even with Publius Rutilius and Aulus Virginius, who are much your juniors. One would wish indeed, to preserve those friends through all the successive periods of our days, with whom

we

we first set out together in this our journey through the world. But since man holds all his possessions by a very precarious and uncertain tenure, we should endeavour, as our old friends drop off, to repair their loss by new acquisitions; lest one should be so unhappy as to stand in his old age, a solitary, unconnected individual, bereaved of every person whom he loves, and by whom he is beloved. For without a proper and particular object upon which to exercise the kind and benevolent affections, life is destitute of every enjoyment that can render it justly desirable.

As to the loss I have myself sustained by the death of Scipio, who was so suddenly and so unexpectedly snatched from me; He is still present in my mind's eye, and present he will ever remain. For it was his virtues that endeared him to my heart: and his virtues can never die. But not by me only, who

who had the happiness to enjoy a daily intercourse with them, will they be held in perpetual remembrance; his name will be mentioned with honour to the latest posterity: and no man will hereafter either meditate or execute any great and laudable achievement, without proposing to himself the conduct of Scipio, as his brightest and most animating exemplar. For my self; among all the blessings for which I am indebted either to nature, or to fortune, there is not one upon which I set so high a value, as the friendship in which I lived with Scipio. In him I found a constant associate in public affairs, a faithful counsellor in private life, and upon all occasions the confidential friend from whom my soul received her truest and most solid satisfactions. I am not conscious of ever having given him even the slightest cause of offence: and sure I am, that I never heard a word proceed from his lips, which I had reason to be sorry he had

had uttered. We not only lived under the same roof, and eat at the same frugal table, but advanced together through the several military services; and even in our travels, as well as during our recess into the country, were constant and inseparable companions: not to mention that we were equally animated with the same ardent love of science, and jointly passed every hour of our privacy and leisure, in one common pursuit of useful knowledge. If the power of recollecting these pleasing circumstances had become extinct in me at the same time that he expired, it would have been impossible that I could have supported the loss of a man whom I so tenderly loved, and with whom I was so intimately united: but they are indelibly stamped upon my mind, and the oftener they recur to my thoughts, the more lively is the impression they leave behind them. But were I totally deprived of these soothing reflections, my age, however, would afford me
great

great consolation; as I cannot, by the common course of nature, long be separated from him: and short pains, how severe soever they may prove, may well be endured.

I have thus laid before you all that occurs to me on the subject, concerning which you desired my sentiments. Let me only again exhort you to be well persuaded, that there can be no real friendship which is not founded upon virtuous principles, nor any acquisition, *virtue* alone excepted, preferable to a true friend. ⁶⁸

REMARKS

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REMARKS

ON
Let me only again exhort you to be
well persuaded, that there can be no

LÆLIUS:
OR, AN

ESSAY ON FRIENDSHIP.

REMARKS

JUVAT INTEGROS ACCEDERE FONTEIS
ATQUE HAURIRE.

LUCRET.

THE summe of Quintus Ma-
cius was Scervola; and he
is by the latter appellation he is distin-
guished in the following conference.
Having parted through the gates
honours of the state with the greatest
reputation, he was elected consul in
the year of R. 636. At the expiration
of his pretorship, he succeeded to the
government of the republic's territories
in Asia; where he exerted his autho-
rity.

REMARKS

ON

LÆLIUS, &c.

(1) **T**HE surname of Quintus Mucius was, Scævola; and it is by the latter appellation he is distinguished in the following conference. Having passed through the previous honours of the state with the greatest reputation, he was elected consul in the year of R. 636. At the expiration of his pretorship, he succeeded to the government of the republic's territories in Asia; where he exercised his autho-

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rity

rity with such uncommon equity and moderation, that the inhabitants instituted an anniversary festival to commemorate the happiness they had enjoyed under his administration: an honour never conferred before on any Roman governor, and one of the noblest, as well as most singular memorials ever exhibited by a grateful people, in testimony of public virtue. But it was not only in the more exalted spheres of political life, that his superior merit was conspicuous: his mind was enlarged by science, and adorned with the elegant arts; inso-much that it was remarked by his contemporaries, that he was “the greatest *orator* among the Civilians, and the greatest *Civilian* among the orators” of his time. Thus distinguished by his genius, his talents and his virtues, his house was frequented by the most illustrious citizens of Rome; who daily resorted to him either for the benefit
of

of his advice, or the advantage of his conversation.

He married Lælia, the eldest daughter of Lælius: a lady whose virtues and cultivated understanding, rendered her an honour to her sex, and one of the principal ornaments of Rome. She possessed the elegancies of her native language in so eminent a degree, and delivered her sentiments in conversation, with so remarkable a purity and correctness of expression, that the first orators of the age were ambitious of being admitted into her company; esteeming the graces of her natural and unstudied elocution, as the most perfect model by which to form or improve their own. It is probable, that Cicero was in the number of those who thus profited by the privilege of conversing with her: it is certain at least, that in several of his rhetorical writings, he speaks of her singular talents in this re-

spect with particular admiration and applause.

To the respected consort of this accomplished matron, the venerable Quintus Mucius, full of years, of dignity, and of wisdom, Cicero was introduced by his father at the age of seventeen: a period, at which the Roman youths were solemnly invested with the manly robe; and when they entered also upon a mode of instruction most happily calculated to form them, with the greatest advantage, for the future parts they were designed to act upon the theatre of the world. There is no article indeed, in which the wisdom of the antients may more justly be held forth as an example to modern times, than the judicious method they pursued at this critical season of every young man's life, to improve his mind and qualify him for public action.

It

It was customary with the Romans, as the finishing part of education, to recommend their sons to the patronage and protection of some respectable personage, eminent for his public and private virtues. From that time the young man not only attended his illustrious guide and exemplar, in the public discharge of his civil functions both in the senate and the assemblies of the people; but was permitted also to be present at the domestic conferences he occasionally held with his select friends, upon any article of interesting, or useful discussion. Men of the first rank and distinction in the republic, gloried in being thus singled out as conductors of the rising generation; and the greatest characters that ever dignified the annals of any age or country, were proud of appearing in the streets of Rome, accompanied by a train of these honourable disciples. The lectures they delivered, were far other than the *verba otioforum senum ad imperitos*

juvenes: they were the animating lessons of patriotic fages, rising from the life, and impressed by the occasion. A young person thus trained to useful knowledge and manly habits, amidst the important and instructive scenes of public debate in the forum and the senate^a, was undoubtedly taking a much surer and shorter road towards rendering himself a beneficial and respectable citizen, than by wandering through the labyrinths of metaphysical disputation, or gleaning the follies and the fashions of foreign courts.

Nor did the wiser antients defer the great business of education, to the period above mentioned: they may in some degree be said to have entered upon it, from the very moment of birth. Accordingly, they never trusted the new-

^a *Magnus ex hoc usus, multum constantiæ, plurimum judicii juvenibus statim contingebat, in media luce studentibus et inter ipsa discrimina. Auct. de caus. cor. eloq. 33.*

born infant to the care of unfeeling and mercenary nurses; on the contrary, every woman, how high soever her station might be, considered it as an indispensable duty, to suckle her child at her own breast. But as demands of that tender kind, might happen to rise too quick upon the virtuous mother, to admit of her giving proper attention to the elder branches of her little family; it was usual, under those circumstances, to consign the latter to the care of some female relation or friend: who not only formed their minds during that soft and ductile age, but superintended even their playful hours, and guarded them against every *impropriety* both of language ^b and manners. And this province, as well as

^b Thus Cicero observes, *magni interest quas quisque audiat quotidie domi; quibuscum loquatur a puero; quemadmodum patres, pædagogi, matres etiam loquantur. Legimus epistolas Cornelie, matris Gracchorum: apparet filios non tam in gremio educatos, quam in sermone matris. De clar. orator.*

that which was undertaken at a more advanced time of life; by the other sex, was deemed an employment of so much credit and dignity, that ladies of the first rank and character did not disdain to be engaged in it. Thus we find the names of those venerable matrons, Cornelia, Aurelia, and Attia, the respectable mothers of the Gracchi, Julius Cæsar, and Augustus, mentioned in the list of these honourable Governesses.

But, — *proh ! curia inverſique mores !*
—when the Romans had lost their virtues together with the liberties of the antient republic; these generous cares, with every other rational and laudable attention, gave way to the fashionable dissipations of those degenerate days. The little child was now consigned to the care of some paltry Greek female, in conjunction with two or three other ignorant and vicious domestics, equally unqualified and indisposed

posed for the important office of tuition. From the idle tales and gross manners of this low and illiberal tribe, the soft and ductile mind was suffered to receive its earliest, and deepest impressions. The parents themselves indeed, far from training their young families in the principles of virtue and knowledge, were the first to lead them, by their own encouragement and example, into the most luxurious indulgencies and most unprincipled licentiousness of manners. A passion for horse-races, theatrical entertainments, and gladiatorial shews, the favourite *occupations* of that frivolous age, was sown even in the very womb: and when once the seeds of these contemptible and unmanly pleasures have early taken root in the heart, they necessarily overrun and destroy every affection of nobler growth. The author from whom the general purport of this melancholy representation is taken, was a living and lamenting witness of the

manners

manners he describes: and he complains, that all conversation was so universally infected with topics of this unworthy nature, that they were the constant subjects of discourse, not only amongst the youth in their seminaries, but even of their tutors themselves. For it was not, he remarks, by stricter morals, or superior genius, that this order of men gained disciples; it was by the meanest compliances with their pupils, and the most servile adulation of their patrons.

Autor Dialog. de caus. corrupt. eloquent. To the same purpose likewise the admirable Quinctilian: *Utinam liberorum nostrorum mores, non ipsi perderemus! Infantiam statim deliciis solvimus.—Quid non adultus concupiscet, qui in purpuris cepit? Nondum prima verba exprimit, et jam coccum intelligit, jam conchylum exposcit. Ante palatum eorum quam es instituimus—verba ne Alexandrinis quidem permittenda deliciis, risu et oscula excipimus. Nec mirum; nos docuimus, ex nobis audierunt: nostras amicas, nostros concubinos vident. Omne convivium obscœnis canticis strepunt; pudenda dictu spectantur. Fit ex his consuetudo, deinde natura. Discunt hæc miseri antequam sciant vitia esse.* *Inst. orat. I. chap. 2.*

Whether

Whether this picture of degenerate Rome, bears a striking resemblance in all its features to those of more modern days, is left to the reader's consideration: and his own reflections cannot fail of reminding him, that by this total depravation of morals, and consequent neglect of education, the fair fabric of civil liberty, which had been raised by the manly principles of their brave ancestors, was gradually undermined, till it fell into total ruin. Thus the once virtuous Romans sinking into a race of abandoned voluptuaries, became the worthy slaves of the most execrable succession of tyrants that ever disgraced human nature! *Pigbii an. III. Cic. Brut. 53. de senect. 9. de orator. I. 45.*

(2) Quintus Mucius Scaevola, distinguished from the former by his office of *chief Pontiff*, was cousin german to the *augur*. Cicero has taken occasion, in several parts of his writings, to celebrate the characters of both these truly great men :

men: and indeed, the advantages he received in the early part of his life by their guidance and example, were powerful demands upon his gratitude to transmit their names with honour to posterity. But although he appears to have holden the virtues and abilities of each in peculiar estimation; he seems to have considered the *chief Pontiff* as meriting his superior veneration. Accordingly, having occasion to take notice in one of his orations, of the consulate of Mucius Scævola^d the Pontiff; he declares, that of all the men whom he remembered to have seen in the exercise of that supreme dignity, Scævola, the high priest, had given the most unquestionable proofs of consummate prudence and wisdom. At the expiration of his consular office, he went governor into the same province over which his relation the augur, had formerly presided: and, like him, he discharged

^d He was elected consul in the Y. of R. 653.

that

that important trust with such a firm and spotless integrity, that his example, (by a particular clause which the senate annually inserted for that purpose in their decrees) was expressly recommended to his several successors, as the best rule of their administrations. *Pigbl. an. II. 167. Cic. Orat. pro Cornelio. Val. Max. VIII. c. 15. N° 6.*

(3) Publius Sulpicius was connected with Atticus, by a family alliance; the brother of the former having married the cousin german of the latter. Pompeius was consul, and Sulpicius tribune, in the year of R. 665, at which time the opposite factions of Sylla and Marius occasioned great disturbances in the republic. The quarrel alluded to in the text, arose from their having taken different sides in those civil commotions: and each lost their lives in the sanguinary contentions of those destructive factions, before the expiration of their respective magis-

magistracies. *Cornel. Nep. in vit. At. 2.*
Pigh. an. III. 230.

(4) There is studied jingle in the original, which would be treated as an unpardonable puerility in a modern writer upon a grave subject: for thus the text runs; *ut tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum amicissimus de amicitia scripsi.* Another instance of the same kind occurs in the present treatise: *Quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre possêt, cuique non auferret, &c.* In authors of a comic character, and subjects of a burlesque cast, these little tricks may claim, perhaps some indulgence, as a species of low humour. Thus the "*non potuit paucis plura plane proloqui,*" being put into the mouth of a slave in Plautus, may possibly raise a smile, as a sort of witticism perfectly well suited to the taste and talents of the person by whom it is delivered. Some critics, however, have not scrupled to justify,

in certain instances, these *literal* conceits even in the higher species of composition. Thus the *χυντο χαμαι χολαδες* of Homer, and the *neu patriæ validas in viscera vertite vires* of Virgil, are pretended to be a designed cacophony; in the former instance, to express the disagreeable image of “*gusbing entrails smoaking on the ground*,” as Pope translates it; and in the latter, the horrors of a civil war. It may be so: certain, nevertheless, it is, that these little tinkling consonancies of letters and syllables, where the sound can have no relation to the *idea*, occur much too frequently in the best classic authors not to render it evident, that they were considered as real and independent beauties*. *Clerici Hom. II. IV. 526.*

(5) Fannius married the youngest daughter of Lælius. He made a cam-

* See Rem. on Cicero's Letters, vol. I. p. 403. n. 1.

paign

paign or two in the early part of his life; and, in due time, was advanced to the dignity of Prætor: but he seems principally to have raised himself into notice, as a citizen of the republic of letters. Cicero mentions, with particular commendation, a history he composed: and it was so highly esteemed by Brutus, that he deigned to employ some of his leisure hours in abridging it. What the subject was, is uncertain; but it may be conjectured, from some obscure intimations, that it related to the last Carthaginian war: during some part of which, Fannius served under Scipio. It was written in Greek; a taste for the Grecian language and literature having been introduced among the Romans, a few years before the times in which this historian flourished.

Cato the censor, whose simplicity of manners revolted against exotic importations of every kind; endeavoured, upon all occasions, to rally this prevailing
ing

ing affectation out of countenance : and one of his sarcasms for that purpose has been handed down to us. Aulus Albinus, a man of consular dignity, had published, it seems, a history in Greek ; and in the preface solicited the reader's indulgence for any inaccuracy of expression he might have committed, upon the plea of having composed his work in a foreign language. This drew from Cato the severe observation, that “ the author was certainly a very pleasant fellow, to prefer the *mortification* “ of asking pardon, to the *honour* of not “ wanting one.” But folly and affectation have ever proved an over-match for wit, in all ages ; and Greece, in spite of Cato's well-directed satire, soon became to the Romans what France is to the English : a nation they affected to despise, yet condescended to imitate. It is well, however, that in one instance at least, the parallel will not hold : for although some writers of a certain class, seem ambitious of larding their meagre compo-

sitions with French terms, where the English ones are, at least, as expressive; authors of a more respectable rank, have not yet been so unwise as to give up the cultivation of our own language, in order to distinguish themselves in that of our neighbours.

This foppery infected their earlier poets, as well as historians; and even in a still more inexcusable manner: for, by a most absurd mixture, they blended the two languages together; and interwove patches of Greek into the motley texture of their Latin verses. This glaring incongruity did not escape the powerful ridicule of Horace, and he has exposed it, with his usual genteel and elegant turn of raillery, in that admirable satire in which he defends, against his censurers, the judgment he had passed in a former poem upon the style of Lucilius.

It may be alledged, perhaps, that Cicero has justified by his example this

mode of writing; as he not only sprinkles every letter to Atticus with Greek phrases, but drew up the memoirs of his own consulate in that fashionable language. But it should be considered, that in the first instance, he was addressing in a private correspondence, a most intimate friend; who having passed much of his time in Athens, spoke the language with such singular facility and elegance, as to have acquired the surname by which he was distinguished: and as to his memoirs, he drew them up in Greek, partly at the request of some of his Athenian friends, but principally, it should seem, in order to spread the fame of his celebrated administration with greater facility into Greece. Upon other occasions, however, he was so cautious not to adulterate his native language with a *foreign* infusion, that in his letters on public affairs, or to his common acquaintance, he scarcely ever employs a Greek expression. It is observable

likewise, that in his philosophic pieces, though derived from the treasures of Greek erudition, and abounding with scientific terms, for which it was not easy to find equivalents in Latin; yet he rather chose to employ a *circumlocution*, than disgrace the powers of his own language by having recourse to foreign aid *. *Cic. in Brut. passim. Pigh. ann. III. Plut. in vit. Grac. Hor. Sat. I. 10. Ad Att. xii. 52.*

(6) Lælius seems to have united in his character, whether considered in a moral, a civil, or a philosophical view, all those talents of the mind and qualities of the heart, that could justly recommend him to the general esteem of his own times, and transmit his name with honour to posterity. He was initiated in the doctrine of the Stoics, by Diogenes; one of those three celebrated phi-

* *Dicam si potero Latinè; scis enim me Græcè loqui in Latino sermone non solere. Tusc. disp. I. 3.*

losophers

losophers whom the Athenians sent as their ambassadors to Rome, upon an occasion that has been already mentioned in the Remarks on Cato *f*. He was afterwards more fully instructed and confirmed in their principles; by Panætius, a most eminent and respectable professor of the same sect and nation: to whose writings Cicero acknowledges himself much indebted, in composing his admirable treatise upon *moral duties*. But although Lælius adopted the general system of the Stoics, and formed his conduct by their noblest precepts; he was far from following them in those paradoxical tenets which disgraced their philosophy, and instead of mending the heart, tended to render it callous to all the more generous feelings of human nature. On the contrary, a tenderness and benignity of disposition, was in the number of those social virtues which particularly endeared this

f See Rem. on Cato, p. 191.

accomplished friend of Scipio, to his contemporaries. There was a politeness and affability in his address, a sprightliness and vivacity in his conversation, together with a constant equality in his temper, that wonderfully recommended him to all those with whom he had any connection; insomuch that what was observed of Socrates, was equally remarked in Lælius, that "he always appeared with a serene and placid countenance."

To the advantages of these captivating manners, were added the ornaments of a most cultivated and improved understanding: he was not only one of the finest gentlemen, but of the first orators and the most elegant scholars of the age. Lælius and Scipio indeed, united as they were by genius and talents no less than by esteem and affection, equally conspired in refining the taste and encouraging the literature of their countrymen. They were
the

the patrons, after having been the disciples, of Panætius and Polybius; and both the philosopher and the historian had the honour and the happiness of constantly sharing with them those hours, that were not devoted to the public service. But the severer Muses did not entirely engross those intervals of leisure, which these illustrious friends occasionally snatched from the great business of the state: Terence and Lucilius were frequently admitted into these parties; where wit and wisdom jointly conspired, to render the conversations at once both lively and instructive.

With respect to his political conduct, Lælius appears to have been deservedly placed high in the roll of those admired citizens of antient Rome, whose memories have been most revered for a warm and disinterested love of their country. He gave a signal proof of his being truly actuated by that generous

M 4

spirit,

spirit, in a very critical situation relating to the Agrarian law. Being elected Tribune ^z, he projected measures in order to revive, and carry into execution, that just but neglected ordinance. But the first steps he took for that purpose, immediately spread an alarm among the most opulent and powerful members of the commonwealth; and they prepared to oppose his scheme, with all their interest, their influence, and their authority. Finding therefore, from the temper of the times, that it would be impossible for him to prevail, without producing greater evils than those he meant to redress; he wisely preferred the peace of the republic, to an act of strict, indeed, but *unseasonable* justice: and with equal prudence and good policy relinquished his design. The moderate and judicious conduct he held upon this occasion, was so generally approved and applauded, that

^z In the Y. of R. 602.

he was ever afterwards distinguished by the title of the *sage* Lælius. *Pater*. I. 13. *Plut. in vit. Grac.*

(7) Scipio Africanus, the second of that name, was the son of Paulus Æmilius ^b, but being adopted by the son of the first Scipio Africanus, he was distinguished by the united appellations of the two families, and called Scipio Æmilianus. The title of *Africanus* was conferred upon him, in honour of the signal success of his arms in the last Carthaginian war. The admiration in which his character was held by his country, and the glowing colours in which the antient historians have painted it to posterity, exhibit him as one of the brightest ornaments of the illustrious age in which he flourished. Cicero never mentions his name but with expressions of the warmest veneration; according to Plutarch, he

^b See Rem. 9.

was the first of Romans in *virtue* as well as in authorityⁱ; and if Paterculus has not flattered his memory, he never uttered a sentiment, or performed an action, that was not worthy of applause^k.

His claim to these exalted eulogies seems to have remained unimpeached, till a late very elegant and ingenious writer of the Roman story, entered his protest against admitting it without great abatements. In Mr. Hooke's opinion, "Cicero's praises of Scipio, "are to be considered as the language of one party zealot extolling "another of the same party^l." Rollin, on the contrary, subscribes without reserve to those encomiums that have been so unanimously conferred upon him by the antients^m. To form a true judgment of Scipio's real cha-

ⁱ In vit. Æmil.

^k Paterc. I. 12.

^l Rom. Hist. II.

^m Roll. H. Rom. IX. 74.

racter,

rafter, it may not be safe, perhaps, to trust entirely to the opinion of either of these justly celebrated moderns: as the *French* historian, by not sufficiently distinguishing between antient and modern ideas of virtue, seems to have exalted his hero's qualities somewhat too high; and the *English* historiographer, by having considered them in a *comparative* view, appears to have equally depressed them too low. But in determining the merit of distinguished characters among the antients, it is neither just, nor candid, to examine them by those rules of moral conduct, which, if known, were at least not admitted in the same purity and extent, to which they have since been refined and enlarged, by the clearer discoveries and stronger authority of divine revelation. If the general complexion of Scipio's actions derived their colour from those lights, how comparatively imperfect soever they might have been, by which all who were deemed *virtuous* in the times

times in which he lived, were professedly guided; it would be unreasonable to question his title to those praises with which his memory has been honoured through so many succeeding generations. Nevertheless, in bringing some few articles of his *public* conduct to the test of this equitable criterion, it will appear, perhaps, that he cannot entirely escape censure: and one or two instances of that kind will be pointed out in the farther progress of these Remarks. In the mean while, taking his character in a general view, it may be asserted, it should seem, with truth, that as a citizen, a soldier, and a statesman; in the accomplishments of his mind, and the virtues of his heart; he stands conspicuous among the most eminent of those celebrated personages who were held in the highest *honour* by antient Rome. In short, what a great genius of a neighbouring nation said of a much greater of our own, may with equal

equal

equal truth, by the change of a single word, be applied to Scipio; *ses vertus etaient a lui, ses fautes etaient a son siecle* *.

(8) There is a great diversity of opinion among the antient writers, concerning the number of these famous sages, and the particular qualifications by which they merited that flattering distinction. Some of the Greek authors who had investigated this question, raised them to seventeen, whilst others, (and they seem to have formed a considerable majority) reduced them to Thales, Bias, Pittacus and Solon. This constellation of geniuses are said to have enlightened Greece at the same period of time, and about 640 years before the birth of Christ. In the opinion of Plutarch they acquired their particular designation, solely on account of those political benefits which their superior wisdom and sagacity had severally

* Voltaire.

rendered to the respective states in which they resided. It is probable, however, that Thales derived this characteristic designation, from the great talents he discovered in natural and mathematical knowledge; as he was the first who introduced those important sciences into Greece. *Diog. Laert. in vit. Thal. Plut. in vit. Solon.*

(9) Paulus Æmilius was father of the second Scipio Africanus whose death gave occasion to the present conference. The manner in which he sustained the domestic loss alluded to in the text, proved the strength and firmness of his mind by a trial the most severe and decisive. For it was in the midst of the most brilliant and seductive scenes of triumphant ambition:

*Lorsque sur cette mer on vogue à pleines voiles;
Qu'on croit avoir pour soy les vents et les étoiles;
Il est bien malaise de regler ses desirs:
Le plus sage s'endort sur la foy des zephirs.*

It

It was while he was enjoying these flattering gales of prosperous fortune, so happily described by the French poet, that Paulus Æmilius was suddenly deprived of two sons; *one* as he was preparing to make his triumphal entry into Rome on account of the glorious victory he had obtained over the Macedonian Prince; and the *other* immediately after °. But altho' he felt, with all the sensibility of a most affectionate parent, the full weight of this complicated calamity; he supported himself under its pressure, with that well-poised equanimity of soul, which no change of fortune could ever destroy.

He remarkably preserved, indeed, this firm equality of mind, upon an occasion which afforded a still stronger proof perhaps, of his being invincibly actuated by a truly heroic spirit; in the first warm moments of a victory, the most glorious to the commander and the most important to

° See Rem. on Cato, p. 233.

the republic, that ever was obtained by Roman arms. When the unfortunate Perseus surrendered himself prisoner of war, on the total overthrow of his army; Paulus Æmilius immediately retired to his tent, accompanied by some of his principal officers, together with his two eldest sons, Fabius and Scipio; the latter of whom was then about seventeen years of age. The magnanimous conqueror appeared for some time wrapped in profound meditation, without uttering a single word; when, at length, breaking through his silence, he particularly addressed himself to the two youths, in terms to the following effect: “ You “ have,” said the illustrious chief, “ in “ the scene which has just now passed “ before you, an exemplary instance “ of the mutability of human affairs. “ Let it teach every one of you, but “ particularly you my sons, never to “ suffer the exultation of victory, to betray you into a cruel, or insulting, “ behaviour towards the vanquished; “ always

“ always bearing in mind, that the
 “ good graces of fortune are so abso-
 “ lutely precarious, that the favours
 “ she confers in the morning may pos-
 “ sibly be reversed before night. Re-
 “ member, therefore, my sons, that He
 “ alone is truly great, who in all the
 “ vicissitudes of human events, steadily
 “ preserves the equal balance of his
 “ mind; and is neither elated with
 “ prosperity, nor depressed by adversity,”

*Exemplum insigne cernitis, inquit, muta-
 tionis rerum humanarum! vobis hoc præ-
 cipue dico, Juvenes: Ideo secundis rebus
 nihil in quemquam superbe ac violenter
 consulere decet, nec præsentì credere for-
 tunc; quum quid vesper ferat incertum
 est. Is demum vir erit, cujus animum nec
 prospera flatu suo efferet, nec adversa in-
 fringet. Liv. XLV. 8.*

(10) Cicero does not seem to do
 strict justice to the comparative charac-
 ters of the two celebrated personages
 contrasted in the text, when he repre-

sents them as standing in direct opposition to each other: for Socrates distinguished himself by *action* as well as speculation; and Cato united the *philosopher* with the statesman. The only difference in the merit of these truly great men, appears to have been, that in the former, philosophy was the *predominant*, and in the latter, the *subordinate* excellency. The truth is, Socrates distinguished himself both as a soldier and a citizen: he served in the army from the thirty-seventh to the fiftieth year of his age; and signalized not only his courage but his conduct, in several actions during the Peloponnesian war. He was afterwards elected into the Athenian senate.

Being joined in a commission with some other members of that assembly, to inquire into the conduct of certain officers in a naval engagement with the Lacedæmonians; he gave a memorable instance, both of his spirit and his probity.

probity. The parties accused, although they had obtained a signal victory over the enemy, were charged with having neglected to perform the funeral rites over the dead bodies of those brave men, who were slain in the action. The prosecution appeared to be altogether malicious and groundless: but notwithstanding the clearest proofs of their innocence, all the judges, except Socrates, influenced by private and personal motives, pronounced them guilty. The populace, whose passions had been artfully excited, became clamorous for having the sentence carried into execution: and Socrates was threatened with a prosecution in his turn, if he continued to oppose the decision of his colleagues. But he resolutely refused to withdraw his protest; no consideration of his own safety, or interest, being sufficient to prevail with him to join in condemning the innocent. This inflexible magistrate and most justly revered of philosophers,

sophers, was sixty-three years of age at the time of the present transaction: and although from this period, he does not seem to have engaged in any civil functions, yet he still continued to sustain the character of a zealous and patriotic citizen. For when all regular government was overturned by the usurpation of the thirty tyrants, and they were exercising the most unbounded cruelties, in support of their unjust dominion; Socrates, instead of cautiously providing for his own safety by retiring from Athens, continued, at the imminent hazard of his life, to exert all his credit and influence to excite and encourage his despairing fellow-citizens, to unite in proper measures for the recovery of their common liberties.

Thus it appears that the speculative and the active virtues, met together in the characters of these eminently philosophic patriots. Nor was it by any means

means a singular union: instances of the same kind were far from being uncommon among the most distinguished personages, both of antient Greece and Italy. Epaminondas, Scipio, the last Brutus, the two Catos, Cicero, Marcus Antoninus, are names that will particularly occur upon this occasion, to every reader in the least acquainted with antient history. Nor are more modern ages wholly destitute of similar examples. To look no farther than our own country; Sir Thomas More, Lord Bacon, Sir Walter Raleigh, Sir William Temple, and a few others, were in their respective generations, shining ornaments both of the active and the contemplative world. *Sen. Ep. 104. de Tranq. c. 3. Charpentier vie de Socrat, p. 127.*

(II). Although Scipio was but seventeen years of age, when he made the glorious campaign under his father, mentioned in a foregoing remark;

yet he gave such uncommon proofs of military skill and valour, that in the judgment of the whole army, he was thought qualified, even at that early period of his life, to act as commander in chief. *Plut. in vit. Æmil.*

(12) Scipio was advanced to his first consulate, in the thirty-seventh year of his age; five years sooner than he was legally capable of being elected into that office. The republic was at that time engaged in the third Punic war; in the commencement of which, having served as military tribune with great reputation, he returned to Rome in order to present himself as a candidate for the Ædileship. The war not having been hitherto carried on with the success there was reason to expect; and the people being dissatisfied with the conduct of their generals, they looked up to Scipio as most capable of retrieving the honour of their arms. Accordingly, instead of creating him

Ædile,

*

Ædile, they unanimously conferred on him the consular dignity: and he was immediately appointed to take the command of the troops before Carthage. The event, it is well known, sufficiently justified the opinion his fellow-citizens had entertained of his superior conduct and abilities; and this great captain happily terminated the war, by a total extinction of the Carthaginian commonwealth.

Scipio's second consulship, was in the year of R. 619. At this time, the republic was engaged in hostilities with the brave Numantines: a people of Spain, who with forces much inferior to those of the enemy, defended the liberties of their country with such uncommon spirit and vigour, as to alarm Rome for the event. At length, however, after a most obstinate and gallant resistance, it was their misfortune to be totally overpowered by Scipio: and he laid the walls of Numantia, as he

had those of Carthage, level with the ground.

Nothing seems to have been wanting to complete the glory of Scipio's triumphant arms, in each of the foregoing instances, but to have proved himself the hero and the conqueror in a better cause: for both the respective wars were confessedly entered into by the republic, in defiance of every principle of national justice and honour. With respect to the *former*; Paterculus acknowledges it was declared against the Carthaginians, not because they had given any *just* cause for hostilities, but solely from jealousy of a rival state. And as to the *latter*; Florus does not scruple to confess, there was not even a colourable pretence to render it justifiable⁷. One might naturally expect, that the historians who thus saw and condemned the iniquity of

⁷ Paterc. I. 12.

⁷ Flor. II. 13.

the national councils, must equally have perceived and censured the unworthy conduct of Scipio, in not refusing to be the executor of such impious commissions. But not the slightest blame is even hinted, by either of those authors: on the contrary, he is held forth by both, as a finished and perfect model of true heroism; and Paterculus, in particular, as has been mentioned in a former remark, represents his whole life as one uninterrupted series of virtuous and praise-worthy actions. But what increases the wonder is, that in Cicero's political dialogues concerning government, written after the conclusion of both these wars; Scipio, as appears from a fragment still existing, is introduced as maintaining, that, "it is so far from being a true maxim, that the policy of states cannot be carried on without injury to others; that, on the contrary, nothing is more certainly true, than that it cannot be properly administered
" without

“without a constant and inviolable
 “observance of the strictest justice.” It
 is remarkable, likewise, that Florus,
 notwithstanding his express acknow-
 ledgment that the Numantines had
 given the Roman state no real cause of
 complaint, yet in closing his summary
 relation of this war, does not scruple
 to include it within that period in
 which he describes the national cha-
 racter of the Romans, as meriting the
 highest encomiums: *Hactenus*, says the
 historian, *Populus Romanus, pulcher,*
egregius, pius, sanctus, atque magnificus.
 It should seem therefore, in the judg-
 ment of these writers, that neither the
 state which commences an unjust war,
 nor the chief who conducts it, derogate
 from the general sanctity of their respec-
 tive characters. Nevertheless, all their
 moralists, and Cicero in particular,

“Non modo falsum esse illud, sine injuria non posse,
 sed hoc verissimum, sine summa justitia Rempublicam
 regi non posse.”

lay

lay down the most equitable maxims, when they are stating the motives upon which a war may justly be declared. This, it is true, was the philosophic foundation upon which their idea of public justice was erected in theory: but their practice was governed by motives of a far different nature. An ardent love of their country was a passion too heroic, they seem to have thought, to be restrained within the more confined limits of speculative morality; and *those* were deemed the truest *patriots*, who most contributed to gratify the popular ambition of universal sovereignty. But it is not only in the annals of Rome, that the public councils with respect to foreign states, are at variance with their *professed* principles. There is scarcely a page of antient or modern history relating to the subject of national contentions, but will furnish proofs of these glaring inconsistencies. The melancholy truth is, that the *law of nations*, although
founded

founded upon the clearest principles of natural obligation, and universally acknowledged in *theory* by every civilized state, seems to be equally disregarded by all of them in practice. Interest, or ambition, too generally appears to be the governing motive of all public communities, in respect of their conduct towards each other; and nothing, perhaps, can be more true than the observation of an antient philosopher, that “if every people were
“to restore the territories they had unjustly usurped, they would each of
“them be reduced to their original
“huts.” The Roman boundaries, at least, would have been wonderfully contracted; as no consideration of a moral kind, seems ever to have restrained their insatiable thirst of dominion. *Regere imperio Populos*, was the invariable object of their politics; and the measures by which they pursued it, were perfectly agreeable to what the poet adds; “*parcere subjectis et debellare*

lare superbos." That their empire was destined to everlasting duration, and pre-ordained to be extended over the whole globe; was a persuasion coeval with the earliest period of their constitution; inculcated by the establishment of a religious anniversary; and confirmed by pretended prophecies. Every state, therefore, that opposed the licentious progress of their unbounded ambition, was considered as rebels to the decrees of Heaven; and had nothing to expect, but the *pious* severity of their exterminating vengeance. That this is no unfair representation of the principle upon which Rome enlarged her dominion, appears, among other notorious proofs, by that relentless havoc which was made at the two

Thus Ovid:

*Gentibus est aliis tellus data limite certo;
Romanae spatium est urbis et orbis idem.*

Fast. II. 683. see also Fast. III.

345. et seqq.

Æn. V. l. 781. et seqq.

famous

famous sieges which gave occasion to the present remark. It is impossible, indeed, to reflect on the cruelties that were exercised in the destruction of those unhappy cities, especially of Numantia, without being struck with peculiar indignation and horror. The unexampled bravery of the latter, ought to have recommended them to the esteem of a generous enemy; but, on the contrary, it rendered them the objects of a most base resentment, indulged without measure and without mercy. Appian indeed affirms, that Scipio, by totally destroying Numantia, acted beyond his *orders*; but as this assertion stands unsupported by any of the historians who lived nearer to the times of the transaction; candour will be inclined to look upon it, as a groundless charge; and consider Scipio as no otherwise to be personally condemned, than as executing the sanguinary instructions of his Roman masters. *Appian in Iber. p. 311. Ed. Toll.*

(13) If

(13) If some parts of Scipio's public transactions, seem by no means strictly unexceptionable; his private conduct appears, not only free from reproach, but worthy of all commendation. He passed the early season of his youth, untainted by those vices to which that period is particularly exposed: and he preserved his more advanced years from that epidemical *profusion* and *avarice*, which at this time so universally prevailed in Rome, that a contemporary historian informs us, acts of generosity and beneficence, were looked upon as prodigies of the most extraordinary kind. The following instances therefore, alluded to in the text, of Scipio's liberal and munificent spirit, cannot but render his character the more justly an object of esteem and admiration.

Having, as heir to Æmilia (the wife of the first Africanus, and consequently

quently Scipio's mother by adoption) become possessed of all her effects to a considerable value, he presented the whole to his own mother Papiria; who being divorced by Paulus Æmilius, was in circumstances ill suited to her rank and character. Part of the marriage portion likewise of his two sisters by adoption, amounting in the whole to between seven and eight thousand pounds sterling, having been unpaid in the life-time of their mother; she charged the same upon her estate. By the Roman law, the heir was allowed to clear off incumbrances of this nature, by three annual instalments: but Scipio scorned to avail himself of the indulgence; and immediately advanced to the husbands of the young ladies, their intire fortunes. A few years afterwards, his father Paulus Æmilius died, and left his estate to be equally divided between his two sons, Fabius and Scipio. But the latter, in
pursuance

purfuance of the fame enlarged principles which he had exerted towards his family upon the former occafion, relinquished to his brother his own moiety, which was valued at about eleven thousand fix hundred and twenty-five pounds of our money; as upon the death of his mother, he divided all her effects among his fifters, although they were not legally entitled to any part.

These extraordinary instances of Scipio's munificence, are recorded by his friend and instructor Polybius; who appeals for the truth of them, to living witneffes well acquainted with Scipio's actions, and who would not fail, he observes, to convict him publicly of falsehood, if he dared to advance as facts what it was in their power fo easily to difprove. *Polyb. excerp. Vales.*

(14) Scipio's obfequies were honoured by the nobleft and moft unquestion-

able of all panegyrics; for it was delivered from the mouth of a man who had always been in the number of his political enemies, and was himself esteemed one of the principal ornaments of the times: Go, said Mebelus, addressing himself to his sons, Go, and attend the funeral of Scipio; for never will you follow the remains of a greater man!

(15) The revival of the Agrarian law by the Gracchi (a particular account of which will be given in a subsequent note) being warmly and strenuously opposed by a numerous and powerful party, occasioned great commotions in the republic. Scipio supported the opposition with distinguished zeal; particularly in an animated debate in the senate with Fulvius Flaccus, one of the persons appointed to carry the

Ite, filii, celebrate exequias: nunquam civis majoris funus videbitis. Plin. H. N. VII. 44.

law into execution. The next morning, Scipio was found dead in his bed: and there were certain circumstances attending this catastrophe which raised a suspicion, that he had been assassinated by some of the partizans of the Gracchi.

As the antient historians are much divided concerning the truth of this charge; it is no wonder that two very judicious modern compilers of the Roman story, should equally be found at variance. Mons. Rollin thinks there can be no doubt, that it was the work of the party in the interest of the Gracchi. Mr. Hooke, on the contrary, is persuaded, "from the variety of reports about the violence done to Scipio, that prejudice and party spirit invented the whole, and that he truly died a natural death; which, according to Paterculus," he says, "was the opinion of most authors." It should be observed however, that the

Roman historian acknowledges, there appeared upon the corpse marks of his having been strangled; and that, contrary to the usual custom, he was carried to his funeral with his face covered. To these suspicious circumstances may be added, that there was a design in agitation of creating Scipio Dictator; which, by investing him with absolute power, as it would have totally defeated the hopes of the partizans of the Gracchi, it was much their interest to prevent. It should be farther remarked likewise, that although Cicero in the present passage declares no opinion of his own; yet in another part of his writings, he expressly charges some of Scipio's relations with being perpetrators of his murder. When the weight therefore of these united considerations are thrown into the scale, it seems rather to incline on that side which the French historian has taken in this question. *Pigb. Annal. III. 23. Samn. Scip. No. 2. Rollin, H. R. IX.*

65. *Hooke's R. H. II. 546. Patern.*

II. 64.

(16) Cicero alludes to an article in the vulgar creed, concerning the general receptacle of departed spirits. According to the popular belief, the soul at the instant of death, was conducted to the infernal regions, situated in the lowest depth of this terrestrial globe; where, after having undergone a previous examination by the appointed judges, she was dealt with according to the part she had acted during her residence in the body. This domain of the infernal deities, was represented as being divided into three distinct mansions; the *one* appropriated to those malignant spirits, whose moral depravation being utterly incurable, were consigned to everlasting punishment; the *other*, prepared for the reception of less criminal transgressors, whose moral defilements being of such a na-

XI. R. H. II. 546. Patern.

ture as to admit of purification, were sentenced to undergo certain temporary inflictions in a purgatorial state. *These*, after being thoroughly cleansed from the spots and stains they had contracted in the present life, passed into the *third* division, and resided in the *læta arva*, as the poet styles them, the happy regions of *Elysium*. Some few, however, among mankind, were deemed so perfectly immaculate, and so eminently beneficial to their respective generations, in the double capacity of statesmen and philosophers, as to stand in no need of a previous purification, but to be qualified immediately at their departure out of the body, to enter the celestial mansions of perfect and permanent beatitude. In this latter class, Lælius intimates that his illustrious friend might justly be numbered *.

* Vid. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. II. 17.

But

But although, in order to impress this important doctrine of future rewards and punishments, with the greater force and energy on the minds of the people; legislators and philosophers held forth to their grosser imaginations, the *fictitious* scenery of *Tartarus* and *Elysium*; yet the latter were always careful in their discourses calculated for more improved understandings, to disclaim all pretensions of being able to discover the *precise mode*, by which these equitable retributions would hereafter be made. It was abundantly sufficient; they justly thought, for every moral purpose, to be assured, that “glorious was the prize
“reserved for victorious virtue, and
“firmly grounded her animating hopes
“of one day receiving it.” This was the express declaration of Socrates, in the conversation he held with his friends

^w Καλον γαρ το αθλον, και η ελπις μεγαλη. *Phæd.*
Platon. p. 304. *Ed. Forst.*

on the morning of his execution, Agreeably to these sentiments, Plutarch compares the moral state of man in the present world, to that of an athletic combatant; whose reward or punishment, will hereafter be proportioned to his merit, or demerit, in the conflict. "But by what means," continues this very sensible and judicious author, "the soul in another life shall be affected with happiness or misery, is totally concealed from human penetration." It seems highly probable, that it was likewise in conformity with this way of thinking in respect to the popular creed, that the Roman poet, after having conducted his hero through the several mansions of departed spirits, leads him back again into these upper regions through the portal—*quâ*—
—*falsa ad cælum mittunt insomnia manes*;

and by no means as intending to intimate, that the belief of a general state
of

of retribution in another life, was equally vain and visionary. *Plut. de iis qui tard. de Numin. Cor.*

(17) The doctrine of Epicurus appears to have been first introduced to the general acquaintance of the Romans, about this period*: and it is probable that Amafinius, an author occasionally mentioned by Cicero in different parts of his works, was one of those philosophers to whom he alludes in the text; he seems, at least, to have been the earliest Latin writer who published a treatise on the Epicurean system†. Geniuses of this *benevolent* kind have arisen, indeed, in every age; who seem to think they cannot perform a greater service in their generation, than to deliver the minds of men from those uneasy apprehensions concerning their destination in a future pe-

* See Rem. on Cato, p. 217, n. 49.

† Vid. Tusc. Disp. IV. 3.

riod of existence which will occasionally intrude, in spite of every *artificial* bar to oppose their entrance. But whatever the motive may be that kindles the zeal of these Epicurean *missionaries*, it is but too *evident* that they do not preach in vain. It is equally certain, that the converts they made in Rome, increased with the greatest rapidity. And no wonder: for the doctrine they laboured to propagate, was most conveniently adapted to the morals of an age, when the nobler hopes and principles which actuated their illustrious forefathers, were daily growing more and more out of fashion. Happily, however, there were not wanting men of superior abilities and more enlightened understandings, to oppose its progress: and among the moral arguments they employed for that interesting purpose, those which Cicero has put into the mouth of Lælius, are by no means of inconsiderable weight. For the instituting of
certain

certain rites to the memory of departed friends and relations, being a custom that seems to have prevailed throughout all ages and nations of the world, savage no less than civilized; the nature of these sepulchral ceremonies necessarily imply, a *general* persuasion that the deceased were *personally* concerned in them: and of this kind, in particular, were those anniversaries among the Romans termed *feralia*, so agreeably described in Ovid's poetical calendar *. If to this presumptive proof

* *Est honor et tumulis: animas placate paternas,*

Parvasque in extructas munera ferte pyras.

Parva petunt Manes: pietas pro divite grata est

Munere; non avidos Styx habet ima Deos, &c.

Ovid. Fast. II. 533.

Tombs have their honours too: our parents crave

Some slender present to adorn their grave.

Slender the present which the ghosts we owe;

These powers observe not what we give, but how.

Kennet's Transl. R. A. p. 93.

be

be joined the additional consideration insisted upon in the text, arising from the same belief having been firmly entertained by the best and most sagacious reasoners that have ever dignified the human understanding; the argument rises in its strength and presses with increasing force. For what other cause can be assigned for the belief of the soul's existence after death, being thus the common faith not only of all nations, but of the wisest philosophers, in every age of the world; but that it is a tenet perfectly agreeable to the most improved *reason*, as well as to the general *expectation*, of mankind? *vid. Senec. Ep. 117.*

(18) Nothing remains of this treatise except a few fragments, the most considerable part of which is the concluding vision mentioned in the text. From these remains, however, it appears to have been, as the learned and ingenious writer of Cicero's life observes,

“one

“one of his capital pieces, where all
“the important questions of politics
“and morality were discussed, with
“the greatest elegance and accuracy.”

This valuable performance was brought from Italy into England about the year 1420, by a monk of Canterbury; where, to the irreparable loss of the literary world, it was, among other manuscripts, destroyed by fire. *Mid. L. of Cicero*, II. p. 94. *Wharton's Hist. of ant. Poet. Dissert.* II. in not.

(19) The stoical *sage* to which Cicero alludes, being represented by the philosophers of that sect, as a character of spotless virtue, unsullied by the least speck or taint of moral depravation; has given occasion for much ridicule to be thrown on the disciples of Zeno, both by antient and modern writers: but surely without reason. It is true, indeed, that the real existence of such perfection is absolutely incompatible with the present state of human nature;

nature; nevertheless, the founder of this celebrated school seems to have acted wisely in holding it up to his followers, as their constant and invariable model: for although it cannot be *equalled*, it may be *imitated*. Indeed, what the Roman critic observes with respect to eloquence and the fine arts, holds equally true in morals, and every other laudable object of human endeavours; *evenit non nunquam ut aliquid grande inveniatur, qui semper querit quod nimium est*^a. No man, perhaps, ever advanced as far as his powers would lead him, who was not warmed in his pursuit by an idea of perfection, far beyond the possibility of his actual attainment. Accordingly Zeno's noble disciple, well justifies his great master against the pretended absurdity charged upon this article of his doctrine, when he asks, *Quid mirum, si non ascendant in altum, ardua aggressi? sed Viros*

^a *Quint. Inst. II. 12.*

suspice, etiamsi decidunt, magna conantes. Generosa res est, — conari alta, tentare et mente majora concipere, quam quæ etiam ingenti animo adornatis effici possint^a. Experience had abundantly supported the validity of Seneca's reasoning: for it is certain, that the most virtuous characters in the most virtuous times of the Roman annals, were formed in the schools, and acted upon the principles, of the Athenian porch. The expression, therefore, of the president Montesquieu in his famous *Esprit des Loix*, seems by no means too strong, when he declares, *si je pouvois un moment cesser de penser que je suis chrétien, je ne pourrois m'empêcher de mettre la destruction de la secte de Zenon, au nombre des malheurs du genre humain*^c. Happily, however, for mankind, that destruction has been more than repaired, by the

^a Sen de Vit. Beat. c. 20.

^c L'Esprit des Loix, tom. II. p. 161.

Christian

Christian revelation: which not only exhorts to virtue, upon motives far more suitable to the moral constitution and circumstances of human nature, but supplies, in the person of its sacred author, that *real* and animating example of *consummate* perfection, which the disciples of Zeno could only form to themselves in *imagination*.

(20) Montagne assigns a whimsical reason why connections arising from consanguinity, cannot be productive of *genuine* friendship: *à mesure*, says he, *que ce sont amitiex que la loy et l'obligation naturelle nous commande, il y a d'autant moins de nostre choix et liberté volontaire. Et nostre liberté volontaire, n'a point de production qui soit plus proprement sienne, que celle de l'affection et amitié.* But this lively writer is giving a reason for a fact, which does not exist: for the relation *itself* is not *friendship*, nor in any respect *necessari-*
ly

ly implied by it. When a particular attachment, therefore, subsists between two persons of the same blood; their *moral* union is, undoubtedly, as much the result of a *free*, unconstrained, choice of the will, as if there had been no previous *natural* connection between them. A learned prelate, of the last century has stated this matter with great precision, and placed it in its true light: "He who loves
" me," says Bishop Taylor, " *only* be-
" cause I am his brother, loves me for
" that which is no worthiness: and I
" must love him for as much as that
" comes to, and for as little reason.
" —But whether *choice*, and union
" of souls, and worthiness of man-
" ners, and greatness of understanding,
" and usefulness of conversation, and
" the benefits of counsel, and all those
" endearments which make our lives
" pleasant and our persons dear, are
" not better and greater reasons of
" *love*, than to be born of the same
VOL. II. P " flesh;

“flesh; I think, among wise persons,
“needs no great inquiry^d.”

It must be acknowledged, however, that the reflections of an antient writer, upon this point, are equally well founded; who has enumerated such a variety of conciliating circumstances arising from this relationship, peculiarly favourable to the growth of amity, that there may be some reason, perhaps, for surprize, that it should but seldom take root in a soil so happily prepared for its production. “What an abundant
“source of endearing considerations
“ (observes the sensible author alluded
“to) does the reflection afford, to have
“occupied, even before one came into
“the world, the same common man-
“sion; passed the state of infancy in
“the same cradle; looked up for pro-
“tection to the same parents; to have
“been equally the object of the same

^d *Taylor's offices and measures of friendship*, p. 32.

“ tender vows, and equally heir to
 “ the same common honour reflected
 “ from their virtues ‘.”

Where these early and endearing *participations* produce the effect, which might naturally be expected from them, friendship, certainly, appears in her most amiable form : and let it be remembered, for the honour of the muses, that this pleasing union was never more remarkably exhibited than in the persons of two ingenious poets, the one a Roman, and the other a Briton. With what affecting tenderness does Catullus lament the death of a beloved brother !

----- O ! misero Frater adempte mihi !
 Tu mea, tu moriens fregisti commoda frater :

‘ Quam copiosæ suavitatis illa recordatio est ! in eodem domicilio antequam nascerer habitavi ; in iisdem incunabulis infantiæ tempora peregi ; eosdem appella- vi parentes ; eadem pro me vota excubuerunt ; parem ex majorum imaginibus gloriam traxi ! Val. Max. V. c. 5.

*Tecum una tota est nostra sepulta domus.
 Omnia tecum una perierunt gaudia nostra,
 Quæ tuus in vita dulcis alebat amor.
 Cujus ego interitu tota de mente fugavi
 Hæc studia, atque omnes delicias animi.—*

*Alloquar? audiero nunquam tua verba loquentem!
 Nunquam ego te vita, Frater amabilior,
 Adspiciam posthac! et certe semper amabo.*

Ah, me! what sorrows did my heart invade,
 When Thou wert wrap'd in death's eternal shade!
 With thee the glory of our race expir'd;
 Life's dearest joys, and all my soul admir'd.
 Her wonted aid the muse attempts in vain;
 Tuneless her lyre, and impotent her strain!

Far more than life to my fond bosom dear,
 Ne'er shall thy converse charm my list'ning ear!
 Ne'er shall my arms enfold thee to my breast!
 Yet there, still faithful to its earliest guest,
 There thy lov'd form shall ever dwell impress. }

And in the following tribute of cordial affection addressed by the late Dr. Goldsmith to his brother, one scarcely knows which to admire most, the sentiments of the man, or the numbers of the poet:

Remote,

*Remote, unfriended, melancholy, slow,
Or by the lazy Scheld, or wandering Po,
Or onward where the rude Carinthian boor
Against the houseless stranger shuts the door,
Or where Campania's plain forsaken lies,
A weary waste expanding to the skies;
Where'er I roam, whatever realms I see,
My heart, untravelled, fondly turns to thee:
Still to my Brother turns with ceaseless pain,
And drags, at each remove, a lengthen'd chain.
Eternal blessings crown my earliest friend,
And round his dwelling guardian saints attend!*

Goldsmith's Traveller.

(21) Although Cicero seems to admit, that *perfect* friendship does not absolutely exclude more than two persons; yet both experience and the nature of the connection, appear rather to confine it to a strict duality. We do not find the name of a third person mentioned, in the history of those celebrated amities which were contracted between Theseus and Perithous, Jonathan and David, Achilles and Patroclus, Nisus and Euryalus, Pylades

and Orestes, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, &c. Indeed, the variety and importance of those offices which an alliance of this generous kind indispensably demands, together with the ardency of affection and zeal requisite to support the exertion of them, seem necessarily to confine the sphere of its activity within the shortest possible limits. For "since our faculties," as an ingenious writer observes ^b, "are of *finite* energy, it is impossible our love can be very intense when divided: the rays must be *contracted* to make them *burn*."

(22) The precise uniformity of opinions, both civil and religious, required in *terms* at least, by this proposition, as necessary to conciliate true friendship, seems to have been the unanimous doctrine of all the antient writers upon this subject; and Cicero, in laying it down, does but literally transcribe

^b Norris.

from

from Theophrastus, as appears by a fragment of his treatise preserved in Aulus Gellius *f*.

If the maxim were to be taken, however, in its largest sense, and without any *restriction*; one might justly be astonished that the Roman philosopher should, in this instance at least, have implicitly followed the Grecian as his guide: for if the principle were strictly true, the celebrated connection between himself and Atticus, must have been altogether fictitious and insincere. It is well known, that no two men could differ more widely in their speculative tenets, than these illustrious friends; the one embracing the opinions of the academic sect, and the other being a professed Epicurean. There is reason to believe too, that their political notions were not less at variance; at least if we may fairly infer their respective sentiments upon

f Noct. Att. I. 3.

P 4

that

that article, from the very different conduct they held in those civil commotions, which terminated in the dissolution of the republic. In order therefore to reconcile Cicero both to himself and to truth, it is necessary to take the words of this passage as importing nothing more, than a *general* agreement of opinion “with respect to “the *fundamental* principles of the “civil and religious constitution of “their country.”—It is in this sense that the Civilians understand a similar expression of Ulpian, when he represents the qualification of a lawyer, to consist in a knowledge *omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum*; meaning only the civil and ecclesiastical laws of the empire.

If indeed it were true, that there could be no *real* union of hearts without an *exact* conformity of opinions; friendship would be a connection incompatible

compatible with the nature of the human mind. Never were two understandings, perhaps, so commensurate with each other, as to possess precisely the same equal capacity. The human intellect, like the human countenance, is composed, indeed, of the same common features in every man; yet there is a certain discriminating *seity* (as the school-men called it) no less in the one than in the other, which, to an attentive observer, cannot fail of marking a very sensible difference in each individual. This being evidently the case, no two men, exercising their mental faculties upon complicated questions of a political or theological nature, will ever, perhaps, be found to terminate their reasonings in perfectly similar conclusions. To require therefore, as an essential qualification of genuine friendship, that the parties should *think* alike, is just as possible to be complied with, as if the condition

had

had been that they should *look* alike. If the axiom can hold true in any instance, it can only be with respect to men of the most weak and illiberal minds. Persons of this character, not having the power, or the spirit, to think for themselves, and necessarily forming their opinions (if a mere *passive* persuasion can be called an opinion) by certain prescribed models, could not fail of finding them tally with each other in most exact coincidence. Minds of this narrow and contracted cast, will undoubtedly be affected with sentiments of love, or aversion, towards those persons with whom they converse, in proportion as they shall appear to receive, or reject, their *assumed* tenets. To such therefore the proposition contained in the text is strictly applicable; and to such *only*. But to extend it farther, and represent it of *universal* influence, is to lay the foundation of one of the most refined and generous propensities

penalties of the human heart, in one of its meanest and most selfish weaknesses.

Happily, however, for the credit of the connection, the proposition in its most contracted and illiberal sense, is neither agreeable to truth, nor to the leading principle which Cicero himself inculcates, as the sure ground upon which an honourable and permanent amity can *alone* be raised. This, he justly and repeatedly contends, is *Virtue*; including in that comprehensive term, every public and private affection which raises and dignifies the human heart. In that *essential* article, indeed, their sentiments must strictly and *indispensably* unite: in all the rest, *diversity* of opinion is not only consistent with the most cordial friendship, but in the number of its principal prerogatives. It gives scope to a variety of useful disquisitions, calls into action one of the most pleasing exercises of the mental powers, and eminently contributes

butes to enlarge and enlighten the understanding. Truth is best struck out by a *collision* of opinions: and she is never more successfully investigated, than in the secure freedom of unre-served and amicable debate. In a word, genuine friendship should take for her device the famous Selden's excellent motto; *περι παντος ελευθεριαν*, "above all things perfect freedom of thinking:" for minds are never in truer *harmony*, than when each may safely dissent from the other, without the least diminution of their mutual esteem and good-will.

(23) Some account has been given in the Remarks on Cato, of each of the several persons, except Philus, mentioned in the text *ε*. The company in which Cicero has here placed the latter, cannot but raise the highest idea of his character: there are, however, but very few particulars to be traced

ε See Rem. on Cato, N^o 27, 56, 75; and also in the present Remarks, N^o 9.

concerning

concerning him. One remarkable circumstance, indeed, of his conduct is recorded, which proves him to have been actuated by an uncommon greatness of mind. At the expiration of his consulate, he was sent to command the army then acting against the Numantines: and although Metellus and Pompeius were his declared and warmest enemies, he named those very persons to attend him as his lieutenants into Spain. There cannot be a stronger proof of his possessing a truly magnanimous spirit, than thus sacrificing his private resentments to the public service, and from a consciousness of his own integrity and abilities, choosing to submit his operations to the scrutiny of two inspectors, who he was sure would be least disposed to conceal, or extenuate, any errors he might commit. Valerius Maximus, (from whose elegant and informing compilation this singular fact is taken)

In the Y. of R. 617.

was

was so struck with this uncommon instance of a truly great mind, that he could not forbear to express his sense of it, in the following warm but just exclamation: *O! fiduciam non solum fortem, sed pene etiam temerarium; qua duobus acerrimis odiis latera sua cingere est ausus, usumque ministerii vix tutum amicis, e sinu inimicorum petere sustinuit!* *Pigh. An. II. 499. Val. Max. III. c. 7. N° 5.*

(24) The Poet alluded to, is Empedocles, a native of Agrigentum (now called Gergenti) in Sicily, who flourished about 450 years before the Christian æra. He was one of the most celebrated disciples of Pythagoras, and composed a didactic poem, in which he explained and supported the physiological principles of his great master; as Lucretius in a Latin poem, some centuries afterwards, did those of his admired Epicurus. The two founders of these famous schools, although they

they raised their respective systems upon the same common principle, yet the consequences they deduced from it were widely different; the former leading to Theism, and the latter to Atheism. Nevertheless, Lucretius, at the same time that he opposes the tenets, warmly acknowledges the abilities, of the Grecian poet; representing him as a genius of so superior an order,

Ut vix humana videatur stirpe creatus.

As nothing remains of this famous Greek poem, except a few scattered fragments occasionally cited by the antient writers, it is altogether conjectural what Empedocles, or more properly, perhaps, Pythagoras, meant by those physical powers which he expressed under the moral ideas of *friendship* and *discord*. It has been supposed by some writers, both antient and modern, that he alluded to the doctrine of two distinct, independent, intellectual agents,
the

the respective authors of all the good and evil, which prevails in the world: but the very learned and judicious Cudworth has shewn, by the most convincing evidence, that he is by no means chargeable with this absurd hypothesis^a.

The efficient cause of the opposite phænomena in question, has in all ages engaged the attention, and divided the opinions, of curious inquirers into those latent springs by which the wonderful machinery of nature is performed. The sagacious Mr. Lock acknowledges himself equally incapable of comprehending, "by what secret power the parts of
"bodies are made to *cohere*, as how the
"mind performs the act of thinking,
"or can move our bodies by thought." But Sir Isaac Newton seems to have solved the difficulty, in a very satisfac-

^a See *Intellect. Syst.* passim, particularly vol. I. p. 151, 4to. ed.

tory manner, by assigning his *universal* principle of *attraction*, as abundantly adequate to both those contrary effects. Perhaps, if the poem under consideration were extant, it would afford an additional instance to those that already occur in the history of antient philosophy, that the modern system of physics, in some of its fundamental articles, is not so much a new theory as a revival and confirmation of the old. For although the Sicilian philosopher has assigned *two* distinct powers for the appearances in question; whereas our illustrious countryman accounts for the same, by the assistance of one simple, concealed cause; yet it is possible, if we could trace the Grecian bard through the several links of his system, it might be found, perhaps, that those highly allegorical images he has employed, when reduced into plain language, would not prove at very considerable variance with the doctrine of Sir Isaac Newton upon this subject. For that

plastic nature maintained by Empedocles, as the instrumental, unconscious, incorporeal agent, in the concretion and secretion of the several forms which compose the visible creation, bears a strong resemblance, in many of its features, to Sir Isaac Newton's *universal* principle. In one respect, at least, they evidently agree; both of them being represented as the action of some subordinate, immaterial cause, which perpetually moves and governs matter, according to certain laws originally prescribed by the supreme Architect. It should seem, too, that if our immortal British Philosopher had chosen to veil the fundamental principles of his system in figurative allusions, he could not have found two metaphors more expressive of the *different* effects of that *energetic* power, which he has proved to pervade all the works of nature, than those of *Friendship* and *Discord*. *Laert. in vit. Emped. Lucret. I. 734. Stanley's L. of the Philos. p. 577. Lock's Essay*

*Essay on H. U. II. c. 23. N° 23, et seqq.
Clerk's Robault, Vol. I. p. 54. in note.*

(25) Pacuvius, who flourished about the Y. of R. 590, was one of the earliest as well as one of the most celebrated of the Roman dramatic poets. In the judgment of Horace, he rivalled, if not eclipsed, the poetical reputation of Ennius; to whom he was not more nearly related by genius, than by birth. The epitaph he made for himself, and ordered to be inscribed on his tomb, is preserved in Aulus Gellius^a, and affords a striking specimen of that expressive simplicity, which so remarkably distinguishes the antient inscriptions of every kind, from those of modern composition:

*Adolescens, tamen etsi properas, hoc te saxum rogat
Uti ad se adspicias; deinde quod scriptu'st legas:
Hic sunt poetæ MARCEI PACUVIEI sita
Ossa. Hoc volebam nescius ne offēs, vale.*

^a A. Gel. I. 24.

Tho' haste, O youth! should urge thy destin'd way,
Yet let this verse thy steps one moment stay:
Entomb'd within these monumental stones,
Securely rests the bard Pacuvius' bones.
And, now thou knowest what I wish'd to tell,
Pursue thy road, and ever fare thee well.

The play to which Cicero refers, was founded on the story of Orestes, the son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. His mother, during the absence of her hero at the siege of Troy, having admitted *Aegystus* to her bed; Orestes, fired with indignation at her perfidy, in a transport of rage stabbed her to the heart. When his passion had subsided, and reflection succeeded to resentment, he was struck with horror of the crime he had committed; and in the anguish of his mind, had recourse to the oracle of Apollo, in order to be informed by what means he might expiate the guilt of his parricide. The atonement required, was, that he should carry off the statue of Diana, from her impious temple in Taurica Chersonesus:

fus: where, with more than savage barbarism, the cruel custom prevailed of immolating upon her sanguinary altars, every stranger that happened to come into the country. Orestes was accompanied in this propitiatory pilgrimage, by the faithful and generous Pylades. As soon as these celebrated friends were arrived, they concealed themselves in a cave, in order to wait a proper opportunity of executing the object of their expedition; but being discovered by some shepherds, they were seized and brought before Thoas, the king of this infamous and inhospitable land^b. The sequel of this story is variously related; but it should seem, that in the Roman tragedy, Orestes alone was the destined victim.

The place of Ovid's exile, was in the neighbourhood of the country where

^b Hygin. Fab. 121.

fabulous history has laid the scene of these detestable rites. Accordingly the poet, who too sensibly experienced in his misfortunes, how little those connections are to be relied upon, which in the language of the world pass under the prostituted name of amity; takes occasion, in one of his plaintive epistles from Pontus, to shame his pretended friends into an exertion of their good offices in his behalf, by representing to them the impression which a narrative of this story made even upon the barbarians, among whom it was his unhappy lot to pass his life:

*Mirus amor juvenum, quamvis abiere tot anni,
In Scythia magnum nunc quoque nomen habet.
Fabula narrata est postquam vulgaris ab illo,
Laudarunt omnes facta piæque fidem.
Scilicet hac etiam, quæ nulla ferocior, orâ,
Nomen amicitiae barbara corda movet:
Quid facere Ausoniâ geniti debetis in urbe,
Cum turgent diros talia facta Getas?*

‘ Ep. ex Pont. III. 2.

Tho’

Tho' many an age has o'er the story roll'd,
 With rapture still their honour'd faith is told :
 Still Scythia's sons (than whom a fiercer race
 Ne'er did the form of human kind disgrace)
 Their glorious strife with ceaseless praise admire,
 And bless the force of friendship's sacred fire.
 In this rude clime, where ruder natives swarm,
 If thus the deed their savage souls can charm ;
 Say ye, in Latium's happier regions born,
 Whom manners polish, and whom arts adorn,
 What finer feelings should *your* bosoms know,
 How far more warm with gen'rous friendship glow !

(26) It was one of the tenets maintained in the school of Epicurus, that *Justice* is altogether the creature of positive institution ; there being no principle, it was asserted, in human nature, which leads to the practice of this virtue, independent of the laws established by civil compact. The Stoics and Peripatetics, on the contrary, contended, agreeably to truth and the real constitution of the moral world, that man being *evidently* formed for the social state, it necessarily followed, that the principle denied by

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Laudarunt omnes facta piæque fidem.
Scilicet hac etiam, quâ nulla ferocior, orâ,
Nomen amicitiae barbara corda movet :
Quid facere Ausoniâ geniti debetis in urbe,
Cum tangant diros talia facta Getas ?*

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 With rapture still their honour'd faith is told :
 Still Scythia's sons (than whom a fiercer race
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the Epicureans, must equally be wrought into the composition of his nature: because without the latter, the former could not subsist. The Epicureans, however, endeavoured to evade this argument, by denying that a state of society is the *natural* state of man. There is a fine passage preserved by Arrian, in which the admirable Epicetetus confutes this doctrine, by the practice of the philosopher himself. "Epicurus," says this celebrated Stoic, "acts upon the very principle he labours to overthrow, when he attempts to prove, that man is not naturally inclined to society. For upon what motive, let me ask, does he give himself all this concern to bring us over to his opinion? what can induce him to trim his midnight lamp, and waste his spirits in laborious vigils for the instruction of mankind? As he disclaims all *natural* connection with his species, what

“ what interest can he have in any
“ thing that relates to them? It is
“ evident that the *social instinct*, the
“ most powerful of all principles, insti-
“ gated him in these lucubrations for
“ the supposed benefit of mankind;
“ and compelled him to obey the dic-
“ tates of his sociable nature, in the
“ very act by which he meant to prove
“ that man is not by nature sociable.”

The noble author of the character-
istics, hath taken up this argument and
applied it, with equal force and propri-
ety, to a modern disciple of the Epicu-
rean school, the celebrated sage of
Malmesbury. “ An able and witty phi-
“ losopher of our nation,” says this
polite and ingenious moralist, “ as fa-
“ vage and unsociable as he would
“ make himself and all mankind appear
“ by his philosophy, took the utmost
“ pains to shew us, that both in reli-
“ gion and morals we were imposed
“ upon

“ upon by our governors; that there was
“ nothing which by *nature* inclined us
“ either way; nothing which naturally
“ drew us to the love of what was *with-*
“ *out*, or beyond *ourselves*: tho’ the love of
“ such great truths and sovereign max-
“ ims as he imagined these to be, made
“ him the most *laborious* of all men, in
“ composing systems of this kind for our
“ *use*.—What should we say to one of
“ these anti-zealots, who in the zeal of
“ such a cool philosophy, should assure
“ us *faithfully*, that we were the most
“ mistaken men in the world to imagine
“ such things as *natural* faith and jus-
“ tice; that it was only *force* and *power*
“ that constituted *right*? Sir! the phi-
“ losophy you have condescended to
“ reveal to us, is most extraordinary;
“ we are beholden to you for your in-
“ struction. But pray, whence is this
“ zeal in our behalf? what are *we* to
“ *you*? Are you our *father*? Or if you
“ were, why this concern for us? Is
“ there

“ there then such a thing as *natural af-*
“ *fection*? If not; why all this pains on
“ our account? Of what advantage is it
“ to *you*, to deliver us from the cheat?
“ ’Tis directly against your *interest* to
“ undeceive us, and let us know that
“ only *private* interest governs you, and
“ that nothing nobler, or of a larger
“ kind, should govern us whom you
“ converse with. Leave us to ourselves,
“ and to that notable art by which we
“ are happily *tamed* and rendered thus
“ mild—’Tis not fit we should know by
“ *nature* we are all *wolves*. Is it pos-
“ sible that one who has discovered
“ himself such, should take pains to
“ communicate such a discovery?”
Arrian. Epict. Dissert. l. II. c. 20.
Shafts. Char. vol. I. p. 88. et seqq.

(27) After the Romans had become acquainted with the system of Epicurus, and converts were daily going over to his opinions; the question concerning the origin of friendship seems to

to have been much discussed, not only in the schools of the philosophers, but in the conversation of those ingenious men in general, who had a turn for moral and speculative inquiry. Thus Horace, in that admirable satire in which he so agreeably laments the impertinence and dissipation to which his time was unavoidably sacrificed in Rome; contrasts it with the philosophical manner in which he passed his life at his *sabine* villa. The society he met with there, it seems, was of the most rational kind; and, among other interesting topics of conversation with his sensible neighbours, they frequently debated the controverted question, concerning the true nature and origin of friendship^a.

Upon this inquiry, as upon almost every other, of a moral, or physical

^a *Quidve ad amicitias usus rectumve, trahat nos.*
Sat. L. II. 6.

nature,

nature, the Stoics and Peripatetics widely differed from the Epicureans; the former contending, agreeably to the principles repeatedly insisted upon, and so well supported in the present treatise, that real friendship is a generous, disinterested affection, arising solely and spontaneously from the social *sense* implanted in the human heart: whereas the latter maintained, that it is founded upon the same *selfish* principle which actuates, as they pretended, every other passion in the breast of man, and springs from a motive of *utility* alone. Epicurus indeed, as well as some modern advocates of the same cause, seem to have taken their estimates of human nature, from its meanest and most degrading exhibitions: but the noblest and more respectable philosophers of antiquity, have chosen, for a much wiser and better purpose, to view it on the brightest and most advantageous side. "It is impossible," as the incomparable

Mr.

Mr. Addison remarks, “ to read a
“ passage in Plato, or Tully, and a
“ thousand other antient moralists,
“ without being a greater and a better
“ man for it. On the contrary,” (continues this elegant writer) “ I could
“ never read any of our modish French
“ authors, or those of our own country,
“ who are the imitators and admirers
“ of that trifling nation, without being
“ for some time out of humour with
“ myself, and at every thing about me.
“ Their business is to depreciate human nature, and consider it under its
“ worst appearances. They give mean
“ interpretations and base motives, to
“ the worthiest actions.—In short, they
“ endeavour to make no distinction between man and man, or between the
“ species of men and that of brutes^b. ”

(28) Tarquin the *proud*, so called from his haughty and imperious temper, was one of the most execrable

^b Tat. vol. II. N^o 103.

tyrants,

tyrants, perhaps, that ever disgraced a crown. As he opened his way to the throne by the flagitious murder of that excellent prince, Servius Tullius; so he exercised the sovereign power in a manner perfectly suitable to the cruel means by which he obtained it. At length his intolerable oppressions, together with the infamous outrage of one of his sons on the chastity of the celebrated Lucretia, occasioned a general revolt of his subjects; which ending in the expulsion of himself and family, produced a total change of government from the regal to the republican form.

Cassius, altho' he was himself a patrician, yet favoured, or at least pretended to favour, the rights of the people. With this view, he endeavoured to procure a law, ordaining, that a certain part of the conquered lands which had been usurped by the nobles, should be applied to their original destination,

tion, and distributed among the indigent citizens. This attempt, together with some other circumstances of his political conduct, drew upon him a suspicion that he was secretly aiming, under the specious appearance of popular justice, to undermine the constitutional liberties of his country. He was accordingly arraigned for treason; and being condemned to suffer death, the sentence was executed in the Y. of R. 268. *Liv. Hist.* II. 41.

(29) Concerning the invasion of Pyrrhus, see Rem. on Cato, p. 217. Humanity was a striking feature in the heroic character of this illustrious prince: and he gave a strong proof of that magnanimous quality, in the single victory he obtained over the Roman army; treating the prisoners taken in that battle, with the most humane tenderness, and generously restoring them without ransom. *Flor.* I. 13.

That

That cruel disposition which Cicero imputes to Hannibal, is unanimously attributed to him by all the Roman historians: Livy, in particular, represents him not only of a sanguinary temper, but void also of every principle of honour, justice and good faith^a. But it may well be suspected, that these moral deformities in his character, are much aggravated at least, if not absolutely misrepresentations: for it should be remembered, that the picture is drawn by his enemies; who having suffered much from his valour and abilities, may fairly be supposed to have exhibited a caricature, rather than a just resemblance. Accordingly the candid Rollin observes, that neither Plutarch nor Polybius, altho' they frequently take occasion to mention this celebrated Carthaginian, throw out the least hint of his being stained by those horrid vices, of which he is accused by Livy^b. In-

^a Liv. xxi. 4. ^b Rol. Belles Let. vol. iv. p. 93.

deed with regard to *crudelty*, (the particular charge alledged against him by Cicero) it is but justice to remark, that his restraining the slaughter his victorious troops were making of their fleeing enemies, at the battle of Cannæ; the respect he paid to the military virtues of Flaminius, (who was slain in the overthrow of the army he commanded at the battle of Thrasimenus) by causing diligent search to be made for his body, in order, if it had been found, to pay it funeral honours^d; together with the same generous tribute of esteem he paid to the remains of Marcellus; are such instances of moderation and true heroism of mind, as cannot but impress a very favourable opinion of his humanity upon every unprejudiced reader.

For the rest, Cicero's observation, That there is an innate propensity in the

^c Flor. ii. 6.

^d Plut. in vit. Fab. Max.

^e See Rem. on Cato, p. 217.

heart of man to admire virtuous actions and abhor their contraries; at what distance soever placed from their respective influence, and antecedently to all reasoning and reflection, was one of the fundamental tenets of the Athenian *Porcb*; as it is the leading principle likewise upon which he reasons, throughout the present treatise. It should seem indeed, that virtue would be left destitute of requisite aid, if she were secured by no *internal* auxiliary, but must depend entirely for assistance on the slow and deliberate advances of reason and experience. Happily, however, there are certain symptoms in the constitution of human nature, that strongly indicate the reality of a *moral sense*: and this hypothesis, altho' much controverted, hath been well supported by some of the most distinguished philosophers both antient and modern. The reasoning of one of its latest and most respectable advocates in our own nation,

is so conformable to the passage under consideration, that it may be produced as a collateral support of Cicero's argument. "As soon as any action is represented to us," (says this ingenious writer) "as flowing from *love*, *humanity*, *gratitude*, a study of the good of others, and an ultimate desire of their happiness, altho' it were in the most distant part of the world, or in some past age; we feel joy within us, admire the lovely action, and praise its author. On the contrary, every action represented to us as flowing from ill-will, desire of the misery of others without view of any prevalent good to the public, or from *ingratitude*; raises abhorrence and aversion:—But whence this secret chain, between each person and mankind? How is my *interest* connected with the most distant parts of it? And yet I must admire actions which shew good-will towards them, and *love*

“ love the author. If there is no *mo-*
 “ *ral sense* which makes benevolent ac-
 “ tions appear beautiful; if all appro-
 “ bation be from the *interest* of the ap-
 “ prover,”

What's Hecuba to us, or we to Hecuba ^a?

Hamlet.

(30) *Amico vecchio*, says the Italian proverb, *è cose nuova*. There is nothing indeed of a more brittle composition, than the common friendships of the world: every day's experience shews, that the slightest collision is sufficient to break them to pieces. In fact, ruptures of this kind are so frequent, and generally attended with such inconsiderable consequences, that they scarcely make a stronger impression upon observers, than the most usual and unimportant occurrences of ordinary life. But the easy dissolution of that cement by which worldly amities

^a Hutchinson's inquiry concerning moral good and evil, p. 144.

are held together, may become a matter of serious reflection, when the union is separated between men, whose station and talents give them a powerful influence over the public affairs of a commonwealth. There is a memorable instance to this purpose, in Roman story. An irreparable breach was made in the intimacy of M. Livius Drusus and Q. Servilius Cæpio, from no higher a cause than each persisting to bid against the other, for a curious ring at a public auction: yet this paltry object of contention kindled between these two friends, (both of them men of considerable rank and weight in the republic) an enmity that contributed, in its consequences, to the breaking out of the war between Rome and her Italian allies^a; in the course of which, no less than three hundred thousand lives perished in battle. This dreadful havoc of the human species might have been spared, if the Romans

^a Plin. Hist. Nat. xxxiii. c. 11.

had

had yielded at first to those most just claims (as Paternulus expressly calls them) of their neighbouring allies; and which, after all the horrors of a long and destructive scene of sanguinary contention, they were at last compelled to grant. Should there be any circumstances in modern story, not very dissimilar from those which attended this impolitic war; it were devoutly to be wished, that no event might verify the severe observation of an ingenious French writer, *que les sottises de nos devanciers sont perdues pour nous!*

(31) Caius Marcius Coriolanus was descended from an illustrious Patrician family: but the honour he derived from the noble blood that flowed in his veins, was not greater than he reflected back on his ancestors by his own heroic actions. Having, in the year of R. 262, *Quorum ut fortuna atrox, ita causa fuit iustissima.* Patern. Hist. I. 15.

Creirer, Hist. Rom. vol. ix. p. 541.

had

R 4.

made

made a speech in the senate, tending to the abolition of the tribunitial power; it gave such offence to those popular magistrates, as to involve him in a prosecution that terminated in condemning him to perpetual banishment. He accordingly submitted to the sentence: but with sentiments altogether unsuitable to that magnanimous spirit, which had hitherto directed his conduct; for he formed the resolution of revenging on his country the injury he had received from a particular faction. With these unworthy sentiments, he entered into the service of the Volsci, a neighbouring state perpetually engaged in hostilities with the Roman republic. *These*, by the instigation of Coriolanus, they were induced to renew: and they conferred upon him the command of their troops. He opened the campaign by attacking and recovering several towns, which had been formerly taken by the republic from the Volsci: after which he led his victorious army to the gates of Rome.

The

The approach of Coriolanus, at the head of so formidable an army, threw the city into a general consternation. In this alarming situation, several overtures of peace having been ineffectually offered to him by the senate; it was at length proposed, as the last expedient, to send to him a deputation of the principal ladies in Rome, conducted by his mother and wife, accompanied by their children. This singular embassy was not commissioned in vain. The pride and spirit of Coriolanus, inflexible as they had appeared upon all the former applications which had been made to him, were not proof against the conjugal and filial tenderness of his heart: he was prevailed upon to withdraw his army. The antient historians are not agreed with respect to the sequel. Livy speaks dubiously concerning the time and the manner of his death, but cites Fabius Maximus, one of their earliest annalists, as intimating that he lived to an ad-

vanced

The

vanced age^a. But Plutarch affirms^b, his yielding to Volumnia's intercessions cost him his life; as on his return with the army to Antium, a general council of the state having been convened at his request, in order to give him an opportunity of publicly vindicating his conduct; he had scarcely entered upon his defence, when a tumult was raised by his enemies, and he was assassinated in the midst of the assembly.

Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Plutarch, have severally given the speech which they pretend Volumnia addressed to her son on this memorable occasion: but as they are totally different from each other, they are equally, it is probable, fictitious. If any one of them could be supposed genuine, it would be that which Livy has attributed to her. It is expressed in a more concise, and animated simplicity of language and sentiment; and

^a Liv. ii. 24.

^b In vit. Coriolan.

confe-

consequently more agreeable to the genius and manners of the age, as well as to the spirited character of a Roman matron. Shakespear in his tragedy upon this subject, has copied the harangue from Plutarch; but instead of improving the materials he found in that author, they have suffered considerably by passing through his hands. It is by no means wonderful, however, that he should ill succeed in an office for which nature never designed him? for what Milton somewhere says of himself, is, perhaps, even more unquestionably true of Shakespear, that his "mother bore him a speaker of what God made his own, and not a *trans-*
"lator."

(32) The scene to which Cicero alludes, was one of the most important ever exhibited in the Roman republic; as the principal actor concerned in it was one of the most respectable of her distinguished citizens. If the reader, however,

however, were to form his opinion of the character and designs of the latter, by the representations given of them in the treatise before him; he must necessarily look upon Tiberius Gracchus as a turbulent demagogue, who for the sole purpose of gratifying his impious ambition, had well-nigh overturned the liberties of his country.

In justice to the memory therefore of a well-intentioned patriot, and in order also to lay open a more distinct view of a very interesting portion of Roman story, it may be proper to inquire, somewhat particularly, how far Cicero's censures are justly founded: especially as some modern writers of considerable rank have differed much in their judgment concerning them.

Tiberius Gracchus had received by birth, by nature, and by education, every advantage that could render him eminently conspicuous amongst the
brightest

brightest ornaments of the common-wealth. His father, Sempronius Gracchus, had passed through the most considerable civil and military employments, with the highest reputation: and his mother, Cornelia, the celebrated daughter of the first Scipio Africanus, was never excelled by any of her own sex, in those virtues and accomplishments which raise and dignify the female character. During his youth, he every day gave increasing hopes, that the example and instruction of such wise and venerable parents, could not fail of ripening, in due time, those happy seeds which nature had so liberally sown in his genius and disposition, into the noblest and most valuable fruits. With these public expectations, he entered upon the great stage of the world: and the part he acted, seems to have abundantly justified them. In a word, (to judge of his conduct with those candid

candid allowances which human imperfection necessarily requires) there appears no reason to suspect that Paterculus flattered his memory, when he represented him as irreproachable in his morals, upright in his intentions, and endowed with every virtue of the heart and every quality of the mind, which constitute the character of a truly good and great man".

The attempt he made when he exercised the office of tribune*, to revive and enforce the Agrarian laws, is the particular article of his public transactions, which Cicero so warmly condemns. It will be necessary, therefore, to give a general view of the nature and origin of these laws, and of a few

"Vita innocentissimus, ingenio florentissimus, proposito sanctissimus, tanta denique virtutibus adornatus quantis perfecta et natura et industria mortalis conditio recipit. Patere. I. 2."

* In the Y. of R. 620.

of the principal efforts, that, at different periods, were made in order to enforce its due operation.

It was the wise policy of the earlier times of the Roman republic, as often as she enlarged her dominions by invasions on the neighbouring states, to appropriate a certain portion of the conquered territory. Part of these was put up to public sale, and the purchase money applied towards reimbursing the expences of the war; the remainder was annexed to her demelnes, and distributed among the poorer citizens at an easy reserved rent. By this judicious regulation, not only extreme indigence was banished from the lower class of people; but every citizen being thus possessed of a certain landed property, was personally interested in the public welfare. The advantages, however, of this politic or-

Plut. in vit. Gracc.

dinance

dinance were soon defeated, by the avarice of the more powerful and opulent members of the commonwealth; who, under a pretence of improving the public revenue, procured the reserved rents to be raised higher than the poor citizens were able to pay: by which means they gradually got into their own hands the exclusive possession of these territorial farms. In order to relieve the sufferers from this iniquitous usurpation, Licinius Stolo, above three centuries before the present time, proposed a law when he was Tribune[‡], that no citizen should be allowed to possess more than five hundred acres of land. A strenuous opposition was made by the nobles to this motion; but at length, after a most warm and violent contention, the Tribune's party prevailed, and the law was promulgated. Means, however, were soon dis-

‡ In the Y. of R. 373.

covered to frustrate its efficacy; the several commissioners occasionally appointed to distribute the newly acquired lands, being prevailed upon by pecuniary presents, or other interested considerations, to assign them in fictitious names, to those very men whom the legislature had rendered incapable of enjoying the legal possession. The consequence was, that in a course of years the lower order of citizens were totally deprived of all means of subsistence.

In this situation the affair remained when Tiberius Gracchus, with the honest spirit and indignation of a laudable reformer, stood forth to rescue the poor from the hand of the oppressor. To effectuate this benevolent purpose, he exerted the utmost efforts of his credit, his interest and his eloquence, that this neglected law might be carried into proper execu-

tion. But his strenuous endeavours were withstood, with equal ardour and vehemence, by those citizens whose estates principally consisted of the lands in question; insomuch, that the violence of the contending parties, had well-nigh produced a total revolution in the Roman government.

The generality of writers, both antient and modern, who have animadverted upon the conduct of Gracchus in respect to this transaction, agree with Cicero in imputing his motives to an ambition of acquiring greater power and popularity, than was consistent with the principles of the constitution. This charge has been supported, with much plausibility, by Mr. Gordon, in the *political disquisitions* prefixed to his translation of Sallust; as it has, with great ingenuity, been controverted by Mr. Hooke, in his very accurate and elegant Roman history. But it will

5

appear, perhaps, in the present case, as it frequently does in other controversies, that the truth lies between the two disputants; the respective advocates having greatly, it should seem, overstrained both the *accusation* and the *defence*: Gracchus is neither wholly to be condemned, nor intirely acquitted. There is abundant reason indeed to believe, not only from his general character, but from the nature of those measures he *originally* pursued, that the first steps he took in this important business, were directed by the purest and most upright intentions. But it must be acknowledged equally evident, that in following his great object, his passions kindled by opposition; and what he commenced from a principle of public justice, he appears to have carried on in the spirit of personal resentment. If he had never departed from the terms of his primitive plan, it would certainly have stood clear of all reasonable objection. For

his first proposal was, that “ the pre-
“ sent possessors should be excused from
“ the penalty they had incurred on
“ account of their usurpations; that
“ they should not be compelled to re-
“ fund the mean profits; and that they
“ should be indemnified out of the
“ public treasury, to the full value of
“ the estates they were required to re-
“ sign.” Nothing could be more equi-
table than these clauses: and Plutarch,
from whom they are cited, has rea-
son to add, that there never was a law
drawn up against instances of such
enormous avarice and injustice, which
breathed a spirit of greater lenity and
moderation^a. Indeed, had Gracchus
continued to hold out these just quali-
fications to the parties who were called
upon to make the surrender; even Ci-
cero himself, who so repeatedly arraigns
him of factious views, could not but
have approved the law, and acquitted
its author of any unwarrantable designs.

^a Plut. in vit. Gracch.

For

For at the time when the senate began to be jealous of Pompey's power, Flavius, a Tribune, having proposed a renewal of the Agrarian laws; Cicero moved that the very *same* clauses just now cited should be inserted: and with those amendments, he acknowledged himself willing to concur in the Tribune's motion.

Thus far therefore Gracchus seems to have acted in a manner worthy of himself, and of the cause in which he had engaged. But the misfortune was, that in the course of those vehement contests he had to sustain with the unjust and outrageous opposers of his projected reformation, his passions took fire, and broke out into measures much too inflamed for the temperate warmth of a wise and well regulated zeal. Thus unhappily yielding to an impulse, which carried him far wide of the proper bias

Ad. At. I. 19.

S 3

both

both of his nature and his principles, he rashly retracted the several softnings he had before annexed to his law; and changing his ground, he now insisted upon an absolute and *unconditional* restitution of the lands in debate. This was breaking into one of the most sacred boundaries of civil property. For long prescription has been always admitted, in every equitable system of jurisprudence, as a title never to be impeached: and no reasons of state can render it just policy to over-rule this plea, without making the parties in possession a full and adequate compensation. Indeed Mr. Hooke denies that this plea would hold in the present instance; concluding from a passage cited by Aulus Gellius out of a speech of the elder Cato, delivered in the senate, that the "Licinian law could not for
"any length of time have been evaded,
"when Gracchus contended for its
"renewal." It is with great reluctance that the author of these Remarks finds
himself

himself obliged to dissent from so very respectable an authority; but the result of his best inquiry leads him to observe, in the first place, that even *two* years peaceable and uninterrupted possession of *immoveables*, was by a law of the twelve tables, a sufficient bar against the demands of any claimants; tho' it is confessed, that in times long after, this term was considerably and upon the truest principles, of equity, enlarged by Justinian: and in the next, that the learned writer lays a greater stress upon the passage he produces, than it seems fairly to support. The subject of debate in the senate was, whether war should be declared against the Rhodians, for having in the late hostilities between the republic and Perseus king of Macedon, shewn a *disposition* to favour the royal cause, altho' they had not, by any direct and explicit act, entered as parties into his quarrel. Cato, among other arguments which he urges in defence of the Rho-

dians, asks if it would not be thought the greatest injustice by every man, were the case his own, to be punished merely for an *inclination*? and then, adds, *Quæ tandem lex est tam acerba quæ dicat——si quis plus quingenta jugera habere voluerit; tanta pœna esto:——atqui nos omnia plura habere volumus; et id nobis impune est* .

It would seem, that no inference can be justly drawn, from these words, with respect either to the observance, or contravention, of the Licinian law: the venerable orator mentions it merely as an illustration of his general argument, and as an instance that came home to the bosoms of all his auditors. “Every one of us,” says he, wishes, “no doubt, to possess “more land than the law allows, but “wishes with impunity; for what legislation was ever so severe as to

Aul. Gel. VII. 3.

“make

“ make a simple act of the mind, an
 “ object of punishment.”

But if nothing can be deduced from the above passage, in favour of the ingenious advocate's assertion; it stands equally unsupported by historical evidence. As Mr. Hooke does not seem disposed to allow much credit to Cicero in the present question; his testimony might, perhaps, be waved, if it were not authenticated by an unexceptionable witness. For what the former assures us in his book of offices, concerning the *great length* of time these estates had been in the *families* of the possessors, is expressly confirmed by Florus*.

The fact is, that the Agrarian law had been disregarded almost as soon
 as

* *Quam autem habet æquitatem ut agrum multis annis aut etiam sæculis possessum, qui nullum habuit, habeat; qui autem habuit, amittat?* De Off. II. 22.

Relictas

as it was enacted; that is, above three centuries and a half before Tiberius Gracchus attempted to reform the abuse. For we find the Tribunes warmly contending with the opulent Patricians, in order to obtain a just distribution of the conquered lands, when the first law for that purpose had not existed full twenty years". Towards the close of the following century, the Licinian law, which has been so often mentioned in this remark, was ordained. But the temptation to elude it was so strong, that some years after it had passed, even Licinius himself was discovered to possess a greater portion of the public lands than he could legally enjoy: and he was actually

Relictas sibi a majoribus sedes, ætate quasi jure hæreditario, possidebant. Flor. III. 13.

"Vid. Liv. II. 41. iii. 1. Dionys. VIII. 2.

arraigned

arraigned and condemned for transgressing his own law^w.

Upon the whole, it seems evident, that many of the estates which Gracchus required to be immediately and *unconditionally* surrendered, had from time immemorial been in the possessors families, or in those of the several persons from whom they respectively derived their titles. To compel therefore the proprietors to surrender them, not only without an adequate, but without any *compensation*, was levelling one of the strongest and most inviolable fences of property: and as it could not possibly be effected without involving great numbers of citizens in one common and unmerited ruin; Gracchus in attempting to enforce this injurious law, was too plainly sacrificing his principles to his passions, and for the sake of taking

^w Liv. VII. 16.

vengeance

vengeance on his enemies, throwing his country into the most dangerous and alarming convulsions.

In consequence of his thus deviating from the rectitude of his original scheme, the wise and venerable Mucius Scævola, together with some others of the most respectable personages, both in rank and character, whose sanction had given the highest credit to his cause; equally sunk it in the public opinion by withdrawing their farther concurrence. Nor was this the only important loss he sustained, by the violence of his intemperate proceedings. For whilst, in the obstinate prosecution of his purposed reformation, he was haranguing the people from the steps of the capitol, an armed mob, headed by Scipio Nafica, (a senator of considerable authority, and one of those nobles who had large possessions in the usurped estates) broke through the crowd, and forcing their way to Gracchus; the latter,

latter, together with 300 of his friends and partizans, were basely massacred upon the spot, by the savage fury of instigated assassins. *Orat. pro. Plan.* 36. *Plut. in vit. Gracch.*

(33) If Plutarch's account of this examination may be relied upon, Cicero has not done justice to Blossius in suppressing a part of his answer to the last interrogatory: for, according to the Greek biographer, Blossius added, that "he was confident Gracchus would never have laid such a command upon him, if it had not been for the public advantage". These supplemental words very much soften the extravagance of his reply, as it stands in Cicero's narrative: for they import, not that he was ready, upon a wild notion of friendship, to commit any violence which Gracchus should propose to

^{to} Plut. in vit. Gracc.

him;

him; but that he had such an implicit confidence in the rectitude of his friend's patriotism, principles, and understanding, as to be well persuaded it was impossible he could recommend to him any action of a public nature, which had not the public welfare for its object.

But even with this mitigation, there was an enthusiastic extravagance in the acknowledgment, utterly inconsistent with sound sense and sober philosophy: for a philosopher, it seems, Blossius, professed himself to be. Nevertheless, the very singular and adventurous Montagne does not scruple to assert, that the answers of Blossius were precisely what they ought to have been. His reasoning is curious: but as it turns entirely upon metaphors, and those of the boldest and most uncommon kind, they must be given in his own language; for no other can express them.—*Ceux qui accusent cette reponse—
n'entendent*

n'entendent pas bien ce mystere ; et ne
presupposent pas, comme il est, qu'il tenoit
la volonté de Gracchus en sa manche,
et par puissance et par cognoissance. S'e-
tans parfaitement commis l'un a l'autre,
ils tenoient parfaitement les renes de
l'inclination l'un de l'autre : et faites
guider cet harnois (par la vertu et cela)
duit de la raison, (comme aussi est-il du
tout impossible de l'atteler sans cela)
la reponse de Blofius est telle qu'elle
devois estre *. This marvellous lo-
gic assumes, that friendship is strict-
ly and literally what Aristotle figu-
ratively defined it, " one soul in two
" bodies ;" and consequently, that
Blofius might be as intimately con-
scious of his friend's intentions, as he
could possibly be of his own. The sim-
ple stating of a proposition so glar-
ingly absurd, is to confute it ; and
it is only produced as a remarkable

* Mont. vol. I. p. 333. ed. par Coste.

instance,

instance, among many others which occur, that even a very ingenious understanding may sometimes embrace the most irrational and dangerous tenets, by unwarily suffering imagination to substitute *metaphor* for truth.

(34) He fled to the protection of Aristonicus, the natural brother of Attalus king of Pergamus. The latter having, by an injurious will, bequeathed all his dominions to the Romans, Aristonicus had the spirit to take up arms against their ill-grounded pretensions, and the misfortune to be made a prisoner by the consul Perpenna. The affairs of this prince being thus absolutely ruined, and the unhappy Blossius no longer secure from the vengeance of his enemies; he put an end to his life by his own hand. *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*

(35) Q. Æmilius Papus was consul in the Y. of R. 471, and a second time, four years afterwards; in both which dignities, as also in that of Censor, Caius Luscius Fabricius was his colleague. Concerning the latter, as likewise Curius and Coruncanus, some account has already been given in the former Remarks.

These glorious lights and ornaments of the republic shone out together at the same period, when as yet neither the philosophy of Greece^z, nor the luxury of Asia, had tainted the virtuous simplicity of Roman manners. It was these gallant commanders and sagacious statesmen, that gave victory to the arms and wisdom to the councils of the commonwealth, when Pyrrhus found it expedient to send Cyneas

^y See Rem. on Cato. p. 170.

^z The *Epicurean*.

upon an embassy to Rome with overtures of peace. Accordingly at his return, being asked by the King his opinion of that city and her senate; he replied, that the former seemed the *temple of virtue*, and the latter a *council of monarchs*. *Flor. I. 18.*

(36) C. Papirius Carbo possessed in an eminent degree the talents of a good speaker. As he had entered with great zeal and spirit into the measures of Tiberius Gracchus during his life, so after his death, being elected tribune with Caius Gracchus, he exerted his eloquence and his credit in conjunction with the latter, to enforce the Agrarian law, and to instigate the populace to revenge the murder of Tiberius. In allusion to this part of his conduct, he is described by Valerius Maximus as a most turbulent incendiary, who had well-nigh revived the dying flames of civil discord which

had been kindled by the sedition of Gracchus ^a.

It appears, however, that by the favour and protection of Lælius, he escaped the cruel persecution in which the rest of the friends and supporters of the Gracchi were involved, after the death of their two illustrious leaders. It was in return, probably, to so good an office, that this man not only changed sides and espoused the cause of the senate, but being some time afterwards advanced to the consulship, basely defended, before the people, the assassination of his friend and colleague Caius Gracchus, as a just and necessary sacrifice to the peace and preservation of the republic. *Pigh. Annal. Cicer. de Orat. II. 25.*

Caius Cato was grandson of the ve-

^a *Sepultæ Gracchanæ seditionis turbulentissimus vindex, et orientium civilium malorum fax ardentissima.*

nerable Censor. In what particular manner he signalized himself as a partizan of Gracchus, does not appear; but his joining in the opposition to the senate, was perfectly agreeable to the principles he may be supposed to have imbibed from his patriotic ancestor, whose long and honourable life was laid out, in withstanding the dangerous encroachments, and unjust usurpations, of the too powerful nobles. *Langius. in loc.*

(37) Tiberius Gracchus, in the prosecution of his great object, had recourse to a very extraordinary privilege annexed to the tribunitial office: he published an edict, by which he suspended the several magistrates of Rome from exercising the functions of their respective departments. He fixed his seal likewise upon the temple of Saturn; and by that means excluded the proper officers concerned in

in the finances, from entering into the public treasury of the state. *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*

(38) Scipio Nasica was cousin to Scipio Africanus the younger, and related likewise to the Gracchi. The people were so exasperated against him for the lawless and cruel outrage he had committed by the murder of Tiberius Gracchus ^b, that they could not be restrained from insulting him as often as he appeared in the streets of Rome. The senate, therefore, in order to protect him from the fury of the mob, and give a colourable pretence for conveying him out of their reach, conferred upon him an honorary commission into Asia. In this kind of banishment he wandered for some time from place to place, a melancholy and dispirited exile; till at length grief put an end to his life, in an obscure town belonging to the territories of

^b See Rem. 29.

the king of Pergamus. *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*

(39) The senatorial vengeance pursued Tiberius Gracchus and all his adherents with such implacable fury, that Carbo is the single instance of mercy to be found in the disgraceful records of this sanguinary scene. Not contented with having destroyed Gracchus, the unrelenting victors would not suffer his brother to pay his mangled remains the common rites of a decent funeral; but ordered his corpse, together with three hundred more that were knocked on the head by Scipio Nasica's mercenary mob, to be thrown into the Tyber. Their insatiable resentment did not end here; for without any trial, or the least regard to the forms of justice, they arbitrarily put to death, and in some instances with particular circumstances of cruelty, every friend to the cause of Gracchus that fell into their merciless hands.

This

This is the first instance of blood being shed in any of the civil commotions that had happened in Rome; all the former diffensions, between the people and the senate, having been happily compos'd by one or other of the two contending orders giving up the point in dispute. The present animosities would probably have terminated in the same manner, if more temper and moderation had been shewn in the opposition to Gracchus: for it does not appear that he was prepared, or had even the most distant intention, to support his cause by any other means, than those with which the tribunitial magistracy had legally and powerfully armed him. *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*

(40) Caius Gracchus was several years younger than his brother Tiberius, and but just entering upon the stage of the world, when the latter was acting a principal part in that great

political drama which drew the attention, and engaged the passions, of the whole Roman commonwealth. It was not till about ten years after the tragical catastrophe which closed the life of the elder Gracchus, that Caius opened his way to the tribuneship: and he had not yet given any decisive indications of the use he meant to make of his power, when the present conference is supposed to have passed. But it soon appeared that, actuated by the same principles, spirit, and abilities which so conspicuously marked the character of his illustrious brother, and undismayed by the example of his unhappy fate; he was determined to pursue and enforce the same plan of reformation, or perish in the attempt. The consequence was, that after many animated efforts to withstand the opposition of the nobles, he fell a victim to their superior power, and added one martyr more to the cause of an injured people.

All

All public spirit seems to have expired with the Gracchi: for after their death, as a late elegant and ingenious historian remarks, “there never
“arose a Tribune honest and generous
“enough to espouse the true interest of
“the people. The civil contests hence-
“forward were between the senate te-
“nacious of their sovereign rule, and a
“few grandees who sought to wrest it
“out of their hands; or between one
“grandee and another, each supported
“by an army at his devotion: contests
“which had their final issue in the
“subjection of Rome to an absolute
“monarchy.” *Plut. in vit. Gracc.*
Hooke's R. H. II. p. 560.

(41) The original manner of voting among the Romans at the choice of their magistrates, was by announcing the name of the person to whom the elector gave his suffrage. The Tribune Gabinius, in order to prevent the dangerous influence in elections which
this

this method gave the rich and powerful, proposed and carried a law in the Y. of R. 614, by which it was declared, that for the future the elections should proceed by ballotting. A few years afterwards, L. Cassius, another Tribune, extended this mode of voting to the judges on trials before the people. The success of bribery must ever be much too precarious to be hazarded, where laws of this nature prevail: and one can scarcely believe that any real friend of civil liberty, should express himself concerning them in the manner which Cicero does in the passage to which this note refers. It appears, however, that there was a time when he held a different opinion: for there exists a fragment of a speech he delivered the year before he was chosen Consul, in which he gives the law in question its proper epithet, and calls it, “*principium justissimæ libertatis.*”

Pigh. Annal. Frag. Orat. pro Cornel.

(42) Themistocles, for the reasons assigned in the text, being sentenced to banishment by that singular, but well-known institution among the Athenian laws, called ostracism; entered into the service of Artaxerxes, the son and successor of Xerxes, whose formidable armaments against the Grecian states he had some years before totally overthrown at the famous battle of Salamis. Altho' Cicero positively asserts, that both Themistocles and Coriolanus destroyed themselves by their own hands; yet the disagreement of historians upon those points, has left the facts altogether uncertain. *Corn. Nep. et Plut. in vit. Them.*

(43) It appears from several oblique insinuations scattered through this performance, that altho' Cicero's principal design in drawing it up, was to settle the true measures and offices of a very important moral connection, yet he had an indirect view likewise
to

to the particular principles of the times, and the circumstances in which public affairs stood when he composed it. The present passage evidently glances at the partizans of Julius Cæsar. No statesman ever possessed a greater number of personal friends; as none ever used more address to acquire them, by every artful application to their interests or their passions. But many of those who joined his faction, entered into it from a disinterested affection to the man; and they pleaded the *duties* of friendship in their justification. Those duties appear, indeed, to have been considered by some of the antients, as superior to every other claim of moral obligation: it was a frequent saying of Themistocles, “God forbid
“I should ever sit upon a tribunal
“where my friends were not more
“favoured than strangers.” Agreeably to these sentiments, there are two very curious and spirited letters extant in the collection of Cicero’s familiar epistles,

epistles, the one written by Mutius, and the other by Asinius Pollio, in which they each of them vindicate their adherence to his cause, upon the sole principle of friendship. The English reader may find them in the third vol. of the translation of *Cicero's Letters*, p. 112, and p. 207.

(44) It is by no means clear to what sect of philosophers Cicero alludes; perhaps, as one of the commentators guesses, to the *Cyrenaic*. It is certain at least, that some of their tenets, as collected by Laertius in the life of Aristippus of Cyrene, their founder, renders the conjecture not improbable.

It was the peculiar character of this philosopher, that he had the convenient art of accommodating himself with much good grace and complacency, to the various ranks and vicissitudes

cissitudes of human life^e; as it was the capital doctrine of his cool philosophy, to preserve the mind in a constant state of perfect tranquillity. This selfish composure can no otherwise be possessed, than by banishing from the heart those generous affections, which cannot fail of occasionally producing the disquietude of sympathetic anxieties. Martial has expressed these sentiments in a pretty epigram :

*Si vitare velis acerba quædam,
Et tristes animæ cavere morsus,
Nulli te facias nimis sodalem:
Gaudebis minus et minus dolebis.*

Mart. Epig. V. 43.

*^e Omnis Aristippum decuit color, et status, et res,
Tentantem majora, fere præsentibus æquum.*

Hor. Ep. I. 17.

Would'ft

Would'st thou secure thy guarded breast
From many a tender, anxious, pain?
Let cold indiff'rence, wiser guest!
From friendship's warmth thy heart restrain.
Thy joys will thus be less, 'tis true;
But less will prove thy sorrows too.

(45) The Epicureans, whom Cicero particularly points at in this place, although they universally ascribed the social connections of every kind to a principle of *self-interest* alone; yet some of them acknowledged, that after a long and habitual intercourse had taken place, the friendly affections might still continue, notwithstanding every advantage resulting from the union should totally cease^d. But this was an unwary concession: for interest cannot possibly be the necessary basis of friendship, if that alliance may in any case be equally well supported without it.

^d Torquatus ap. Cic. de Fin. I. 20.

(46) Cicero seems in this passage to have had his eye upon a particular custom that prevailed in Rome, by which the general whose arms had made any new acquisition of territory to the republic, was the declared patron of those people whom he had subdued. *These* were ever afterwards considered as the hereditary clients of his family; to the head of which they constantly had recourse as their standing advocate in all those causes of a national concern which they had occasion to plead before the senate. *Vid. Cic. de Offic. II.*

(47) The unhappy Ovid, in one of his plaintive epistles from Pontus, gives an example in his own person of an unexpected reverse of fortune, in some very pathetic lines:

Ludit in humanis divina potentia rebus,

Et certum præsens vix habet hora fidem.

Litus ad Euxinum, si quis mihi diceret, ibes,

Et

*Et metues arcu ne feriare Getæ;
 I bibe, dixissem, purgantes pectora succos,
 Quicquid et in tota nascitur Anticyra:
 Sam tamen hæc passus !*

The gods delight to sport with human kind,
 And scarce the present moment trust can find.

"The day will come," if once I had been
 told,

"When exil'd Thou, where Euxine's waves
 are roll'd,

"Shalt dread each instant, level'd at thy
 heart,

"The wild Sarmatian's unrelenting dart;"
 Go! frantic prophet, I with scorn had said,
 Go! cool with helebore thy raving head.
 Yet such my fate hath prov'd!

(48) *Les grands se piquent (s'ays an admirable moral painter ^a) d'ouvrir une allée dans un foret; de soutenir des terres par de longues murailles; de dorer de plafonds; de faire venir dix pouces d'eau;*

^a Bruyere.

de meubler une orangerie : mais de rendre un cœur content ; de combler une ame de joie ; de prevenir d'extremes besoins, ou d'y remedier ; leur curiosité ne s'étend point jusques-là.

It should seem indeed, from the misapplication usually made of great wealth, and the remarkable infelicity that hath generally attended the “ lords “ of useles thousands” in all ages, from the *Timon* of Lucian to the *Villars* of Pope ; that a curse is intailed upon immoderate riches. One scarcely knows, at least, how else to account for so astonishing, yet common a phænomenon in the moral world ; that men who are supplied with the greatest abundance of those *external* means which, when properly employed, largely contribute to human felicity, rarely seem to be sensible of the only modes of application which can prevent them from proving a misfortune. One judicious direction of wealth, as the most
productive

productive of heart-felt happiness, is that which Cicero has particularly pointed out in the present passage; and if a philosopher should not be credited, let a poet support his testimony.

Callidus effracta nummos Fur auferet arca;

Prosternet patrios impia flamma Lares.

Debitor usurum pariter sortemque negabit;

Non reddet sterilis semina jacta seges.

Dispensatorem fallax spoliabit amica;

Mersibus extructas obruet unda rates.

Extra fortunam est quicquid donatur amicis:

Quas dederis solas semper habebis opes.

Martial. L. V. ep. 43.

Some felon hand may steal thy gold away;

Or flames destructive on thy mansion prey.

The fraudulent debtor may thy loan deny;

Or blasted fields no more their fruits supply.

The am'rous steward, to adorn his whore,

With spoils may deck her from thy plunder'd store.

U 2

Thy

Thy freighted vessels, ere the port they gain,
O'erwhelm'd by storms, may sink beneath
the main:

But what thou giv'st a friend for friend-
ship's sake,

Is the sole wealth which fortune ne'er can
take.

(49) The Roman poet, who was not more eminent by his genius than amiable in his moral character, affords, perhaps, the most remarkable instance that any where occurs, of the *concessions* which a mind strongly impregnated with sentiments of genuine amity, is capable of making. Virgil's superior talents rendered him qualified to excel in all the nobler species of poetical composition: nevertheless, from the most uncommon delicacy of friendship, he sacrificed to his intimacy with Horace, the unrivalled reputation he might have acquired by indulging his *lyric* vein; as from the same refined motive, he forbore to exercise his *dramatic*

matic powers, that he might not obscure the glory of his friend Varius.

*Aurum et opes et rura, frequens donabit amicus;
Qui velit ingenio cedere, rarus erit.*

Mart. VIII. 18.

(49) Dio, the magnanimous deliverer of the Syracusians from the tyranny of Dionysius, gave a striking proof of a truly great and elevated mind, when being informed that Calippus, the man in whose friendship he had always placed the most implicit confidence, was engaged in a conspiracy against his life, he refused to inquire into the truth of the charge; generously declaring, that “ death was preferable to the pain of perpetually standing upon the defensive against one’s friends^f.”

* The numeral in the text, p. 91, referring to the present Remark, ought to have been 50, but the *erratum* was not discovered till it was too late to be corrected.

^f *Plut. Apotheg.*

U 3

Never-

Nevertheless, there does not seem sufficient reason to agree with Scipio in absolutely, and without restriction, condemning the maxim which he deemed so unworthy the liberal spirit of a true philosopher. For it is but supposing that Bias meant to apply it only to those kinds of loose connections, which in the ordinary language of the world pass under the abused name of *friendship*, to render the precept perfectly consistent with a just and laudable caution. The philosopher's maxim, it is probable, had the same sort of connection for its object, which a late noble author had in view when he observed in a letter to his son, that "the vicissitudes of courts frequently make friends of enemies, and enemies of friends; you must labour therefore to acquire that great and uncommon talent of hating with good breeding, and loving with prudence; to make no quarrel irreconcilable by silly and unnecessary indications of anger; and
" no

“ no friendship dangerous by a wan-
 “ ton, indiscreet, and unreserved confi-
 “ dence.” *Chest. Let. vol. iv. p. 368.*
8vo. ed.

(50) Cicero is by no means singular when he indulges friendship, in certain particular situations, with privileges which do not precisely coincide with the strictest and most severe rules of rigid rectitude: for this was a doctrine universally maintained by all the antient writers on the subject. The present passage is literally copied from a treatise on friendship, composed by Theophrastus, the successor of Aristotle, and one of the most celebrated of his disciples. Aulus Gellius complains, however, that neither Cicero, nor any other of those great masters who were so unanimous in granting this licence, have given sufficient satisfaction to a conscientious inquirer, in what cases and to what extent it might justly be claimed^s. But it

^s *Noct. At. I. 3.*

U 4

appears

appears by those passages which this antient critic has cited from Theophrastus, that he was somewhat more explicit than Cicero, in treating this delicate article; yet upon the whole, his opinion seems to have been, that the allowed cases could only be determined by their own particular nature and circumstances, as they might occasionally happen to arise.

But Cicero, in that admirable treatise on *moral duties*, addressed to his son, and drawn up for his particular use, thought it incumbent upon him to deliver his sentiments upon this nice question, in clearer and more express terms. Accordingly, he there specifies the two particular cases evidently alluded to in the text; and marks out, in a distinct manner, the conduct which he thinks may, or may not be justifiably held when they happen to occur. The instances he mentions are, where a man is called upon to act either as a *judge*,
or

or an *advocate*, in the cause of his friend. "If it should come before him in his *judicial* capacity," says this excellent moralist, "he is no longer to consider himself in the character of a *friend*, but of a magistrate who is solemnly sworn to give sentence according to evidence: and the only *favour* he can justifiably shew, is to appoint the trial, in consequence of the discretionary power with which he is invested by the laws, at the time that may be most convenient to the party who is his friend. But when he appears as an *advocate*, he is under much less restraint. He may support the cause of his friend, provided his crime be not of a very atrocious nature, without any impeachment of his own integrity: and in this he acts agreeably, not only to the general practice and expectation of the world, but to the common dictates of humanity. The *judge*, indeed, must strictly and
" invariably

“ invariably be governed by truth, as
 “ far as he can discover it, in every
 “ question that comes before him: but
 “ the *advocate* may be permitted to give
 “ a plausible colouring to the fact in
 “ charge, and place it in the most ad-
 “ vantageous, though it should not be
 “ its *proper*, light ^b. And this is a doc-
 “ trine,” continues Cicero, “ which I
 “ would not venture to advance, espe-
 “ cially in a treatise of ethics, if I were
 “ not supported in it by the authority
 “ of Panætius, one of the most judi-

^b *Neque contra temp. neque contra iuramentum ac fidem, amici causâ vir bonus faciet, ne si iudex quidem erit de ipso amico: ponit enim personam amici cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae ut veram amici causam esse velit; ut orandæ liti tempus, quod per leges liceat, accommodet. Cum vero jurato sententia dicenda sit, meminerit se Deum adhibere testem.—Si omnia facienda sint quæ amici velint, non amicitiae tales, sed conjurationes putandæ sunt.—Cum igitur id quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo quod honestum est, comparatur: jaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas.—Religio ac fides anteponatur amicitiae. De Off.*

III. 10.

“ cious

“ cious and respectable writers among
 “ the Stoic philosophers ⁱ.”

Cicero composed his *Offices* after the publication of this Essay on Friendship; the passages therefore here produced from the former, cannot but be considered as throwing the strongest and most unequivocal light upon his meaning in the present text. It must be acknowledged at the same time, that unassisted by this *comparative* view of his sentiments, they are so loosely expressed in the sentence under consideration, as to justify a suspicion that he thought the privileges of friendship, in certain circumstances, superior to moral obligations of a much higher and more

ⁱ *Nec tamen—habendum est religioni, nocentem aliquando, modo ne nefarium impiumque, defendere: vult hoc multitudo, patitur consuetudo, fert etiam humanitas. Judicis est semper in causis verum sequi: patroni non nunquam verisimilia, etiam si minus sit verum defendere. —Quod scribere, præsertim cum de philosophia scriberem, non auderem, nisi idem placeret gravissimo stoicorum Panætio. De Off. II. 14.*

sacred

sacred nature. The author, at least, of these Remarks confesses, it formerly led him to entertain that suspicion, and to express it in a collection of letters published many years ago under a fictitious name^{*}: but having since had occasion to inquire into Cicero's philosophical tenets with more attention and accuracy, he has great satisfaction in the present opportunity of thus publicly *retracting* an opinion too hastily formed, and vindicating, against his own censure, the principles of this noble moralist.

(51) Among the very rare instances of this nature which occur in the political history of mankind, there is not one, perhaps, more worthy of notice than that which was exemplified in the persons of the two greatest statesmen and captains that Greece ever produced; Epaminondas and Pelopidas.

^{*} See Fitzosborne's Let. p. 131.

There

There is nothing, indeed, more to be admired in the shining characters of these illustrious supports and ornaments of the Theban commonwealth, than that perfect union and constant friendship which subsisted between them, during their joint direction of public affairs, both in peace and war. If we observe, says Plutarch, what happened in the same situation between Aristides and Themistocles, Cimon and Pericles, Nicias and Alcibiades; we shall find their respective administrations full of tumult, contentions and disputes. As Epaminondas and Pelopidas possessed the first posts in the state, all the most important interests of the republic passed through their hands, and was trusted to their management. In such delicate conjunctures, what a variety of incidents must naturally arise, to give occasion to mutual jealousy and dissension! But no diversity of opinion, no opposition of interest, nor the slightest emotion

of

of envy ever interrupted, or impaired, that singular harmony in which they lived and acted together. The reason, continues Plutarch, is evident; their friendship was founded upon an unalterable principle of virtue, which solely and constantly directed their views, not to what would most contribute to the advancement of their own particular interest and power, but what would best promote the general welfare and glory of their country. *Plut. in vit. Pelopid.*

(52) “*Ma disgrace*” (says an ingenious writer, not less distinguished by his talents than by the high rank from which he fell^a) *ma disgrace me fit perdre le meilleur de mes amis, ou pour mieux dire, elle me servit a le connoistre, et m'apprit que l'adversité étoit bien plus la véritable borne de l'amitié, que les autels.*

The fertility of Ovid's genius furnished him, in his misfortunes, with a

a. Buffi. Rabutin.

variety

variety of striking images to illustrate the same mortifying truth; as there is scarcely a poem which he wrote in his exile, that will not afford an affecting proof of Cicero's observation. Nothing can be more happily imagined, nor more pathetically expressed, than the thought in the following lines:

*Ut—comes radios per solis euntibus umbra,
Cum latet hic pressus nubibus, illa fugit;
Mobile sic sequitur Fortunæ lumina vulgus,
Quæ simul inductâ nocte teguntur, abit.*

Trist. I.

As when the Sun breaks forth with splendor
gay,

The shadow follows his all-gilding ray;
But soon as clouds o'ercast his happier light,
Follower no more! she takes her faithless flight:
The world's vain friends, ungen'rous, thus
recede,

When Fortune's gloom to brighter days suc-
ceed.

It

It is impossible to read his tender but animated remonstrance in the subsequent lines, without feeling the most sensible indignation at the base desertion which occasioned them :

*Dum mea puppis erat validâ fundata carinâ,
 Qui mecum velles currere primus eras :
 Nunc quia contraxit vultum Fortuna, recedis ;
 Auxilio postquam scis opus esse tuo.
 Dissimulas etiam, nec me vis nosse videri :
 Quisque sit, audito nomine, Naso rogas ?
 Ille ego sum, quamquam non vis audire, vetustâ
 Pene puer puero junctus amicitia.
 Ille ego, qui primus tua seria nosse solebam ;
 Qui tibi jucundis primus addeſſe jocis.
 Ille ego conviكتور denſoque domesticus usu :
 Ille ego judiciis unica Muſa tuis.
 Idem ego ſum, qui an vivam, perſide, neſcis :
 Cura tibi de quo querere nulla fuit !*

Ex. Pont. IV. 3.

Ere the rude winds did yet my bark affail,
 The firſt wert Thou to ſhare the proſp'rous
 gale.

Now

Now, sad reverse! when storms enrage the
main,

Thy aiding arm I seek, but seek in vain:
Each antient tie that bound thee mine, dis-
claim'd,

Who Ovid is? thou ask'st, whene'er I'm
nam'd.

He *is*, tho' glad to blot him from thy mind,
Whom early friendship long with thee had
join'd;

The chosen partner of thy varied day,
As sway'd thy heart the serious or the gay;
At thy convivial meals domestic guest,
Whose converse pleas'd and numbers charm'd
thy breast.

Yes, this is *He* whom thou disdain'st to
know,

False to thy vow, and callous to his woe!
No more the object of thy faithless care,
Thou ask'st not if he breathes the vital air!

(53) It was the saying of a certain
philosopher cited by Seneca, " that
" the satisfaction in conciliating a
Vol. II. X " friendship,

“friendship, is the greatest pleasure
 “of the connection; as an ingenious
 “artist is more delighted in executing
 “his performance, than when it is
 “completed.” ¹ False as this maxim
 is, Seneca’s philosopher seems, how-
 ever, to have better understood the
 nature of amity, than Cicero’s que-
 rist; as the sentiment of the former
 at least implies, that, abstracted from
 all consequences, there is a most
 sensible complacency annexed to the
 simple exercise of friendly offices. But
 both were equally mistaken in suppos-
 ing, that, to a mind rightly formed, the
 satisfaction of a well-contracted alli-
 ance of this kind, could possibly be-
 come languid by possession. The mo-
 ral affections can never be satiated by
 the enjoyment of their proper objects:

¹ *Attalus Philosophus dicere solebat, Jucundius esse
 amicum facere, quam habere; quomodo artificis jucun-
 dius est pingere, quam pinxisse. Senec. Ep. 9.*

in every other passion indeed of the human heart,

*The best of things beyond their measure cloy;
Sleep's balmy blessing, love's endearing joy,
The feast, the dance, whate'er mankind desire,
E'en the sweet charms of sacred numbers tire^m.*

(54) The commentators suppose, that Cicero's memory failed him in this place; as the story which he applies to Neoptolemus has always been related of Achilles; whose mother sent him to the court of Lycomedes, in order to prevent his going to the Trojan war. *Hygin. Fabul. 96.*

(55) Q. Pompeius, the first of his family who was raised to any considerable post in the republic, was ancestor to Pompey the Great. He was chosen Consul in the Y. of R. 612: and the

^m Iliad, Pope's trans.

manner by which he obtained that office, most deservedly cost him, not only the friendship of Scipio and Lælius, but the esteem of every worthy man in Rome. For Lælius intending to appear as a candidate for that dignity at the ensuing election; Scipio applied to Pompeius to know if he had any thoughts of standing; if not, he requested him to exert his interest in favour of his friend. Pompeius promised to comply; but instead of keeping his word, he solicited, and obtained, the consulship for himself. *Plut. Apotheg.*

The dissension between Scipio and Metellus was of a very different nature, and occasioned solely by a disagreement in opinion with respect to public measures. A variance of this sort between men who are equally actuated by the same honest intentions, and patriotic spirit, may produce a coolness, but never can rise

8

into

into enmity. Accordingly it appears that Metellus entertained, all his life, the highest respect and veneration for the talents and virtues of Scipio. *Val. Max. L. IV. c. 1. N° 12.*

(56) Martial, soliciting one of his contemporaries to be admitted into the number of his friends, concludes an epigram which he addresses to him for that purpose, with a sentiment perfectly agreeable to Cicero's advice :

Ad FUSCUM.

Si quid, Fusce, vacas adhuc amari,

(Nam sunt hinc tibi, sunt et hinc amici)

Unum, si superest, locum rogamus.

Nec me, quod tibi sum novus, recuses :

Omnes hoc veteres tui fuerunt.

Tu tantum inspice qui novus paratur,

An fieri possit vetus sodalis.

Epig. I. 55.

TO FUSCUS.

If yet one corner in thy breast
 Remains, good Fuscus, unpossess'd,
 (For many a friend, I know, is thine)
 Give me to boast that corner mine.
 Nor thou the honour'd place I sue
 Refuse to an acquaintance new:
 The oldest friend of all thy store
 Was once, 'tis certain, nothing more.
 It matters not how late the choice,
 If but approv'd by reason's voice.
 Then let thy sole inquiry be,
 If thou can'st find such *worth* in me,
 That constant, as the years are roll'd,
 Matures *new* friendship into *old*.

(57) This was Aristotle's definition of friendship*. There is a fine passage cited by Mr. Pope in his notes on the Iliad, from the lives of those heroes who were engaged in the Trojan war, composed by Philostratus, which turns upon the same sentiment. Ajax is introduced by that Greek

* Εἰς ὃ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός. Ethic. VIII. 1.

writer,

writer, inquiring of Achilles, "Which
 " of all the wounds he had received
 " in battle, was most painful to him?
 " Achilles answers, That which he
 " received from Hector. But Hec-
 " tor, says Ajax, never gave you
 " a wound. Yes, replies Achilles, a
 " mortal one, when he slew my friend
 " Patroclus."

(58) The advice which Plutarch gives to those, who expect greater perfection in others than they are able, or disposed, to acquire themselves; is full of that candid and humane spirit, which so eminently marks the writings of this amiable author. He introduces it by observing, that when Anaxagoras was condoled on the death of his son; the philosopher calmly replied, *I perfectly well knew he was mortal.* In like manner, says this admirable moralist, every man should say within himself (as the particular occasion may happen to require)

X 4.

" I knew

“ I knew that my slave was ~~no~~ philo-
 “ sopher; that my friend was liable to
 “ passion; that my wife was but a
 “ woman.” “ If the man,” continues
 Plutarch, “ who is inclined to ani-
 “ madvert with too much severity on
 “ the failings of others, would turn his
 “ eyes inward, and honestly ask his
 “ heart, *Was I never guilty of the same?*
 “ the true answer to that question
 “ could not fail to render him less ob-
 “ servant of those little pardonable de-
 “ fects in the characters of his connec-
 “ tions, at which he is apt to take such
 “ quick offence.” *Plut. de cobibend. Ira-*
cund.

(59) Cicero seems to have had in his
 thoughts the happy effects of those
martial friendships which were custo-
 mary among the young men in antient
 Greece, and productive of the most
 glorious exploits:

His

His amor unus erat, pariterque in bella ruebant.

VIRG.

Of this kind was the connection between Nisus and Uryalus, whose generous union, bold adventure, and fatal catastrophe are so beautifully and affectingly related in the ninth Book of Virgil's *Æneid*. Pelopidas, the famous Theban general, composed a battalion consisting of three hundred of these select friends: and it was principally owing to the courage and magnanimity of this chosen band of *Lovers*, as they were called, that he obtained one of the most signal victories over the Lacedæmonians that is recorded in their history*. Nor is it only in ancient Greece that instances of this kind of *heroic* amity occur: they prevailed among the barbarous Scythians, as appears from Lucian's dialogue intitled *Toxaris*; and are still

* *Plut. in vit. Pelopid.*

frequent

frequent (as modern travellers of good credit relate) among the savage nations of North America.

(60) The profusion with which Timon dissipated a very considerable fortune; the infidelity of those pretended friends upon whom he had indiscriminately squandered it away; and the utter detestation which, on account of their base ingratitude, he conceived against the whole human race; are circumstances in the life of this famous misanthropist, which, having been wrought into one of Shakespear's celebrated tragedies, are perfectly well known to every English reader: and it is scarcely any thing more than ancient history hath transmitted concerning him. All that can be farther collected relating to this extraordinary man, is, that he was a contemporary of Alcibiades, who flourished about four centuries before the Christian æra; that he broke his leg by falling from a tree; and

and that the physicians (for in those days the two branches of the healing art were united in the same profession) unanimously refusing to come to his assistance, the fracture turned to a mortification, and put an end to his worthless life. *Vid. Not. Hemster. ad Lucian. Colloq. Selecta, p. 86.*

(61) Terence, as has been already remarked in a preceding note, was in the number of that select society of men of genius and literature, in whose conversation Scipio and Lælius usually passed their private hours. This gave occasion to the enemies of the poet to propagate a report, that the merit of his plays was owing to the assistance he received from these his two noble friends. Terence alludes to this circumstance in his prologue to the *Adelphi*; but in so delicate and artful a manner, that, without denying or admitting the charge, he pays a refined compliment to his supposed

posed illustrious coadjutors, and at the same time turns the reproach into an article of peculiar honour to himself:

*Nam quod isti dicunt malevoli, homines nobiles
Hunc adjuvare assidueque una scribere;
Quod isti maledictum vebemens existimant,
Eam laudem hic ducit maximam: cum illis placet
Qui vobis universis et populo placeant.*

(62) The *parasitic* character appears to have been one of the principal objects, against which the antient satirists pointed their strongest invective. The fashion of encouraging foreigners, had introduced an inundation of indigent strangers of various nations into Rome; but it was among the Greek dependants and domestics, that the most artful and insinuating of this sort of men were principally found. Juvenal, in one of his most animated satires, has directed the keenest poignancy of his wit and indignation against this sup-
ple

ple and insidious tribe. That admirable poem has been so happily, and with such a congenial spirit, imitated and *applied* in our own language; that a few extracts from it will prove the best comment on Cicero's text:

*London, the needy villain's general home,
The common-sewer of Paris and of Rome,
With eager thirst, by folly or by fate,
Sucks in the dregs of each corrupted state.
Forgive my transport on a theme like this;
I cannot bear a French metropolis. —
All sciences a fasting Monsiear knows;
And bid him go to Hell, to Hell he goes. —
Studious to please, and ready to submit,
The supple Gaul was born a parasite:
Still to his interest true, where'er he goes,
Wit, bravery, worth, his lavish tongue bestows;
Practis'd his master's notions to embrace,
Repeat his maxims, and reflect his face;
To shake with laughter ere the jest he bear,
To pour at will the counterfeited tear;
And*

*And as his patron hints the cold or heat,
To shake in dog-days, in December sweat.
How, when competitors like these contend,
Can surly Virtue hope to find a friend?*

Doddsley's Misc. Vol. I. p. 101.

(63) By an antient ordinance of the republic, no person could be chosen twice into the same magistracy, unless an interval of at least ten years had passed since his last election. But Caius Papirius Carbo, when he was tribune*, endeavoured to procure a repeal of this law, and to impower the people to choose the same person immediately on the expiration of his office. *Langius in loc.*

(64) It was customary, when the orators harangued the people upon any public occasion in the forum, to address them with their faces turned

* In the Y. of R. 622.

towards

towards the contiguous temple in which the senate usually met; as a mark of respect to that supreme council of the state. But Licinius, to shew his contempt of the order, spoke with his back turned upon that assembly. The speech which Lælius delivered upon this occasion, seems to have been a masterpiece of that mild and insinuating species of eloquence which was the distinguishing characteristic of his oratory; as Cicero, taking notice of it in another part of his writings, emphatically styles it *aureolam oratiunculam*.

(65) Seneca, in one of his letters addressed to Lucilius, has a sentiment upon this subject worthy of those pure morals, which so eminently distinguished that philosophy he professed to follow. After recommending to his friend an unlimited confidence, so essential to the genuine spirit of true amity; he adds the following admirable reflection: *Tu quidem ita vive, ut nihil tibi*

com-

committas, nisi quod committere etiam inimico possis: sed quia interveniunt quædam quæ consuetudo fecit arcana; cum amico omnes curas, omnes cogitationes tuas, misce.
Senec. Ep. 3.

(66) Concerning Paulus, see before note 9. p. 174: with respect to Gallus and Cato, see Rem. on Cato, p. 233, note 56. and p. 154, note 6. The person here mentioned by the single appellation of *Nasica*, was probably Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica, surnamed *Optimus*, on account of his eminent virtues. He was consul in the Y. of R. five hundred and sixty-two. The present conference is supposed to have passed immediately after the death of Scipio, which happened in the six hundred and thirtieth Y. of R. and the fifty-sixth of his own age. Now Lælius speaks of himself in this treatise, not only as senior to his deceased friend, but as being arrived at a time of life when, according to the common course of nature, he must soon follow

low him. Admitting therefore, what seems to be a reasonable conjecture, that he was at this time about seventy, and that Nafica was elected consul when he was forty-two, (which was as soon as he could be legally chosen) the latter must have been advanced in life when the former was about twenty: and this perfectly coincides with the early date which Lælius here gives to the commencement of their friendship.

Gracchus, the last person mentioned in this passage, was memorable not only for his own illustrious virtues, but as being father of the two Gracchi; those celebrated patriotic martyrs, whose political conduct, and unhappy catastrophe, have been the subject of a former remark.

The several venerable personages whom Lælius names as in the number of his *early* friends, were each of them among the principal orna-

ments of his own times *. The advantage of entering into the world under the steerage of such wise and approved pilots, cannot be more forcibly illustrated than by the experimental testimony of one of the most respectable characters which our country has produced: Lord Clarendon was often heard to say, “ that next the immediate
 “ blessing and providence of God Almighty, which had preserved him
 “ throughout the whole course of this
 “ life from many dangers and disadvantages, in which many other young
 “ men were lost; he owed all the
 “ little he knew, and the little good
 “ that was in him, to the friendships
 “ and conversation he still had been
 “ used to, of the most excellent men
 “ in their several kinds that lived in
 “ that age, by whose learning, and information, and instruction, he formed
 “ his studies, and mended his understanding, and by whose example he

* See Rem. on Cato, p. 167. No. 21.

“formed his manners, subdued that
“pride, and suppressed that heat and
“passion he was naturally inclined to
“be transported with. And always
“charged his children to follow his ex-
“ample in that point; protesting that
“in the whole course of his life he
“never knew one man, of what condi-
“tion soever, arrive to any degree of
“reputation in the world, who made
“choice or delighted in the company
“or conversation of those who in their
“qualities and their parts were not
“much superior to himself.” *Clarendon's*
Memoirs of his own life, Vol. I. p. 29.

(67) Among the many *private* virtues which added lustre to the public characters of Scipio and Lælius, their singular *temperance* was particularly conspicuous, in an age when the riches that had flowed into Rome in consequence of her Asiatic conquests, had begun to spread wide the contagion of sensual gratifications. Every nobler emulation was at this time yielding to the contemptible vanity of excelling

in the most expensive indulgencies of the table, Lucilius, a contemporary poet, and one of the first satyrists that appeared among the Romans, exposed with great spirit and manly indignation this mean and inverted ambition. The following lines, in which he celebrates Lælius for his abstemious and exemplary course of diet, have been preserved among the very few fragments remaining of that poet's works:

O lapathe, ut jactare necesse est, Cognitu' cui sis!

In quo Læliu' clamores sophos ille solebat

Edere, compellans gumias ex ordine nostros.

Leliu' præclaré et recté sophos, illudque vere:

" O Publi, ô gorges, Galloni: es homo miser,"
inquit,

" Cænasti in vita nunquam bene, cum omnia in
" ista

" Consumis squilla, atque acipensere cum de-
" cumano."

Ap. Cic de Fin. II. 3.

" Delicious sorrel! were thy merits known,

" E'en pamper'd sensu'lists thy worth would
" own

" 'Twas

'Twas thus *sage* Lælius (for his virtues claim
The well earn'd title of that honour'd name)
Oft, with indignant warmth, aloud would cry,
As some swoln glutton struck his wond'ring
eye.

"And thou, Gallonius, man of mighty maw!
"A right good feast," he said, "did'st ne'er
enjoy,

"Tho' thy vain wealth's consum'd to load
the dish

"With the proud weight of each gigantic
"fish!"

Sea-fish of enormous magnitude, was one of the most extravagant articles of luxurious indulgencies among the Romans. Besides the original cost, which was very considerable, the price of the several ingredients with which their sauce was composed, together with that of a cook properly skilled in the art of dressing them; was raised to a sum beyond what even modern profusion could easily conceive. These articles alone were purchased at an expence equal to

that of the most magnificent triumphs; and no qualification was held in such high repute, as being an adept in the most ruinous modes of fashionable cookery^p. As these leviathans of luxurious tables, were the produce alone of the ocean; large store ponds of sea-water were constructed at great cost, in order to guard against disappointments when the season or circumstances of the year might render it impossible to procure them from their native element. Lucullus was at the expence of perforating a mountain contiguous to his villa near Naples, in order to introduce a constant supply of sea-water into a reservoir of this kind^q. Martial describing the elegant villa of Appollinaris on the sea-coast; among other voluptuous accommodations with which it was furnished, celebrates with par-

^p *Nunc coci triumphorum pretiis parantur et coquorum pisces; nullusque prope jam mortalis æstimatur pluris, quam qui peritissimè censum domini mergit.* Plin. Hist. Nat. IX. 17.

^q Plin. H. N. IX. 54.

ticular encomium his *piscinæ* or store
ponds :

*Si quando Nereus sentit Æoli regnum,
Ridet procellas tuta de suo mensa.
Piscina, rhombum pascit et lupos vernas ;
Natat ad magistrum delicata muræna,
Nomenclator mugilem citat notum,
Et adesse jussi prodeunt senes nulli.*

Ep. X. 30.

In vain rude Æolus deforms
Old ocean's brow with rising storms :
Thy splendid board, secure, defies
The angry main and threat'ning skies.
Within thy ample basin see
Each nobler fish that swims the sea.
The stately sturgeon, ocean's pride,
The mugil, fond in sands to hide *,
The turbot, and the mullet old,
Are pastur'd in thy liquid fold :
Train'd to the summons, lo ! they all
Rise at the feeders well-known call.

* *Mugilum natura ridetur in metu, capite abscondito
totos se abscondari credentium.* Plin. H. N. IX. 16.

Among the several fish specified by the poet, the *mullet* (supposed to be what in England and France is called the *surmoulet*) appears to have been in highest estimation and greatest scarcity. Six thousand *nummi*, (somewhat more than forty-three pounds sterling) is mentioned by Juvenal to have been paid for *one* only of these rarities; and Macrobius speaks of another, that was purchased at a still more enormous price. The cost of this single article renders it less surprizing that the fish which Lucullus had collected in his reservoirs, were sold after his death, for no less a sum than thirty-two thousand two hundred and ninety-one pounds of our money; and both together afford a striking specimen of the wealth and extravagance of some individuals, in the luxurious ages of degenerate Rome. *Plin. H. N. IX. 54. Arbutnot's tables of ant. coins, &c. p. 132.*

(68) The antient moralists were not agreed in what class of social merit to rank

rank friendship; some placing it high in the scale of moral virtues, and others considering it as having no claim, in a strict and proper sense, to be admitted into their number^a. The notions of two celebrated moderns in estimating the value of this connection, are at a still greater distance from each other. The noble author of the *characteristics*, animated with a warm sensibility of the moral charms of this generous affection; and not being able, it seems, to discover that it is either *enjoined*, or *encouraged*, by the Christian institution, imputes this pretended omission as a capital defect in the code of evangelical

^a Aristotle speaks doubtfully: *ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀρετὴ τις, ἢ μετὰ ἀρετῆς*. *Ethic. ad Nichom.* VIII. 1. And so his paraphrast Aristonicus: *ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ φιλία ἀρετὴ τις, ἢ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἀρετῇ*. p. 363. *ed. Cantab.* Cicero in the present passage evidently considers it as an affection distinct from virtue. Seneca, on the contrary, recommends it as a virtue of considerable magnitude: *Sapiens habere amicum vult; si ob nihil aliud, ut exerceat amicitiam, ne tam magna virtus jaceat*. Ep. 9.

ethics ^b. On the contrary, a late ingenious advocate for that sacred cause, which it was the unhappy direction of this accomplished nobleman's learning and talents to depreciate, far from discerning any thing laudable or meritorious in private friendship, has attempted to prove, that "it is totally incompatible with the *genius* and *spirit* of the gospel." Thus the very same *supposed* circumstance, which appears to have been no inconsiderable obstruction to the noble philosopher's faith, is assigned by the elegant defender of Christianity, as one of those *internal* marks which authenticate its divine origin.

--- *Mibi convivæ prope dissentire videntur
Poscentes vario multum diversa palato:*

Quid dem, quid non dem? Renuis tu, quod Jubaet alter.

HOR.

^b *Character*. vol. I. p. 93, et seqq.

^c *A View of the Internal Evidence of the Christian religion*, p. 51, 52.

Widely,

Widely, however, as these admired writers differ in their moral taste; there is one point in which they may be perfectly united: for the same mode of reasoning which overturns either of their respective positions, will equally confute both.

That private friendship does not expressly enter into the precepts of Christianity, is unquestionably true: for, the nature of the connection *necessarily* excludes it from being the subject of a religious, or moral, obligation. The distinctive character of this relation, consists in a *spontaneous* sentiment of the heart, unconstrained and uninfluenced by *compulsive*, or *external*, motives of every kind and degree. To attempt therefore to produce a voluntary affection, by the authority of a positive *command*, would be to publish a law evidently destructive of its own end: for, its sanctions could no sooner operate as *primary*, or *determining*, inducements,

ments, than the sentiment they were designed to create would utterly be prevented from existing.

But a *general* ordinance for this purpose, would not merely be absurd; it would be unjust: because it would require *universally*, what is not in every man's power to perform. A great variety of circumstances must concur, to form and cement this union: and these are of a nature so exceedingly contingent and fortuitous, that they are frequently never realized in the course of the longest life. Indeed, they so rarely meet together, that what a sagacious observer of mankind remarks concerning love, holds equally true in respect to *friendship*; *il est du veritable comme de l'apparition des esprits; tout le monde en parle, mais peu de gens ont vû*^d.

If what the noble author requires from revelation is, in the first instance, inconsistent with the essential nature of

^d *Rochefoucault.*

its object; it implies, in the next, an assertion no less contrary to fact: for altho' friendship could not, either in reason or justice, have been *commanded* by the precepts, it is evidently encouraged by the spirit, of Christianity. Universal benevolence or good-will to mankind, is the vital principle that animates and pervades the whole system of evangelical morality: and it is by a proper cultivation of this enlarged and comprehensive virtue, that the heart is best prepared and qualified to enter into the engagements, and discharge the offices, of private friendship. This the noble moralist himself acknowledges in a subsequent treatise: for when the religion of his country was not in his immediate contemplation, and his inveterate prejudices had not their usual object to call them forth; his lordship asks, "Can any friendship be so heroic, as that towards man-kind? Do you think—that particular friendship can *well subsist* without such

“such an *enlarged* affection and sense
 “of obligation to society ‘?’” This kind
 of reasoning, however, when applied
 to revelation, will not satisfy his de-
 mands; he contends, that “friendship
 “is no *essential* part of a Christian’s
 “charity *f.*” But if there were any
 force in this objection, it would over-
 shoot its intended aim, and wound
natural religion no less than *revealed*;
 as friendship, for the reasons above
 assigned, can no more be the *essential*
 part of a theist’s *benevolence*, than it is
 of a Christian’s

In confirmation of his lordship’s opi-
 nion, he cites the authority of Bishop
 Taylor, who asserts that “the word
 “*friendship*, in the sense we commonly
 “mean by it, is not so much as *named*
 “in the New Testament; and our holy
 “religion takes no *notice* of it.” But

* The Moralists. Charact. vol. II. p. 239.

f Id. vol. I. p. 99.

it may be questioned, perhaps, whether this very respectable ornament of our church, would have been able to justify his assertion in its full latitude.

Does not Christ himself make the most honourable mention of friendship, in the *precise* and *proper* sense of that word? For, discoursing with his disciples upon the subject of his approaching crucifixion, he illustrates the magnitude of that benevolence which induced him to submit to the painful and ignominious death he was going to suffer, by a comparison drawn from the highest possible instance of human amity: "Greater love than this," He observes, "hath no man, than that he layeth down his life for his friends." To which he immediately adds, "ye are my *friends* if ye do whatsoever I command you : " that is, ye shall stand to me in the *same* relation as that term *imports*. For, the

: John XV. 13. 14.

meaning

meaning of the word *friends*, in the latter of these passages, must bear the same sense it evidently does in the former; otherwise the idea would be suddenly changed, without the least mark to distinguish its difference.

But the texts just cited, are not more unfavourable to the learned Prelate's assertion, than to that of the ingenious author of the "*Internal Evidence*." For it cannot, surely, be supposed with the least degree of reason, that our Saviour, either by way of analogy, or comparison, would have chosen to represent himself under a character, the genuine principles of which "are to tally *incompatible* with the genius and "spirit" of those moral laws, which it was one great object of his divine commission to confirm, or promulgate.

Nor is it solely by necessary implication, or circumstantial inferences, that the Christian revelation recognizes friendship:

friendship: it strongly and expressly recommends and encourages this amiable alliance; if exhibiting it in the noblest and most animating exemplar, may be allowed to have an immediate and direct influence over the heart of man. Two very remarkable instances for this purpose occur, in the history of our Saviour's life: and they have repeatedly been pointed out. Nevertheless, as the principal writers who have animadverted upon the respective tenets under examination, have contented themselves with slightly alluding to them; it may not, perhaps, be altogether unnecessary to state them in all their striking circumstances; especially as they seem to have been overlooked, or not duly considered, by the truly right reverend author, on the credit of whose opinion Lord Shaftesbury has endeavoured to support his own.

The evangelist, in relating the miracle which Christ performed at Bethany,

by restoring a person to life who had lain some days in the grave^b; introduces his narrative by emphatically observing, that “Jesus *loved* Lazarus;” intimating, it should seem, that the sentiments which Christ entertained of Lazarus, were a distinct and peculiar species of that general benevolence with which he was actuated towards all mankind. Agreeably to this explication of the sacred historian’s meaning, when the sisters of Lazarus sent to acquaint Jesus with the state in which their brother lay; they did not even mention his name; but pointing him out by a more honourable and equally notorious designation, the terms of their message were, “behold! He whom thou *lovest* is sick!” Accordingly, when he informs his disciples of the notice he had thus received, his expression is, “our *friend* Lazarus sleepeth.” Now that Christ did not upon

^b John XI. 1. et seqq.

this occasion use the word *friend* in its loose undistinguishing acceptation, but in a restrained and strictly appropriated sense; is not only manifest from this plain account of the fact itself, but appears farther evident from the sequel. For, as he was advancing to the grave, accompanied with the relations of the deceased, he discovered the same emotions of grief as swelled the bosoms of those with whom Lazarus had been most intimately connected; and sympathizing with their common sorrow, he melted into *tears*. This circumstance was too remarkable to escape particular observation: and it drew from the spectators, what one should think it must necessarily draw from every reader, this natural and obvious reflection, “Behold! how he *loved* him!”

But in the concluding catastrophe of our Saviour’s life, he gave a still more decisive proof that sentiments of the

strongest *personal* attachment and friendship, were not unworthy of being admitted into his sacred bosom: They were too deeply, indeed, impressed, to be extinguished even by the most excruciating torments. In those dreadful moments, observing among the afflicted witnesses of his painful and ignominious sufferings, That faithful follower who is described by the historian as "the disciple whom he *loved*;" he distinguished him by the most convincing instance of superior confidence, esteem and affection that ever was exhibited to the admiration of mankind. For, under circumstances of the most agonizing torments, when it might be thought impossible for human nature to retain any other sensibility but that of its own inexpressible sufferings; he recommended to the care and protection of this his tried and approved *friend*, in terms of peculiar regard and endearment, the most tender and sacred object of his private affections.

But

But no language can represent this pathetic and affecting scene, with a force and energy equal to the sublime simplicity of the evangelist's own narrative: "Now there stood by the cross
 " of Jesus, his mother, and his mother's sister,—and Mary Magdalene.
 " When Jesus saw his mother, and the
 " disciple (*standing*) by, whom he loved; He saith to his mother,—Behold thy son! then he saith to the
 " disciple, Behold thy mother! And
 " from that hour That disciple took
 " her to his own home."

It may safely be asserted, that among all those memorable examples of friendship, which have been celebrated with the highest encomiums by the antients; there cannot be produced a single instance, in which the most distinguishing features of exalted amity are so strongly displayed, as in the forego-

i John XIX. 25, 26.

ing relation. The only one, perhaps, that bears even a faint similitude to it, is that famous transaction, recorded by a Greek author, which passed between Eudamidas and Aretheus*. But when the very different circumstances attending the respective examples are duly considered; it must be acknowledged, that the former rises as much above the latter in the proof it

* The story is related by Lucian in his dialogue intituled *Toxaris*. Eudamidas being on his death-bed, made his will, by which he bequeathed his aged mother to the care and protection of Aretheus; and his daughter, to Charixenus, to be disposed of in marriage according to his discretion; injoining him at the same time, to give her as ample a portion as his circumstances would admit. He added, that in case either of the legatees should happen to die, he substituted the survivor in his stead. Charixenus died very soon after the testator: in consequence of which, Aretheus took each of these singularly confidential legacies to himself; and celebrating the marriage of his only daughter and that of his friend, on the same day, he divided his fortune equally between them.

exhibits

exhibits of sublime friendship, as it does in the dignity of the characters concerned.

Upon the whole then it appears, that the divine Founder of the Christian religion, as well by his own example as by the spirit of his moral doctrine, has not only encouraged but *consecrated* FRIENDSHIP.

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